Nature of totalitarian diplomacy: Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini as test cases by Frazer, Gary Lee
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1986 
Nature of totalitarian diplomacy: Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini 
as test cases 
Gary Lee Frazer 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Frazer, Gary Lee, "Nature of totalitarian diplomacy: Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini as test cases" (1986). 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5233. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5233 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
Th is  is  an u n p u b lis h ed  m a n u sc r ipt  in  w hich  c o p y r ig h t  sub ­
s is t s . Any further r e p r in t in g  of it s  contents must be approved
BY THE AUTHOR.
Ma n s f ie l d  L ib r a r y  
Un iv e r s it y  of Montana 
Date : _____ 1
THE NATURE OF TOTALITARIAN DIPLOMACY:
ADOLF HITLER AND BENITO MUSSOLINI AS TEST CASES
by
Gary Lee Frazer
B.A., University of Montana, 1980 
B.A., University of Montana, 1981
Presented in p artia l fu lfillm e n t of the 
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
1986
Approved by:
Chairman, Board of Examiners
ff£an, Gradua
UMI Number: EP40697
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS  
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI
Dissertation WBIiWrig
UMI EP40697
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
iiest*
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1346
ABSTRACT
Frazer, Gary Lee, M.A., Spring, 1986 History
The Nature of T o ta litarian  Diplomacy: Adolf H it le r  and Benito
Mussolini as Test Cases
Director: Paul G. Lauren, Ph.D.
The objective of th is thesis is to gain a better understanding of 
the v ita l problem of to ta lita r ia n  diplomacy in relation to twentieth- 
century diplomatic history by examining the manner in which Adolf 
H itle r  and Benito Mussolini practiced th e ir  diplomacy. By examining 
government documents, diplomatic papers, d iaries , memoirs and the 
classic works of English language scholarship on the subject of Fascist 
and Nazi diplomacy, I plan to demonstrate the differences and the 
problems which to ta lita r ia n  diplomacy presented to the trad itional 
methods of diplomacy as practiced by the Western democracies.
The differences between H it le r 's  and Mussolini's diplomacy and the 
trad itional diplomacy of the Western powers can be summarized as follows 
(1) both H it le r  and Mussolini possessed an extraordinary amount of 
independence in the conduct of th e ir  foreign a ffa irs  as compared to 
the Western leaders, (2) both d ic ta to r's  regimes suffered from a lack 
of professionals in th e ir  diplomatic corps, (3) neither d ictator had 
to consider the impact of public opinion upon his diplomacy to the 
same degree as the Western diplomats, (4) both H itle r  and Mussolini 
held d iffe ren t views from the Western diplomats as to the purpose of 
diplomacy in foreign a ffa irs , and (5) neither d ictator shared the 
same ideological beliefs as the Western leaders.
Not only were the Western diplomats forced to adapt to the changes 
in diplomatic method introduced by such modern pressures as new 
elaborate departments, expanded s ta ffs , enlarged budgets, new personnel 
policies, and sophisticated inventions, but they were also forced to 
confront a d irect challenge to the very purpose of diplomacy which 
formed the universal basis for a ll  international negotiations. Both 
H itle r  and Mussolini accepted warfare as a necessary ingredient of 
national policy, and they were both confident that they could achieve 
th e ir goals by the proper exercise of m ilita ry  force.
The fa ilu re  of the Western diplomats to recognize H itle r 's  and 
Mussolini's contempt for the values of trad itio na l diplomatic practice, 
and to counter the challenges which both H it le r  and Mussolini presented 
to trad itional diplomacy by adopting suitable coutnermeasures, c learly  
demonstrated the in a b ility  of trad itional diplomacy to cope with the 
unique problems which to ta lita r ia n  diplomacy introduced to in te r ­
national relations.
For My Parents 
George and Ruth Frazer
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I .  INTRODUCTION
In order to understand the nature of to ta lita r ia n  diplomacy as 
Adolf H itle r  and Benito Mussolini practiced i t ,  one must consider not 
only the unique conduct of each d ictator, but also the underlying 
differences between "trad itional" or "classical" diplomacy and 
to ta lita r ia n  diplomacy.
The classical period of diplomacy, which reached its  zenith during 
the nineteenth century, was characterized by certain accepted standards 
which the major European nation states agreed to follow in conducting 
th e ir foreign relations. In his book, The Evolution of Diplomatic 
Method, Harold Nicolson affirms that the classical period of diplomacy 
was characterized by the "establishment in every European country of 
a professional diplomatic service on a more or less identical model." 
Moreover, according to him, the professional diplomats of each European 
country "possessed s im ilar standards of education, sim ilar experience, 
and a sim ilar aim." They a ll shared a common heritage, and they a ll 
desired the same sort of world. In short, "they a ll believed, what­
ever th e ir  governments might believe, that the purpose of diplomacy 
was the preservation of peace.
The Great Powers of Europe--England, France, Germany, I ta ly ,  and 
Russia--essentially agreed that a re la tive  "balance of power" should 
be maintained which would preserve the existing status quo on the 
European continent. Moreoever, they agreed that warfare between nation
1
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states should be kept lim ited and that every e ffo rt should be made to 
resolve disputes through diplomatic negotiation. The Great Powers of 
Europe shared a common heritage, and they agreed that the purpose of 
diplomacy should be to preserve the peace and maintain the European 
nation state system.
The to ta lita r ia n  period of diplomacy, which reached its  zenith 
during the 1930s under the guidance of H itle r  and Mussolini, presented 
a challenge to the classical concept of diplomacy. Both dictators were 
rad ica lly  opposed to the accepted standards of trad itional diplomacy. 
They did not believe that a balance of power should be maintained in 
order to preserve the existing status quo on the European continent. 
Moreover, they considered warfare to be a necessary and useful means 
of promoting th e ir  p o litic a l goals. In short, neither H it le r  nor 
Mussolini supported the accepted standards of diplomatic negotiation 
or the nation state system which the Western democracies hoped to 
preserve.
Both H it le r  and Mussolini took advantage of the changes which 
occurred in the composition of the diplomatic community in the twentieth 
century. In his book, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, Paul Gordon Lauren 
paints out that the "decline of Europe as the epicenter of international 
p o lit ic s , the growth in the numbers of nations actively participating  
in a f fa irs , and the in flux of outsiders a ll contributed to end the 
former cultural homogeneity" of the European diplomatic community. 
Moreover, according to Lauren, the "destruction of this former unity 
and the subsequent introduction of new ground rules opened the door to
3
ideological r iv a lr ie s , soon permitting exponents of communism,
fascism, and democracy to contort the trad itional forms of diplomacy
2
into unrecognizable ones."
Both dictators had th e ir own conceptions as to the purpose of 
diplomacy and how i t  should be conducted. H it le r , fo r example, 
considered the sole purpose of diplomacy to be preparation for war.
He was determined to conquer additional liv ing  space or Lebensraum 
for his "ra c ia lly  superior" Germany and he was convinced that he could 
accomplish this goal only by launching a major European war. There­
fore , H it le r  had no use for international diplomacy as a means of 
preserving peaceful relations between nation states. He conducted 
his diplomacy solely for the purpose of advancing his planned wars of 
conquest.
Mussolini, on the other hand, considered the main purpose of 
diplomacy to be a means by which he could build up his own personal 
prestige. In his view, the best way to accomplish this goal would be 
to establish a new Roman Empire with himself as the new Caesar, and 
lik e  H it le r , he was convinced that the only way he could accomplish 
his goal would be to launch wars of conquest and gradually expand 
Ita lia n  te rr ito ry  un til he had created his new Empire. Therefore, 
Mussolini gradually lost a ll in terest in international diplomacy as a 
means of preserving peaceful relations between nation states. He con­
ducted his diplomacy mainly for the purpose of advancing his planned 
wars of conquest.
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Both H itle r  and Mussolini also had th e ir  own conception of how 
they should control th e ir  respective regimes. I t  is not surprising 
that in the f ie ld  of foreign policy each dictator was anxious to main­
ta in  as much authority in his own hands as possible. However, both 
H itle r  and Mussolini realized that they would have to delegate a 
certain amount of th e ir  authority in order to keep th e ir day-to-day 
diplomatic operations functioning at an acceptable leve l. The problem, 
in each leader's view, was how to delegate enough authority to keep 
th e ir  administrative systems functioning, without losing personal 
control over major foreign policy decisions. The solutions that both 
H itle r  and Mussolini settled upon were very sim ilar. Both leaders 
decided to use the party and the services of loyal subordinates to 
help them maintain th e ir  personal control over a ll  aspects of th e ir  
regimes. This is why the manner in which H it le r  and Mussolini 
delegated th e ir  authority and the e ffec t th is delegation of authority  
had upon the Party, the m ilita ry , and the Foreign Office must be 
examined in order to understand the conduct of each d ictato r's  diplomacy. 
Each of these organizations influenced the conduct of diplomacy, and 
therefore the role that each of these organizations played in H itle r 's  
and Mussolini's regimes must be examined in connection with each 
d ictator's  concepts of diplomacy and each d ictator's  ideological goals.
Since a complete examination and comparison of every aspect of 
each d ic ta to r's  regime is beyond the scope of this thesis, i t  is 
necessary to examine H it le r 's  and Mussolini's diplomacy in a lim ited  
context. Therefore, an examination of each d ic tator's  diplomacy in a
5
particular test case* such as th e ir  combined intervention in the 
Spanish C iv il War, w ill provide a better understanding of the strengths 
and weaknesses of to ta lita r ia n  diplomacy. Moreover, by comparing the 
intervention policies of H it le r  and Mussolini, against the policies  
of the Western democracies, i t  should be possible to gain a better 
understanding of the differences between to ta lita r ia n  diplomacy and 
trad itional diplomacy.
Since the objective of th is thesis is to gain a better understanding 
of the v ita l problem of to ta lita r ia n  diplomacy in re lation  to twentieth- 
century diplomatic h istory, I plan to examine the classic works of 
English language scholarship on the subject of Fascist and Nazi 
diplomacy. There is an abundance of excellent material available which 
addresses the subject of to ta lita r ia n  diplomacy in re lation  to Fascist 
and Nazi diplomacy. Government documents, diplomatic papers, d iaries , 
and memoirs are a ll available in English. In addition, several excellent 
works by respected scholars are also available in h istorical journals 
and popular magazines. F in a lly , several monographs of both a primary 
and secondary nature also provide valuable material on the subject of 
Fascist and Nazi diplomacy. Two works which are particu larly  useful 
in exploring the relationship between H itle r  and Mussolini and th e ir  
respective regimes are Ernst No!te's Three Faces of Fascism, and 
F. W. Deakin's The Brutal Friendship. Both monographs provide an ex­
ce llen t evaluation of the role of each d ictator in re lation to twentieth- 
century history.
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Since both H it le r  and Mussolini played such a dominant role in 
the conduct of th e ir diplomacy, i t  is necessary to examine the personal 
tra its  of each dictator in preference to the particu lar characteristics  
of each d ictator's  state in re lation  to foreign a ffa irs . In short, by 
examining both H it le r 's  and Mussolini's diplomacy in re lation  to their  
personal t r a its ,  and by using th e ir  combined intervention in the Spanish 
C iv il War as a test case, I plan to demonstrate the d iffe ren t challenges 
which to ta lita r ia n  diplomacy presented to the Western democracies as 
practiced by Adolf H it le r  and Benito Mussolini. I t  w ill then be 
possible to distinguish the d iffe ren t characteristics of to ta lita r ia n  
diplomacy as opposed to trad itio na l diplomacy.
I I .  HITLER'S DIPLOMACY
In order to understand H it le r 's  diplomacy, i t  is not only 
necessary to examine his personal tra its  as a leader, but also to 
consider whether he possessed a detailed plan of action, or i f  he 
simply took advantage of any situation which might advance his goals.
A controversy exists in the h istorical community as to whether H itle r  
was merely a power hungry opportunist who exploited any opportunity to 
enhance his position, or i f  he was more rational and followed precise 
coherent plans in the pursuit of his objectives.
One scholar who supports the theory that H it le r  was merely an 
opportunist who did not possess a concrete plan of action is A. J. P. 
Taylor. In his book, The Origins of The Second World War, Taylor argues 
that H it le r 's  goal was to make Germany the dominant power in Europe, 
however, he did not possess a concrete plan for achieving this goal.
He planned to achieve his goals through a series of small wars in a 
piecemeal fashion. H itle r  expected French and B ritish  resistance to 
his plans, but he made no specific plans or took any specific preparations 
for a great war.'*
A scholar who opposes the view of H itle r  as merely an opportunist 
without a long-term plan of action is Gerhard L. Weinberg. In his book, 
The Foreign Policy of H itle r 's  Germany, Weinberg supports the view that 
H itle r  did have a long-term plan which he attempted to follow to the 
best of his a b il i t ie s , and simply took advantage of opportunities
7
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which presented themselves during the course of events. Weinberg
agrees with Taylor that H itle r  was preparing for a series of smaller
wars, however, he argues that H it le r 's  strategy was to launch quick
campaigns against isolated enemies, in the b e lie f that success in each
war would help him to prepare for the next war "by increasing Germany's
resources and te rr ify in g  others into submission or at least abstention
4
from intervention."
I agree with the theory that H it le r  did possess a long-term plan 
which dominated his thinking and his actions. However, even though 
H itle r  did possess a long-term plan of action, he was also w illin g  to 
take advantage of any opportunity to advance his goals, even i f  he had 
to temporarily change course. H itle r  never abandoned his long-term 
goals, however, no matter how promising the opportunities of the moment 
might seem. He was determined to achieve his Lebensraum policy, and 
nothing could tempt him to abandon the pursuit of this goal.
In the case of both H it le r  and Mussolini, the personal tra its  of
each dictator had a unique influence upon the conduct of th e ir  regime's 
diplomacy, therefore I shall concentrate my examination upon H itle r  and 
Mussolini as individuals rather than upon the p o lit ic a l, economic, or 
social make up of each d ic ta to r's  particu lar state.
H it le r  as Leader
H itle r 's  personal tra its  were of course varied and numerous, but 
certain qualities remained constant and contributed to both his rise
and f a l l .  One of H it le r 's  dominant tra its  was a passionate b e lie f in
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his own in f a l l ib i l i t y .  His confidence carried him through such episodes 
as the invasion of the Rhineland, but the same t r a i t  also doomed his 
soldiers at Stalingrad to u tte r defeat. C learly, H it le r 's  personal 
idiosyncrasies are an important factor which must be taken into account 
i f  one desires to understand the workings of H it le r 's  leadership.
One of H itle r 's  personal tra its  which affected his diplomacy was 
his aversion to routine administrative paper work. In fa c t, he was so 
anxious to avoid administrative detail that he allowed his subordinates 
a considerable amount of authority to act on th e ir  own in it ia t iv e . As 
long as they remained loyal to him personally, H it le r  did not care who 
carried out his plans or what methods they used to accomplish his 
objectives. He was even w illin g  to re ly  upon the bureaucrats of the 
foreign ministry whom he had inherited from the Weimar government i f  
they could "deliver the goods."
In keeping with H it le r 's  ideological outlook, he believed that 
struggle should determine the d istribution  of power among his sub­
ordinates. As Edward N. Peterson mentions in his book, The Limits of 
H itle r 's  Power:
H it le r  believed the strong would survive and the 
stronger should have the authority. Vet instead 
of deciding who was stronger, he simply gave 
sim ilar authority to various persons, leaving g 
th e ir powers vague and le ttin g  them fig h t i t  out.
H itle r  hated to change his subordinates, and once he became comfortable
with an associate, he would display an unshakeable loyalty for his
"old comrade." He was convinced that he could evaluate people quickly
and accurately, however, he seemed capable of evaluating only who was
10
loyal to him and who was not, and he appointed a large number of in ­
competent people to positions of authority.
Despite H itle r 's  practice of promoting r iv a lry  among his sub­
ordinates, and his appointment of incompetent personnel, he was able 
to maintain a surprising degree of authority over his administrative 
apparatus. As in most p o litic a l systems, H itle r 's  subordinates were 
dependent upon him fo r th e ir power, and consequently, they would perform 
any of his desires, no matter how unorthodox, in order to curry favor 
with th e ir  leader. By delegating his authority among numerous in ­
dividuals and organizations, H it le r  was able to position himself as 
the "referee in the constant fighting for p o w e r . A s  a resu lt, no 
in s titu tio n  or individual posed a serious threat to his position. H itle r  
always remained wary of riva ls  to his personal power, and i f  any one 
organization became too powerful, he would create another riva l 
organization in order to maintain his own superiority.
Even though H itle r  delegated a large amount of authority to his 
subordinates, he was nevertheless quite capable of carrying out his 
schemes by relying upon his own a b il it ie s . As Major General F. W. 
von Mellenthin points out in his book, Panzer B attles, H itle r  was a 
very clever man who possessed an excellent memory, a te r r i f ic  w ill 
power, and an outstanding oratorical a b il ity  which helped him to con­
vince his subordinates to obey his commands. Moreover, H itle r  also had 
an "extraordinary f la i r  for sensing the weakness of his adversaries,
O
and for exploiting th e ir fa ilin g s  to the fu l l ."
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In addition to his p o litic a l g if ts , H itle r  also possessed many
tragic tra its  as w ell. In his book, Arms, Autarky and Aggression,
William Carr argues th a t, "H itle r was a moody, restless and explosive
character, lacking in human a ffe c tio n .. . ,  inordinately suspicious of
mankind..., domineering, opinionated" and "positively paranoid in some 
g
of his views." Moreover, H itle r  combined a ll  of these t r a its ,  good
and bad, into his extraordinary w ill power. H it le r  had nothing but
contempt for any individual who gave in at the least sign of resistance.
According to H it le r , i f  enough w ill power was applied to a particular
task, then a ll obstacles could be over come. H it le r  made his views in
this regard very clear in his own Secret Book:
These unhappy souls have no understanding at a ll  
of the fact t h a t . . . ,  a decision which I deem to be 
necessary, whose success however does not seem 
completely assured, or whose success w ill o ffer
only a partia l satisfaction , must be fought for with
an increased energy so that what i t  lacks in the 
po ss ib ility  of success in percentage points, must, 
be made up for in the energy o f its  execution.
One positive feature of H it le r 's  tremendous w ill power was his 
a b il ity  to get people to believe in him and to follow him. This 
particu lar a b il ity  helps to account for much of H itle r 's  power. In 
his book, Panzer Leader, the German General Heinz Guderian maintains 
that H itle r 's  w ill power was so extraordinary that its  "effect on many 
men was almost hypnotic."^
Moreover, H it le r 's  w ill power was buttressed by his other physical 
and in te llec tu a l q u a lities . H it le r  had the amazing a b ility  to 
assimilate large amounts of information very rap id ly, and to block out 
a ll distractions from the single-minded pursuit of his objectives.
He would then proceed to convince his followers that any task could be 
accomplished i f  i t  were reduced to simple objectives, and i f  enough w ill 
power was committed to the task.
In addition to his w ill power, H it le r  was able to cap ita lize  upon 
his oratorical a b ilit ie s  to help maintain his power. H it le r 's  ora­
to rical a b ilit ie s  were so masterful, that he could convince almost a ll 
audiences that his was the correct path to follow , even when his logic 
was based upon personal assumptions which might not conform to re a lity .
He knew how to adjust his manner of speech to su it the m entality of 
his audience, and he could judge his listeners and sense exactly what 
they wanted to hear, or what they hoped to gain. As Norman Rich argues 
in his book, H itle r 's  War Aims, "H itle r was convinced that every man 
had his price, and he had a f l a i r  for sensing what that price might be, 
whether i t  was peace, power, status, money, or simply personal security."
Another one of H itle r 's  idiosyncracies was his tendency to 
procrastinate and to delay decisions as long as possible. Instead of 
issuing necessary orders he would deliver "long and vague harangues," 
and "when dealing face-to-face with sk illed  associates he was lik e ly
11to avoid c o n flic t, postpone unpleasant decisions, and delay solutions." 
The resulting delays meant that many of H itle r 's  decisions arrived too 
la te  to be of any use to his subordinates. For example, by the time 
H itle r  f in a lly  decided to withdraw his troops from Stalingrad, th e ir  
situation was already hopeless.
H itle r 's  tendency to delay solutions to problems was partly  a 
reflection  of his desire to wait for the most opportune moment to s trike .
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In his book, H itle r: A Study in Tyranny, Alan Bullock argues that 
H itle r  "contrived to keep his plans f le x ib le , and un til he was con­
vinced that the right moment had come, he would find a hundred excuses 
for procrastination." Once H it le r  did f in a lly  make a decision to ac t, 
however, he moved very quickly. Of a ll his demagogic s k il ls ,  H itle r  
was c learly  very fond of quick and decisive action. "Surprise was a 
favorite  gambit of H it le r 's  in p o litic s , diplomacy, and w a r."^
Another one of H itle r 's  tra its  which encouraged him to attack
innocent people without warning, was his complete lack of scruples and
inhib itions. He respected only power, and he was w illin g  to commit
any crime, no matter how repulsive, in order to achieve his goals.
H it le r  even admitted his lack o f respect for principles in his own
book, Mein Kampf. H itle r  said that "in questions of foreign policy I
15shall never admit that I am tied  by anything." Other than the firm  
b e lie f in the necessity of preserving his own power and the power of
Germany, there seems to be few principles that H itle r  would not
sacrifice . Hermann Rauschning, who interviewed H it le r  and reported 
some of his findings in his book, The Voice of Destruction, was con­
vinced of H it le r 's  lack o f principles. He mentioned that H itle r  "was 
prepared to repudiate a l l  trea ties and standards of justice as i r ­
relevant in the decisive struggle for p o w e r . H i t l e r  was in no way 
restrained by any feelings of compassion, decency, or moral principles.
H it le r 's  lust fo r power was the main force which dominated his
behavior, and he took advantage o f any situation which might improve 
his position. He simply used Germany to achieve and maintain his
personal power. H it le r  was fond of Germany, and he connected his
destiny with Germany, but H itle r  would sacrifice  anything or anybody
to maintain his position. He clung to a "fanatic b e lie f that he had
been selected by destiny to lead the German people... to a permanent
status of security and greatness," and he believed that this mission
exempted him from the ordinary rules of human conduct.^
H itle r  partly  ju s tif ie d  his actions by claiming that he was
following the dictates of h istory. He was fascinated by the rise and
fa l l  of c iv iliz a tio n s , and as Percy Schramm points out in his book,
H itle r: The Man and the M ilita ry  Leader, "the decline of classical
c iv iliz a tio n  preoccupied him as an example of what he f e l t  he had to
18prevent in his own time." According to H it le r ,  the Bolshevik 
ideology of the masses would overrun Europe unless the Nazi rac is t 
ideology of the e l i te  proved strong enough to stop i t .  Only Nazi 
Germany could save Europe from the Bolshevik threat from the East.
H itle r  believed that i t  was his mission to lead Germany on a crusade to 
save Western Europe from th is eastern threat. In his book, The Three 
Faces of Fascism, Ernst Nolte argues that H it le r  always "succumbed to 
an ungovernable passion on the subject of bolshevism" because he
"regarded i t  as the most radical form of Jewish genocide ever known "
Moreover, according to Nolte, H itle r  had no choice but to portray 
Bolshevik Russia as the major enemy of Nazi Germany because the entire  
basis of National Socalism's race-doctrine rested upon the acknowledged 
aim of annihilating the "Jewish-Bolshevik head" and returning the 
"Slavic masses to th e ir  natural state of slavery, so that the superior
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race could find space to ensure its  existence, and subjects over which
20to exert its  claim to hegemony." H it le r  was convinced that history  
had provided him with a ju s t guide to his world view, and once he had 
formed his ideological framework, i t  became rig id  and in fle x ib le . He 
v io len tly  rejected any a lternative views, and he refused to allow others 
to c r it ic iz e  his assumptions.
H it le r 's  Racism
Although H itle r 's  personal characteristics are an important guide 
to his actions, his ideological framework can be used as an even more 
permanent guide to understanding his foreign policy. His concepts of 
racia l purity and of Lebensraum, or liv ing  space, dominated H it le r 's  
thinking and actions. H itle r 's  personal tra its  influenced his actions, 
but his ideological concepts provided him with his goals. Therefore, 
i f  one wants to understand H itle r 's  motivations and actions, one must 
examine not only his personal t r a its ,  but also his doctrine of race, 
and his attitude toward space.
H itle r 's  doctrine of race was based upon the assumption that 
history could be understood only in terms of racial analysis. He be­
lieved that the security of c iv iliza tio n s  depended upon th e ir  success 
or fa ilu re  in maintaining th e ir  racial purity . Therefore, H it le r  de­
cided to make racia l purity the guiding principle of his foreign policy. 
H itle r  said that:
The essential fundamental and guiding princip le , 
which we must always bear in m in d ..., is that foreign 
policy is only a means to an end, and that the end 
is solely the promotion of our own nationality .
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No consideration of foreign policy can proceed 
from any other crite rio n  than th is : Does i t  
benefit our nationality  now or in the future, or 2, 
w ill i t  be injurious to it?
H itle r  used his racial views to provide a basis for his vision 
of Germany's future empire. He believed that Germany's defeat in the 
F irs t World War was not due to its  "inherent weakness." H itle r  con­
sidered Germany's " a b ility  to hold out for so long against a world of 
foes" as a sign of Germany's "inherent racial superiority ," and he was
determined to draw from th is racial superiority the necessary strength
22to produce a victory in the next war.
H itle r 's  race and space policy went beyond "the classic im peria list 
answer to the problem of growing numbers pressing on lim ited resources." 
H itle r  wanted to create a continuous cycle of expansion, and he con­
trived to make the need for expansion both the ju s tif ic a tio n  and the 
objective of his policy. He deliberately "encouraged" the German 
people "to outstrip" th e ir  "resources in order to create" a new need
for further expansion. In this manner, a continuous cycle of expansion
23could be maintained. H it le r  considered the old nationalist goals of
former times to be outdated, and he despised anyone who fa iled  to
recognize the new importance of racial policy. He asserted that:
diplomacy must see to i t  that a people does not 
heroically perish, but is prac tica lly  preserved.
Every road that leads to th is is then expedient, 
and not taking i t  must be characterized as criminal 
neglect of duty.
In H it le r 's  view, old-fashioned nationalism should be used solely  
as a means to an end, and not as an end in i t s e l f .  He believed that 
the old nationalis t goals of the past would not provide the security
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that Germany needed. Only additional liv ing  space and not the mere 
reestablishment of Germany's former borders would guarantee Germany's 
future. H itle r  was convinced that Germany could be made the dominant 
power of Europe by expanding its  ra c ia lly  superior population eastward. 
H itle r  knew that such a policy would make war with Russia a v irtua l 
certa in ty , but he believed that the future of Germany demanded such a 
course.
According to H it le r , Russia represented not only a potential area
for German conquest, but also an area of potential threat to Germany's
security. He believed that th is  Russian " te rrito ry  provided the breeding
grounds fo r an inexhaustible supply" of ra c ia lly  in fe rio r people who
would one day overrun Germany. H itle r  believed that these in fe rio r
races "had been held at bay over the centuries only by the bravery of
the Germans, whose racial qualities  had enabled them so fa r to with-
25stand a numerically superior foe." In H it le r 's  view, only te r r ito r ia l  
expansion could provide the necessary security that Germany needed in 
order to protect Western c iv iliz a tio n  from the masses of ra c ia lly  
in fe rio r people of the East.
H itle r 's  racial concepts were a natural complement to his desire 
to wage an aggressive foreign policy. Russia proved to be a handy 
ta rget, but H itle r  had always planned to expand in the east no matter 
what form of government controlled Russia and no matter how strong or 
weak Russia might prove to be at the time. H itle r  intended to expand 
at Russia's expense, and he used his racial concepts to help ju s tify  
this decision, and to make the task appear both necessary and easy.
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The preservation of the Aryan race was a basic component of 
H itle r 's  ideological framework. According to H it le r , everything worth­
while that mankind had achieved had been the direct result of the 
Aryan race. In H it le r 's  view, the Aryan race constituted an e lite  
group of superior individuals who had the righ t and the duty to rule 
over in fe rio r people in order to preserve c iv iliz a tio n  from cultural 
decay. This was the basis upon which rested H itle r 's  entire ideological 
program. H it le r  believed th at, "a people had the righ t to ex ist only 
i f  i t  were ra c ia lly  valuable." He was convinced that the preservation 
of the Aryan race and of c iv iliz a tio n  required the elimination of in ­
fe rio r races, and he was not concerned about the consequences of such 
objectives. "The f i r s t  commandment of H itle rian  morality was... the
preservation of the co llective v ita l force of the German people," and
2fia ll other peoples were simply to be "brushed aside." Racism was more
than ju st a mere propagandists slogan for H it le r . He was determined
to make his racial concepts a guidepost for the National S ocialis t
Party. H it le r  said that:
I t  w ill be the task of the National Socialist 
movement to carry over into a policy applied in 
practice the knowledge and s c ie n tific  insights of race 
theory, e ither already existing or in the course of 
development, as well as the world history c la rifie d  01 
through i t .
Moreover, H it le r  knew that his racial goals would be costly to 
achieve, and "he warned" the German people "that the fu lfillm e n t of 
his program would require work and sacrifice  on an unprecedented scale." 
H itle r  knew that his racial goals "could only be met by" consolidating
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"the undivided devotion and entire  energy of the German people" in
28preparation for foreign expansion. Therefore, he made every e ffo rt  
to consolidate a ll authority under his personal control in order to 
shape Germany into the instrument which would allow him to carry out 
his racial policies. As fa r  as H itle r  was concerned, the preservation 
and security of the German race depended upon expansion in the east, 
and a ll policies should be directed towards this goal. Moreover,
H itle r  made i t  very clear that his goals could only be achieved through 
conquest, and he was confident that the superior German race could 
accomplish his goals.
Lebensraum
H itle r 's  doctrine of space was a logical complement to his doctrine
of race. In H it le r 's  view, both doctrines should be combined into one
comprehensive ideology. He believed th at, "racial v i t a l i t y  and spatial
29expansion were d irec tly  re lated." The stronger race would always
have the right to take the additional space that i t  needed in order to
meet the demands of its  growing population. H it le r  argued that i f  the
Germans did not expand, then they would gradually weaken and eventually
lose th e ir racial superiority. Therefore, the desirable course for
Germany to follow would be to conquer additional te rr ito ry . H itle r
said th at, "the increase of population can be balanced only through an
30increase, that is an enlargement, of liv ing  space.' Moreover, since 
H itle r  intended to exterminate a ll conquered peoples, he maintained 
that he could avoid any dangers of contaminating the purity of the 
German race through conquest. According to H it le r , the a v a ila b ility
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of conquered te rr ito ry  free from the dangers of racial contamination 
would ensure the future security of the superior Aryan race. Therefore, 
H itle r  decided to make eastward expansion the major goal of his leader­
ship. As H it le r  said: "the task of the leaders of a nation's struggle
for existence consists in . . .  restoring a to lerable re lation  between
31population and te rr ito ry ."
H itle r  saw te r r ito r ia l expansion as a natural component of man's 
struggle for existence, and he considered any display of compassion 
for the elimination of in fe r io r races during the process of expansion 
contrary to the rules of nature. He said that there is "nothing sinful
32in te r r ito r ia l acquisition, but something quite in keeping with nature." 
H itle r  had nothing but contempt for weaker races, and he believed that 
human rights counted for nothing when compared to the duty to protect 
and enhance the Aryan race.
Moreover, in H itle r 's  view, the threat from the east embraced not 
only the German people, but a ll of European c iv iliz a tio n . Therefore, 
i t  was his duty to acquire additional te rr ito ry  in the east in order 
to provide both Germany and Western Europe with the security needed 
to guarantee the future of Western c iv iliz a tio n . H itle r  believed that 
te r r ito r ia l expansion would therefore protect both Germany and Western 
Europe, and he was determined to carry out this task.
H it le r 's  b e lie f that he was protecting Western c iv iliz a tio n  by 
increasing the size and power of Germany added a universal and crusading 
aspect to his ideological framework. In H itle r 's  mind, his expansionist 
policy took on a lim itless character. H itle r  described his concept
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of lim itless struggle as follows:
We calculate our own sacrifices, weigh the extent 
of the possible success and w ill stride forward to 
the attack, regardless of whether i t  w ill come to 
a ha lt ten or a thousand kilometers behind the present 
lines . For wherever our success ends, i t  w ill always 33 
be only the point of departure fo r a new struggle.
Even though H it le r 's  doctrine of space had a universal and lim it ­
less character, H it le r  was mainly concerned with Russia. Germany might 
expand in every d irection , but the eastern areas held the greatest 
promise for H it le r . He insisted that the major theme of his foreign 
policy should always be based upon the conquest of eastern te rr ito r ie s . 
H itle r  argued that Germany should follow:
not the diplomatic aimlessness of the las t decades, 
but a conscious and determined course, and stick to 
i t .  Neither western nor eastern orientation must 
be the future goal of our foreign policy, but an 
eastern policy in the sense of acquiring the necessary.,, 
soil fo r our German people.
H itle r  believed that Russia would be easy to conquer because of 
its  ra c ia lly  in fe rio r inhabitants. In H it le r 's  view, the combination 
of the necessity of expansion coupled with the weakness of Russia's 
racial stock, made eastward expansion the most logical direction for 
his aggressive policy. Expansion at Russia's expense provided H itle r  
with the perfect opportunity to implement his combined theories of 
racial superiority, economic advantage, and even strategic necessity.
To H it le r , German foreign policy would retain  significance only i f  
i t  sought to carry out his ideological theories by conquering new 
te rr ito ry  in Eastern Europe.
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H itle r  as Diplomat
In order to understand H it le r 's  concept of diplomacy i t  is 
necessary to acknowledge that H itle r  considered diplomacy as simply 
one more means of preparing for war. As fa r as H itle r  was concerned, 
any form of alliance or other diplomatic agreement should be dropped 
immediately i f  i t  did not prepare Germany for war. H itle r  recognized 
that his policies could be achieved only through war, and he was quite 
w illin g  to make preparation for war the guiding principle of his foreign 
policy. In H itle r 's  view, there would be no need for negotiations 
between states because he was determined to in it ia te  a war and not to 
prevent one.
H it le r 's  concept of diplomacy as a means for preparing for war 
naturally had a profound e ffec t upon the handling of treaties and other 
international agreements. To H it le r , the main purpose of forming an 
alliance was to increase the power of Germany in its  struggle for space. 
"An alliance whose aim does not embrace a plan for war is senseless
35and worthless," he wrote. "Alliances are concluded only for struggle." 
Moreover, H itle r  also believed that alliances were only temporary 
instruments which could be broken as soon as they were no longer useful. 
He assumed that there could be no alliance based upon good w il l .
Alliances should be based solely upon the prospect of mutual gain on 
the part of both parties. He proclaimed: "Alliances w ill be a ll  the
stronger, the more the individual contracting parties may hope to derive 
private advantages from them. I t  is fantastic to wish to form an
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37alliance on any other basis." I t  was only logical to him therefore, 
that once the prospect of mutual gain was gone or in any way obstructed, 
the alliance should be dropped immediately.
H itle r 's  view that alliances should only be temporary in nature, 
helps to explain why he avoided a ll m ultila tera l commitments. H itle r  
always wanted to preserve his own freedom of movement, and he con­
sidered i t  much easier "to make and break a treaty  with" only one power,
38rather than to withdraw "from a complicated m u ltila te ra l structure." 
Therefore, H itle r  not only took Germany out of a ll international organi­
zations, but he also refused to jo in  any m ultila tera l commitments i f  
he could avoid i t .
H itle r 's  concepts of the uses of diplomacy also affected the manner 
in which he viewed his diplomats and the methods of procedure which he 
allowed them to carry out. He was determined not to le t  his diplomats 
repeat what he considered to be the mistakes of the past. H itle r  
described the diplomats of the prewar period as, "supercilious, arrogant 
know -it-a lls , without any capacity for cool testing and weighing, which...
must be recognized as the pre-condition for any... action in the f ie ld
39of foreign a ffa irs ."  Moreover, H itle r  considered the prewar German
policy of alliances to be weak, defea tis t, and even "treasonable in
nature." According to him, the prewar diplomats were responsible "for
the collapse of Germany" during the war because th e ir alliance policies
40le f t  Germany in a weak and impossible position.
In order to avoid these alleged mistakes of the past, H itle r  tried  
to place complete control of the foreign service in his own hands.
He soon found out however, that he would have to re ly  upon older 
members of the diplomatic corps un til he could organize enough of his 
loyal follower's who were competent enough to replace the older diplomats. 
Therefore, H itle r  found i t  much easier in the beginning of his rule to 
force the older foreign service to do his bidding, rather than to create 
a new organization that would be both loyal and e ff ic ie n t. He in ­
stitu ted  s tr ic t  procedures designed to curb the power of the older 
o ffic ia ls  un til he could replace them with his own loyal subordinates.
For example, he made i t  a constant practice to keep his o ffic ia ls  in  
the dark as much as possible. H itle r  only told his o ffic ia ls  "what 
he wished them to know" so that he could "retain absolute control of
policy making" decisions and "keep the reins of authority in his own 
42hands." H itle r  was to ta lly  convinced that he was the only person who 
had the necessary insight to guide German policy along the correct path.
Another important aspect of H itle r 's  concept of diplomacy was his 
insistance that Germany should seek an alliance with I ta ly .  H itle r  
considered such an alliance for both practical and personal reasons.
On the practical le v e l, H itle r  believed that an alliance with Ita ly  
could be based solely on the prospect of mutual gain. According to 
H it le r , Ita ly 's  ambitions of expansion would not conflic t with Germany's 
expansionist plans. While Germany conquered the continent, Ita ly  
could take control of the Mediterranean and its  surrounding areas. The 
obvious enemy of both Ita ly  and Germany was France. Therefore, i t  
would be only logical for Ita ly  and Germany to form an a lliance.
Indeed, as F. W. Deakin argues in his book, The Brutual Friendship,
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Mussolini essentially agreed with H it le r  on the practical benefits
of forming an alliance:
The conception of an Italo-German a lliance , 
apart from its  ideological significance, was 
therefore, from the Ita lia n  point of view, to cover 
and secure by treaty with the greatest European 
land power the continental position of I ta ly ,  and 
free her to pursue her v ita l interests in the 
Mediterranean and in A frica.
On the personal le v e l, H itle r  desired an alliance with Ita ly
because he admired Mussolini and his Fascist regime. According to
Nolte, H itle r  "revered the Ita lia n  as the f i r s t  destroyer of Marxism,
and i f  H itle r  had died in 1930 a historian would hardly hesitate to
call the man, whose study contained a bust of the Puce, a disciple and
44im itator of Mussolini." H itle r 's  admiration fo r Mussolini never
fa lte red , and he considered Mussolini and his Fascist doctrine as
guideposts for his own leadership and his own ideology. Iro n ica lly ,
Mussolini did not return H itle r 's  admiration in the same unqualified
terms. Indeed, as the fortunes of war began to turn against the Axis,
Mussolini's opinion of H it le r 's  strategic thinking began to wane.
Unlike H it le r , Mussolini realized that the Axis Powers would be defeated
unless Germany came to terms with Russia and turned her m ilita ry
strength against the Western Powers. According to Deakin, only the
Puce could persuade H it le r  "to consider the necessity of a strategic
revolution by liquidating the anti-Russian crusade. In such a move
lay the las t opportunity of the Axis to avoid defeat, and a ll  depended
45on the person of Mussolini." Unfortunately fo r Mussolini, he could 
not persuade H itle r  to abandon his anti-Russian crusade. Therefore,
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i t  is understandable why Mussolini admired the sheer power of H itle r 's
regime, but did not consider H itle r  to be a wise leader.
Whether H itle r  desired an alliance with Ita ly  for practical
reasons or for personal reasons, his overriding concern always remained
the preparation of Germany for war. H itle r  said that: " I f . . .  I
advocate an alliance between Ita ly  and Germany I do so only because I
believe that both states can thereby achieve useful advantages. Both
46states would prosper as a resu lt."  H it le r  knew that his policies 
would result in war, and he wanted to strengthen his position as much 
as possible. H itle r 's  desire for an alliance with Ita ly  was ju s t one 
more reflection  of his view that the purpose of diplomacy was simply 
to prepare for war. This b e lie f remained a constant bulwark of his 
ideological framework.
Delegation of Authority
The manner in which H itle r  delegated authority among his sub­
ordinates, and the various organizations that they represented, had a 
profound e ffec t upon the conduct of his diplomacy. I f  one wants to 
understand how H itle r 's  dissemination of power affected his po licies, 
then one needs to examine the role played by the Foreign O ffice , the 
m ilita ry , and the Party in administrative a ffa irs . Before examining 
these separate organizations in closer d e ta il, however, one should 
f i r s t  take into account H itle r 's  basic attitudes towards the dissemina­
tion of power and responsib ility  among his subordinates and the various 
organizations that they represented.
In H it le r 's  view, his personal authority over his governmental 
organizations outweighed the importance of establishing a completely 
uniform administrative organization. As Herbert Jacob argues in his 
book, German Administration Since Bismarck, " H it le r . . .  preferred com­
petition  among" his "subordinates to complete coordination and uniform 
organization." H itle r  "feared that subordinates would use undivided 
power for th e ir own purposes rather than according to" his "instructions." 
He was convinced that the best way to maintain his power was to con­
tinue his practice of creating various organizations which remained in 
direct competition with each other. H itle r  recognized the importance 
of administrative centra lization , but he always remained careful not to 
concentrate too much power in the hands of subordinates.
Whenever H it le r  did increase administrative centra lization , he very 
often found that such centralization could retard his goals as well as 
advance them. H it le r 's  system of competition between riva l organi­
zations did allow him to maintain ultimate authority, but the actual 
workings of administrative procedure became more and more d i f f ic u lt  to 
control. As one might expect, he discovered that the central government
could not "maintain e ffec tive  administration" because centralism was 
48in e ffic ie n t. In order to overcome this problem, H itle r  turned to 
the practice of placing trusted Nazis in key positions. Since he hated 
career bureaucrats in general anyway, he was only too happy to replace 
them whenever possible. "H itle r looked on bureaucrats as technicians
4Qwhose role consisted of executing orders but not formulating polic ies."  
H itle r  was unable to purge the old bureaucrats in governmental service
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as quickly as he would have liked however, because he soon found out 
that he would have to u t i l iz e  the major portion of the bureaucracy 
which he had inherited from his predecessors. H itle r  simply found 
that he lacked the competent personnel to replace a ll  of the older 
bureaucrats.
H itle r 's  basic goal in dealing with the dissemination of power
always remained the perservation of his own authority. In order to
maintain his authority, H it le r  attempted to erect a to ta lita r ia n  state
in which a ll public organs would remain submissive to his w i l l .  The
system that he created to ensure his authority was known as the
Fuhrerprinzip. According to th is system, "absolute authority" was to
flow "from the top to the bottom of the party hierarchy," while
"absolute loyalty and obedience" was "to flow from the bottom to the
top." Moreover, each Party member was ultim ately responsible to H itle r
50as the supreme leader of the nation.
H itle r  wanted this principle to be s tr ic t ly  applied to his govern­
mental bureaucracy. He wanted a ll of his o ff ic ia ls  to obey his commands 
and to concern themselves only with th e ir  own work. H itle r  was de­
termined that his own position should remain supreme, and he applied 
his Fuehrer principle to every one of his separate organizations in 
order to remain in control. His concepts of delegating authority  
remained the same for the Foreign O ffice, the m ilita ry , and the Party.
Role of the Foreign O ffice . The role that the Foreign Office 
played in H itle r 's  diplomatic a ffa irs  was conditioned by the uneasy 
relationship between H itle r  and the career diplomats. The mutual
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contempt between H itle r  and his diplomats added a certain urgency to
H itle r 's  wish to replace the older diplomatic s ta ff with his loyal
followers; however, H it le r  found that he could not dispense with the
older professionals as quickly as he desired and s t i l l  maintain an
e ffic ie n t Foreign O ffice. As Paul Seabury argues in his book, The
Wilhelmstrasse, "there were few in the ranks of National Socialism who
possessed any awareness of p o litic a l conditions abroad," and H itle r
51was "forced to re ly  heavily upon the m inisterial bureaucracy."
Even though H it le r  was quite w illin g  to dispense with the advice of
his career diplomats, he was unwilling to dispense with the trappings
of diplomacy. As Seabury argues:
regard for the sen s ib ilities  of foreign missions 
in B erlin , for public opinion abroad, and a host 
of other considerations doubtless had made H itle r
aware of the peacetime u t i l i t y  of keeping his correct,
conventional, and urbane diplomats in th e ir  posts, as 
shock absorbers between the outside world and the grim52
re a lit ie s  of Nazi power and purpose.
H itle r  had no intention of becoming dependent upon the governmental
bureaucracy however, and he "carefu lly nurtured auxilia ry  instruments
of diplomacy, responsible to himself alone or to Party formations, as
53counterbalances to the Wilhelmstrasse." As Gordon Craig points out
in his study, "The German Foreign Office from Neurath to Ribbentrop,"
H itle r  encouraged the National Socialist Party's Foreign Organization, 
known as the Auslandorganisation, or simply the AO for short, to
encroach upon the prerogatives of the Foreign Office in order to
expand its  power base into the realm of foreign a ffa irs . In H itle r 's  
view, the competition between the Foreign Office and the Party would
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help him to maintain his personal control over both organizations.
Therefore, the Auslandorqanisation began to compete with the Foreign
Office by sending its  own agents abroad in order to "spread National
Socialist propaganda, maintain contact with subversive elements and
54extend party discip line over German nationals."
Moreover, in order to fa c il ita te  his personal control over the
Foreign O ffice , H itle r  also encouraged the National Socialis t Party to
in f i l t r a te  and control the Foreign Office i t s e l f  as much as possible.
Therefore, in compliance with H it le r 's  wishes, the Party sought to
destroy the trad itional nonpolitical and "neutral" character of the
Foreign Office administration. The Party wanted to reshape the c iv il
service as a whole into a legal and ideological framework which would
55accord "the Nazis the monopoly of determining" state policy.
Nazi ideology assumed a theoretical harmony between the Party and
the state bureaucracy. According to these precepts, state o ffic ia ls
would have to consider themselves as National Socialists f i r s t ,  and as
c iv il servants second. In the National Socialis t system the state
o ff ic ia l was to be guided by both the laws of the state and by the rules
of the Party. However, the "National S ocialis t o f f ic ia l 's  loyalty
56was f i r s t  to the Party, and second to the state ." The National 
Socialist Party was w illin g  to allow the Foreign Office to continue 
to operate, but i t  remained determined to bring the Foreign Office  
under its  e ffective control. The Party demanded an end to the con­
cept of p o litic a l n eu tra lity  and unconditional obedience from the state  
bureaucracy. In order to ensure this compliance, every o ff ic ia l was
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forced to take an oath of loyalty  to H it le r , pledging:
I swear that I w ill be true and obedient to the
Fuhrer of the German Reich and People, Adolf 
H it le r , and that I w ill observe the laws and 
conscientiously f u l f i l l  my duties of o ffic e , 57 
so help me God.
Under H it le r 's  system the c iv il servant became obligated not only 
to adhere to National S ocialis t doctrine, but also to report any 
a c tiv itie s  which might possibly endanger the existence of the Nazi
state. In e ffe c t, the National Socialist system attempted to make the
c iv il service responsible for policing its  own a c tiv it ie s . The result 
of such interference was "that the Nazi Party d e c is iv e ly ... triumphed 
over the nonpolitical principle once so cherished by the German foreign 
service."88 The alleged neutral character of the Foreign Office was 
replaced by a subservience to the new National Socialist ideology.
H itle r  was determined to use Party ideology as a tool to maintain 
control over the Foreign O ffice.
In addition to using the Party to help him control the Foreign 
O ffice, H itle r  also appointed his loyal follower Joachim von Ribbentrop 
to the position of foreign m inister. With the appointment of such men 
as Ribbentrop to the Foreign O ffice , H itle r  intended to replace the 
older career o ffic ia ls  upon whom he was forced to depend with a younger 
group of a c tiv is t o ff ic ia ls  who would be more amenable to his personal 
authority. The new diplomats were to be compliant tools of his 
commands. In H it le r 's  view, the Foreign Office was not to be a major 
policy-making organization. Major policy decisions were to remain the 
work of himself and a few close but amateur advisers such as Ribbentrop.
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As the new foreign minister of Nazi Germany, Ribbentrop was
always careful to obey H it le r 's  wishes and to make himself appear
indispensable to the fu lfillm e n t of H itle r 's  foreign policy goals.
Ribbentrop took note of whatever H itle r  said and adopted his ideas as
his own in order to maintain H it le r 's  favor and increase his own 
59personal power. Ribbentrop knew that the s ta b il ity  of his position 
depended e n tire ly  upon H itle r 's  favor, and he therefore made i t  a con­
stant practice to act even "more H itle rian  than H itle r  himself," and 
to encourage H itle r  whenever "he developed doubts about the possible 
success of his plans." I t  is clear that Ribbentrop was very sk illed  
in the a rt of f la t te ry , for even though his s e rv ility  often bordered 
on the ridiculous, H itle r  "never fu lly  recovered from the conviction 
that Ribbentrop was a man of parts ."60
However, i t  is also clear that in re a lity  Ribbentrop was a very 
poor foreign m inister. The appointment of Ribbentrop as foreign 
minister helped to destroy "any pretense of ra tio n a lity  in the Foreign 
O ffice 's  structure." Ribbentrop destroyed the administrative structure 
of the Foreign Office by creating "a vast and loose undergrowth of new 
divisions" and agencies which were ordered to carry out assignments 
"which could hardly have been considered to have much to do with 
diplomacy in its  usual sense." Moreover, Ribbentrop v ir tu a lly  
destroyed the trad itio na l chain of command within the Foreign O ffice.
By disseminating authority "in a ll directions through a confusing maze 
of bureaus" and by placing his personal followers in select positions
of authority, Ribbentrop made a shambles of the Foreign O ffice 's
61administrative structure.
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Even though Ribbentrop was a poor foreign m inister, many of the 
professionals of the Foreign Office supported his attempts to protect 
the Foreign Office from outside interference. The older diplomats of 
the Foreign Office knew that they were as dependent upon the whims of 
H itle r  for p o litic a l survival as Ribbentrop, and therefore they decided 
to assist Ribbentrop in his e ffo rts  to safeguard the prerogatives of 
the Foreign O ffice. Ribbentrop and his "subordinate officialdom" were 
bound together in a "tenuous but persistent coalition of fear."  Both 
Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office o ff ic ia ls  were fearful of Party 
in f i l t r a t io n , and they worked together to preserve th e ir  positions. 
Ribbentrop wanted complete authority in the Foreign O ffice, and this  
included his desire to keep intruders out of his personal organization. 
In this regard, Party r iv a lry  worked to the advantage of the Foreign 
O ffice. According to Seabury, even though they resented him, the 
bureaucrats of the Foreign Office were w illin g  to put up with Ribbentrop
because they "were fu lly  aware of the possible consequences of his re-
fi?placement by an equally hated, but more powerful figure ." However, 
the ta c it  agreement between Ribbentrop and the older diplomats to work 
together in  order to preserve the authority o f the Foreign Office was 
essentia lly  meaningless because Ribbentrop did not not consider the 
Foreign O ffice to be a decision-making organization. As Craig 
argues, "in Ribbentrop's conception, the Foreign Office was meant to
C O
be a technical apparatus and nothing more."
Despite th e ir  efforts  to protect the Foreign Office from outside 
interference, the older professionals could not compete with H itle r 's
34
determination to force his w ill upon the Foreign O ffice through the
use of Party interference and through the appointment of individuals
such as Ribbentrop to positions of authority. As Seabury states:
by the use of judicious pressure on c iv il servants 
to jo in  the Party, by the in f ilt ra t io n  of re liab le  
Party members into important state administrative 
posts, by the preferment o f Party members in c iv i l -  
service advancement... the Nazis transformed the 
German Foreign Office into a p liable instrument of g4 
th e ir po licies.
Under Nazi control, the Foreign Office underwent a profound up­
heaval in its  hierarchical structure which made i t  of l i t t l e  con­
sequence in terms of policy making under H itle r 's  ru le . The "Foreign
65Office became l i t t l e  more than a stenographic bureau." Thanks to 
modern technology, H it le r  was able to delegate many of the trad itional 
functions of the Foreign Office professionals to less experienced 
subordinates. Moreover, personal representatives such as Ribbentrop 
were able to keep the Foreign Office operating by restructuring the 
administrative organization of the Foreign O ffice. Because the older 
diplomats fa iled  to maintain a monopoly of the trad itio na l in ­
strumentalities o f diplomacy, th e ir  advice and reports were of minor 
importance in shaping high-level policy in H it le r 's  regime.
Role of the M ilita ry . In order to understand the role that the 
German m ilita ry  played in H it le r 's  regime, one should examine H itle r 's  
personal views concerning the purpose of the army. Only then can one 
fu lly  understand the manner in which H itle r  captured control of the 
army and how he therefore removed the las t vestige of res tra in t to 
the implementation o f his ideological goals.
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According to Robert J. O 'N e ill, H it le r  had an almost unlimited 
admiration for the German Afmy. As he argues in his book, The German 
Arm.y and the Nazi Party, H it le r 's  views of the army "probably had 
th e ir  origins in his war experiences." To H it le r ,  the F irs t World 
War was a glorious "struggle for the existence of the German people," 
and i t  convinced him that the German Army was an organization "which 
could teach men the virtues of s a c rific e , devotion to a cause, physical
c c
courage, toughness and comradeship." The F irs t World War helped to 
convince him of the unique value of the German Army in the preservation 
of everything he admired in the German race.
H itle r  was convinced that the German Army formed the basic founda­
tion of German society as a whole. As H it le r  himself said: "What the
German people owes to the army can be b r ie f ly  summed up in a single
C J
w o rd ,... everything." H itle r  believed that the German Army imbued 
the German people with martial a ttitudes , and he was hopeful that a 
continuation of th is m ilita ry  influence upon the population would make 
Germany strong enough to avoid defeat in the next war. He described 
the influence of the German Army in the following manner: "The
German Army at the turn of the century was the most magnificent organi­
zation in the world and its  e ffec t on our German people one that was 
more than b e n efic ia l."68
H itle r  knew that he would have to re ly  upon the army to carry out 
his ideological goals. For this reason, he was determined to build the 
army back into the immense fighting machine i t  had been during the 
F irs t World War. H itle r  needed a strong army in order to carry out
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his intended wars of conquest. As he said himself: "No army with
a high in trin s ic  value can be trained, i f  the preparation for war is
69not the aim of its  existence." In order to accomplish this task, 
H itle r  was aware that he would have to capture control of the German 
General S ta ff. Therefore, i f  one wants to understand the relationship  
between H it le r  and the army, and the consequence of th is relationship  
in regards to H it le r 's  attempts to mold the army to suit his goals, 
one must examine the role of the General S ta ff in  H it le r 's  m ilita ry  
a ffa irs . Heinz Guderian described the purpose of the General S ta ff in 
the following manner:
During its  long existence the object of the 
General S ta ff Corps was to select those officers  
with the fin est brains and characters and so to tra in  
and educate them that they could lead the German 
armed forces in any circumstances....
The problem with the General S ta ff, as fa r as H itle r  was concerned, 
was that its  concept of the purpose and organization of the army did 
not conform to his visions of what he wished to accomplish. H itle r  
knew that his vision of to ta l war would require a restructuring of the 
German Army. H itle r  agreed with officers such as Heinz Guderian, who 
contended that "modern developments required reorganization along the 
lines of a combined armed forces and, in particu lar, a unified Supreme 
Command for a ll  those forces." The problem was that the older officers  
of the General S ta ff were blinded to new forms of organization by 
th e ir s t r ic t  adherence to m ilita ry  trad itio n . In addition, the older 
officers were not as enthusiastic about H itle r  or his regime as some
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of the younger o ffice rs , and they were unwilling to hand over the 
army to H it le r 's  absolute control. The older officers were more de­
termined to hold to the old trad itions that kept the army separated 
from the state , and H itle r  resented this a ttitu d e . Moreover, the more 
the older o fficers clung to th e ir  sense of tra d itio n , the more H itle r
began to d istrust th e ir competence and r e l ia b i l i t y  as leaders of the 
71armed forces.
In order to fa c il ita te  his capture of the General S ta ff and thereby 
gain control o f the German Army, H itle r  encouraged the Nazi Party to 
undermine the older traditions of the army and to replace those traditions  
with the new National S ocia lis t s p ir i t .  Unfortunately fo r H it le r , the 
steady growth of Party intervention in army a ffa irs  increased the amount 
of interorganizational fr ic tio n  at a ll  levels. The older officers wanted 
to avoid the encroachment of p o litic a l matters into army a ffa irs , and 
the Party zealots were concerned that the army was becoming a bastion 
fo r National Socialist opposition.
As successful as Party in f i lt r a t io n  might prove to be in capturing 
control of the army, H itle r  was by no means content to re ly  upon Party 
influence to control the army. Even though Party influence did under­
mine army resistance to outside control, H itle r  was determined to make 
his control of the army more complete and more personal. Therefore,
"a ll members of the armed services" were required to "take a new oath 
of loyalty" which forced them to swear unconditional obedience to 
Adolf H it le r . H itle r  wanted the complete control of a ll three branches 
of the armed forces, and he wanted to break the army leadership as a
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stronghold of resistance to his goals. He knew that the army was one
of the few "institutions in Germany... that represented a serious
72counterpoise to" his National Socialist philosophy. The new oath
of loyalty allowed H itle r  to "order the Army to do whatever he liked
without fear of any legal or constitutional check." Indeed, the oath
"removed any means of legally  defying H it le r , as the Armed Forces had
73promised obedience to H itle r  as a person, without any lim its ."
In addition to the new loyalty  oath, H it le r  proceeded to re ­
structure the army's organizational basis in order to remove any las t 
vestiges of res tra in t upon his po licies. He created his own personal 
command organization known as the Office of the High Command of the
Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW), which was to serve
74as his personal m ilita ry  s ta ff . The creation of new organizations
to f u l f i l l  his goals was a typical tac tic  which H itle r  used on numerous
occasions. By restructuring the army command structure and by creating 
new areas of authority, H itle r  was able to increase his personal 
control over policy matters.
Because of the army's fa ilu re  to perceive the dangers of H itle r 's  
concentration of power into his own hands, and of the ramifications of 
the new loyalty  oath, H itle r  was able to restructure the m ilita ry  in 
such a manner as to place himself in absolute authority. H itle r 's  
restructuring of the m ilita ry  gave him an extraordinary amount of 
in it ia t iv e  in p o lit ic a l-m ilita ry  a ffa irs , and he was determined to 
exploit his absolute power for the purpose of achieving his goals in 
both domestic and foreign a ffa irs .
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Role of the Party. The role that the National S ocialis t Party 
played in diplomatic administrative a f fa irs , was a reflection  of 
H itle r 's  basic policy of disseminating power among several organizations. 
Since H itle r  was'a firm  believer in organizational competition, he 
allowed various organizations to expand the range of th e ir  authority  
beyond th e ir designated areas of expertise. Such tactics enabled the 
Party and the m ilita ry  to expand th e ir involvement in diplomatic a ffa irs  
in competition with the Foreign O ffice. Therefore, to understand 
H itle r 's  diplomacy, i t  is necessary to recognize H it le r 's  personal 
views concerning the purpose of the Party and the role that i t  should 
play in his regime.
H itle r  conceived of the National Socialist Party as an instrument
that would unify the people and the government in order to achieve his
ideological goals. Moreover, he wanted his followers unified on a basis
of fa ith  in himself and National Socialism, rather than on a basis of
reason alone. H it le r  believed that he would have to inspire his
followers with "fanatic enthusiasm" in order to achieve his ideological
75goals, and he wanted to use the Party to achieve this aim.
H itle r  was more concerned with the s p ir it  of his followers than 
with the actual structure of any particular organization. He believed 
that any organization was worthless unless i t  unified the m ilitan t 
fa ith  of his followers behind his leadership. He was convinced that 
his goals could only be achieved through the creation of powerful and 
highly e ff ic ie n t p o litic a l organizations that were designed to carry 
out his instructions without delay or compromise.
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H itle r  forced a ll party members to swear eternal allegiance to
7 c
himself. H itle r  was w illin g  to grant his subordinates a certain  
amount of authority within th e ir  own fie lds of competence; however, 
he made i t  very clear that a ll  subordinates owed th e ir  ultimate loyalty  
to himself, and that he held supreme authority over a ll individuals 
and organizations.
Because of H it le r 's  reluctance to concentrate authority in the 
hands of any one organization or individual, there was a great need 
fo r the division of responsib ility  among his subordinates. Lower 
o ffic ia ls  were never certain which authority to follow , and many 
o ffic ia ls  often ignored commands from superiors. Subordinates could 
oppose the policy of superiors because they could claim that they were 
following the orders of another higher o f f ic ia l .77
The role which H itle r  planned for the Party in connection with 
diplomatic administration was to place loyal Party members in govern­
mental positions of authority. He believed that th is ta c tic  would 
allow him both to increase and ensure his personal authority. H itle r  
believed that the placement o f Party o ffic ia ls  into key positions, 
and the control of governmental functions by Party agencies would 
enable him to maintain a higher degree of control.
The Party's own Foreign Division began to encroach upon the pre­
rogatives o f the Foreign O ffice . This Foreign Division of the National 
S ocialis t Party, known as the Auslandorganisation, had been established 
in 1931 and was o rig in a lly  concerned only with maintaining contact with 
Party members who resided abroad. However, H itle r  encouraged the AO
41
to expand Its  a c tiv it ie s , and this organization soon began to in te r­
fere with many of the trad itio na l duties usually reserved for the 
Foreign O ffice. Moreover, the AO played an important role in helping 
the Nazi Party to gain control over the Foreign O ffice. Not only did 
the AO receive " ju risd ic tion  over a ll Germans residing abroad," but
i t  was also "placed in a position to pass judgment on the loyalty
78and effic iency of Germany's diplomatic representatives. The 
National S ocialis t Party was well prepared to compete with and in ­
f i l t r a t e  the regular bureaucracy of the Foreign O ffice.
However, by placing loyal Party members in positions of authority, 
H itle r  was never able to eliminate the fr ic t io n  between the older 
career o ffic ia ls  and the new Party appointees. The "career o ffic ia ls  
resented the sudden rise o f marginal elements of German society to 
positions of leadership over them." Moreover, H it le r  tended to reward 
Party work over simple length of service. He very often placed Party
workers "at the head of promotion lis ts  in front of career o ffic ia ls
79who had served... years in government positions."
H itle r 's  tactics did resu lt in a general penetration of Party 
members into governmental o ffices , but the government was not completely 
taken over by the Party. The "new-style party man" was "not the person
with dreams of social change but of personal advance for which party
80membership was useful." Therefore, the new Party members often 
joined the older o ff ic ia ls  in loyal disobedience. They were more in ­
terested in advancing th e ir careers than in implementing H it le r 's  un­
orthodox schemes.
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H itle r 's  Power in Diplomatic Practice
In order to understand the lim its and strengths of H it le r 's  power 
in dip!ornate practice i t  is necessary to examine the manner in which 
H itle r  organized his bureaucracy and his personal habits of adminis­
tra tiv e  procedure. Moreover, the lim its  and strengths of H it le r 's  
rule need to be examined in the context of H itle r 's  entire governmental 
apparatus, and should not be lim ited s tr ic t ly  to his diplomatic a ffa irs . 
H itle r 's  personal system of government allowed various organizations, 
such as the National S ocialis t Party, to in terfere  with diplomatic 
administration. Therefore, one needs to take into consideration the 
lim its  of strengths of H it le r 's  power in auxilia ry  fie ld s  as well as 
in the diplomatic f ie ld . Interference by outside organizations in diplo­
matic a ffa irs  contributed to the strengths and weaknesses of H itle r 's  
diplamacy. F ina lly , before examining H it le r 's  weaknesses and strengths 
in closer d e ta il, the reader should remember that H it le r  considered 
diplomacy useful only as a means of preparing for war.
Limits of H it le r 's  Power. One of the tra its  which lim ited H it le r 's  
effectiveness in the diplomatic fie ld  was his habit of choosing in ­
competent individuals to f i l l  important posts. Moreover, H it le r  stuck 
by his incompetent comrades even when th e ir lack of a b il ity  was apparent 
beyond question. He would even go so fa r as to suppress en tire ly
correct judgments "in order to ju s t ify  persons who seemed to him use- 
81fu l and devoted." H it le r  never demanded a great deal from his sub­
ordinates because he believed that no one could measure up to his own 
a b ilit ie s . He had an "extraordinarily high estimation of his own 
capabilities and consequently measured his fellow men by fa r more modest
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82standards  Since H it le r 's  p r io rity  in choosing associates rested
more upon his a b il ity  to manipulate people than upon th e ir ca p ab ilities ,
he did not overly concern himself about the competency of his personnel.
Another t r a i t  which inhibited H it le r 's  diplomatic effectiveness
was his aversion to administrative paperwork. The day-to-day details
of governmental administration bored him so much that he habitually
le f t  as much paperwork for his subordinates to handle as possible.
Therefore, i t  is not surprising that H itle r  preferred oral orders over
w ritten forms of communication. In fa c t, he "usually signed orders
without reading them when they concerned" only "personnel changes or
83administrative d e ta il."  Such practices resulted in a great deal of
confusion which H itle r 's  subordinates were unable to compensate for
because H itle r  "did not approve of any appreciable interchange of in -
84formation between departments which might weaken his own position." 
H itle r  was the only person in a position to coordinate administrative 
policy, but he refused to be tied  down to routine or to delegate the 
necessary authority to other individuals. He was content to le t  others 
run the day-to-day tasks of administration, but he was always wary of 
le ttin g  too much power s lip  out of his own hands.
H itle r 's  lack of personal experience in governmental administration 
was another factor which hampered his diplomatic effectiveness. H itle r  
was completely unfam iliar with the daily  workings of government when 
he assumed power. He had never been employed in an administrative 
office  of government, and his contact with the m ilita ry  bureaucracy 
during the F irs t World War had been conducted only on the lowest
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echelon lev e l. Moreover, H itle r 's  experiences within the Nazi Party
were characterized by unique circumstances which did not prepare him
for administrative techniques in the usual fashion. His major concern
as leader of the Nazi Party was to avoid any r iv a l claims to his own
position. Therefore, even though H itle r  believed that he could govern
Germany on the basis of his own unique experiences, he was unprepared
85to construct and lead a governmental bureaucracy.
Another one of H it le r 's  tra its  which lim ited the effectiveness of 
his diplomatic administration was his tendency to delay making hard 
decisions for problems which needed solutions. H itle r  was never as 
sure of himself as he liked others to th ink, and he would very often 
"avoid meetings with subordinates who might question" his decisions.
As a consequence, his subordinates were very often le f t  in the dark and 
they could never be en tire ly  certain ju s t exactly what H itle r 's  wishes 
entailed or how they should be carried out. His subordinates were le f t
oc
more or less on th e ir  own. H itle r  liked to hand down general policies 
from above and le t  his subordinates sort out the d e ta ils . He was 
mainly concerned with maintaining his own position and with increasing 
the power of Germany, and day-to-day administrative details did not 
concern him. He simply wanted to make the grandiose decisions that 
would keep his power in tact and would keep Germany moving in the 
direction that would accomplish his major goals.
Since H itle r  did not lik e  to concern himself with administrative 
d e ta ils , he le f t  himself open to subordinates who wanted to get his 
approval for various pet projects and schemes. As long as H itle r
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believed that his overall strategies were being carried out, he 
allowed hi s.adm inistrative bureaucracies a great deal of independence 
in th e ir own internal a ffa irs . Naturally, by allowing such freedom 
of action, and by fa ilin g  to make clear and detailed decisions, he con­
tributed to the ever increasing confusion which permeated his adminis­
tra tiv e  structure. For example, in 1937 H itle r  contributed to adminis­
tra tiv e  confusion in the f ie ld  of economics by granting his subordinate 
Hermann Goring many of the same powers as his acting minister 
of economics, Hjalmar Schacht. Even the resignation of Schacht a fte r  
a year of fu t ile  struggle against Goring's encroachments upon his
87authority fa iled  to restore order to Germany's economic administration.
Another factor which added to the amount of administrative con­
fusion in H itle r 's  government was the unbridled competition that H itle r  
encouraged between his subordinates and the various organizations that 
they represented. H it le r  believed that his o ff ic ia ls  would carry out 
th e ir assignments more e ffe c tiv e ly  i f  he gave them a certain amount of 
authority and freedom of action. However, as soon as H it le r 's  sub­
ordinates were given a position of authority, they inevitably attempted 
to "build up th e ir  own administrative empires and to provide jobs for 
th e ir personal supporters." As Rich argues, H it le r 's  "deliberate en­
couragement of in it ia t iv e  and r iv a lry  among his followers brought to 
the fore the most power hungry and ruthless" of men who were more con­
cerned with maintaining th e ir  own power than with advancing H itle r 's  
88goals. The competition which H it le r  encouraged among his sub­
ordinates allowed him to maintain ultimate authority in a ll decisions,
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however, the lack of a centralized and logical administration made his 
system in e ffic ie n t.
The combination of H it le r 's  tremendous w ill power and his 
undomitable sense of mission also lim ited his diplomatic effectiveness. 
H itle r  believed that there were no lim its  to his power, and his sense 
of mission convinced him that he could disregard moral laws and ethical 
behavior in his quest to accomplish his goals. H itle r  based his con­
cept of le g a lity  upon what he saw as the eternal laws of nature. He 
wanted to create a new m orality for the fu ture, and he fe l t  no com­
punction at v io lating the trad itional laws of diplomatic procedure.
He was determined to recognize no restraints upon his actions in his 
quest to accomplish his goals, and he was more than w illin g  to sacrifice  
moral and ethical behavior in order to achieve tactica l successes in 
his policy aims.*^
H itle r 's  lack of concern for ethics was a reflection  of his con­
fidence in his mission and his personal a b il it ie s . The more success 
H itle r  achieved in accomplishing his goals, "the more condescendingly 
he regarded those who actually knew better than he, and the more con­
firmed he f e l t  in the pseudo-scientific doctrines with which he
90ju s tif ie d  his po lic ies ." Moreover, H itle r  never seemed to p ro fit  
from his mistakes. He seemed to learn nothing from defeats and refused 
to question his doctrines, even as they began to fa i l  him with in ­
creasing regu larity  in the face of harsh re a lit ie s . For example, 
according to Heinz Guderian, H it le r 's  m ilita ry  defeats on the Russian 
front c learly  showed the lim itations of Germany's strength, however,
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H itle r "did not conclude from th is that he must e ither break o ff the 
undertaking or at least choose more modest objectives." On the con­
tra ry , H itle r  became even more reckless in his determination to force
91defeat upon the Russians. H itle r  simply deluded himself into 
thinking that his w ill power would carry him through any number of 
defeats until he was ultim ately successful.
Strengths of H it le r 's  Power. One of the tra its  which contributed 
to H itle r 's  personal power in the diplomatic fie ld  was the degree of 
his own personal authority. Even though H it le r 's  subordinates might 
implement his orders according to th e ir own inclinations, his major 
policy aims were never appreciably obstructed. During his rise to 
power, H itle r had gradually subjected every s ign ifican t group and 
organization to his personal authority, and his administrative 
apparatus was no exception. Therefore, even though "opponents might 
occasionally sidetrack or sabotage his programs," H itle r  retained 
ultimate authority in the determination of "German policy during the 
Nazi e ra ." ^
Since H itle r  retained ultimate authority in a l l  decisions, he
knew that he could act quickly and even against accepted practices
without fear of re s tra in t. In fa c t, H itle r  occasionally changed his
course even though his actions "d irectly  contradicted his previous 
93position." H it le r 's  position of supreme authority enabled him to 
take advantage of any opportunity in foreign a ffa irs  which called for 
quick and decisive action, and there was nothing that H it le r  would not 
consider doing i f  the situation presented the slightest opportunity of 
success.
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Another factor which contributed to H itle r 's  personal power was
his charisma. H itle r  seemed to possess a "psychological force" which
94radiated "from him lik e  a magnetic f ie ld ."  By the exercise of his
hypnotic w ill he could compel men to follow him even against th e ir
better judgment. Moreover, he capitalized upon his psychological
a b ilit ie s  by convincing his opponents that he could not be deterred
from pursuing his goals. H it le r 's  adversaries were more than convinced
that he was "not b luffing when he threatened drastic re ta lia tio n  for
any resistance" to his demands, and they were "unwilling to risk the
95consequences of denying him whatever momentary object he sought."
In fa c t, most of H itle r 's  antagonists backed down again and again, 
rather than face the re ta lia tio n  that H it le r  promised to unleash i f  
his demands were not fu lf i l le d  to his satisfaction . For example, 
both Neville Chamberlain and Daladier, the English and French prime 
ministers who represented the Western democracies at the Munich con­
ference in 1938, agreed to a ll of H itle r 's  demands rather than risk  
fighting a major European war over the disputed Czech te rr ito ry  which 
H itle r  wanted to incorporate into Nazi Germany.
One additional aspect of H it le r 's  charisma which helped him to 
achieve his goals was his a b il ity  to switch roles from one moment to 
the next. By changing his stance on any issue without notice, H itle r  
was able to confuse his antagonists and to put them o ff balance.
Whether H it le r  was "driven by reason, by temperament, or by dark 
instincts ," according to Schramm, he "was more enigmatic than anyone 
in German history had ever been before him," and he was able to use
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96his mysterious nature to help him advance his diplomatic goals.
H itle r  took advantage of any device which helped him to achieve his 
aims, and he realized very early in his career that he could use his 
dynamic presence as a weapon in the pursuit of his ideological goals.
Another factor which played a positive role in H it le r 's  diplo­
matic technique was the combination of his knowledge of technical 
matters, especially in the m ilita ry  f ie ld ,  and his outstanding memory. 
H itle r 's  remarkable memory, according to Schramm, together with his 
"iron diligence and a strong power of concentration," enabled him "to 
acquire knowledge of a scope and deta il that again and again amazed 
persons talking with him, and earned him sincere admiration." And 
partly  as a consequence of his memory, H itle r  was able to assume the 
dominant role in almost a ll situations. His memory proved especially 
useful when dealing with large numbers of subordinates and huge amounts 
of paperwork. His subordinates "had to be meticulously careful that 
what they said agreed completely with whatever they had told him e a r lie r ."
H itle r  was always on the a le rt for insubordination among his o ff ic ia ls ,
97and the slightest inconsistency would arouse his suspicions.
H itle r 's  knowledge of m ilita ry  technology, in combination with his 
excellent memory, contributed to his personal power because he was able 
to remain on a par with his alleged experts. His technological knowledge 
and understanding of the procedures of modern warfare placed him on
go
solid ground in his discussions with General S ta ff o ffice rs . More­
over, H itle r  was especially adept at recognizing the diplomatic po­
ten tia l of Germany's armed forces. For example, H it le r  recognized that
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he could achieve many of his p o litic a l objectives by threatening to 
use Germany's armed forces to s ta rt a major European war i f  his 
opponents fa iled  to agree to his demands. Such tactics as H itle r 's  
march into the Rhineland in 1936, the Anschluss with Austria in 1938, 
and the incorporation of the Czech te rr ito ry  known as the Sudetenland 
into Nazi Germany in 1938, were a ll  examples of H itle r 's  successful 
use of m ilita ry  force to achieve diplomatic objectives. His detailed  
knowledge of what was feasible in the m ilita ry  sphere, contributed to 
his confidence of what was possible in the diplomatic sphere. Moreover, 
H itle r 's  knowledge of m ilita ry  potential was especially important since 
he fu lly  intended to back up his threats with m ilita ry  force. H it le r 's  
foreign policy aims were based almost en tire ly  upon what could be 
achieved through the use of force, and his m ilita ry  knowledge provided 
him with an insight into what could be achieved in the diplomatic f ie ld  
through the use of m ilita ry  force.
Another factor which contributed to H it le r 's  power was the w illin g ­
ness of many of his administrative o ffic ia ls  to put up with his un­
orthodox procedures, as long as he kept improving Germany's position 
in European a ffa irs . The German people were more than ready to accept 
a strong leader who promised to remove the humiliation of Versailles  
and make Germany strong once again. "In the chaos and despair of a 
defeated country, i t  was e a s ie r ... to put one's fa ith  in one man who
would take care of everything than assume a share of the responsibility
99for the agonizing choices" that had to be made. Therefore, a fte r  
H itle r  reestablished the German Army in 1935, almost the entire  nation
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supported him because he successfully defied the Versailles peace 
settlement which the Western democracies had imposed upon Germany.
H itle r  had a profound impact upon international diplomacy while 
he was the ru ler of Nazi Germany. His character t r a i ts ,  his ideological 
framework, and his unique position of authority were a ll aspects which 
contributed to the manner in which he reshaped trad itional diplomacy 
according to to ta lita r ia n  concepts.
By comparing H itle r 's  diplomacy with Mussolini's, especially in 
regard to the d iffe ren t approaches to the conduct of international 
relations which each dictator introduced into the f ie ld  of diplomacy, 
i t  is possible to gain a better understanding of the differences be­
tween the trad itional diplomacy of the past, where the Great European 
powers essentially agreed upon the necessity of preserving a peaceful 
status quo while allowing for minor changes to occur through diplomatic 
negotiation, and to ta lita r ia n  diplomacy, which denied the necessity of 
preserving a peaceful status quo and indeed promoted the use of force 
to bring about s ign ifican t changes in the European nation-state system. 
The new procedures which each dictator introduced into the f ie ld  of 
diplomatic a ffa irs  dramatically changed the manner in which nation states 
conducted th e ir diplomacy. Therefore, in order to point out how each 
dictator contributed to the establishment of this new form of diplomacy, 
i t  is necessary to examine Mussolini's diplomacy in the same manner as 
H itle r 's  diplomacy.
I I I .  MUSSOLINI'S DIPLOMACY
In order to understand the manner in which Mussolini conducted 
his diplomacy i t  is necessary to examine both his personal habits 
and his ideological framework. Before examining Mussolini's personal 
tra its  in closer d e ta il, however, i t  is necessary to consider the 
argument that Mussolini did not possess a long-term plan for world 
domination. Unlike H it le r , who had a long-term plan which he pursued 
with unwavering persistance, Mussolini possessed no concrete plans for  
world domination. In fa c t, as Laurence Lafore argues in his book,
The End of Glory, Mussolini's foreign policy was "mostly a matter of 
impulse and expediency wholly undisciplined by the slightest regard for  
trad itio na l rules of diplomacy or by principles or long-run objectives." 
I t  is true that Mussolini wanted to establish a new "Roman Empire" 
for Fascist I ta ly ,  but he did not possess a coherent plan for achieving 
this goal. He was more concerned about his own power and the prestige 
of his rule than about vague plans for the future of his country. In 
his book, Mussolini, Denis Mack Smith maintains that Mussolini was "an 
improviser who invented his policy anew each d a y ." ^  Mussolini was 
w illin g  to take advantage of opportunities which might increase his 
power or the prestige of I ta ly ,  but he had no specific plans for a 
great war or for conquering the world.
I t  is true that Mussolini knew how to consolidate and maintain 
his own power in I ta ly ,  but in the realm of foreign a ffa irs  he was
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s tr ic t ly  an amateur. Mussolini wanted to increase his own power and 
prestige by creating a new colonial empire which would make Ita ly  
the dominant power in the Mediterranean basin; however, he lacked 
the necessary expertise in foreign a ffa irs  to achieve his goals.
Mussolini as Leader
Mussolini's complex personal character and his ideological frame­
work are factors which must be taken into consideration in order to 
understand the workings of his leadership. One of Mussolini's dominant 
personal tra its  was his constant concern about image. Consequently, 
as Max Gallo affirms in his book, Mussolini's I t a ly , Mussolini 
"placed the greatest importance in the slightest portrayal of himself,"
and he would personally "examine every photograph in which he appeared"
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to see i f  i t  should be "published by the newspapers." In fa c t, he 
was so preoccupied with his great sense of showmanship that the 
effic iency of his administration suffered as a resu lt. Mussolini 
rare ly  made the e ffo rt to see i f  his policies were carried out be­
cause he was more interested in th e ir propaganda value than in th e ir  
actual application. Mussolini wanted to maintain the appearance that 
he was a strong leader, but in re a lity  he avoided making d if f ic u lt  
decisions whenever possible and relied  upon his omniscient facade 
to carry him through d i f f ic u lt  situations.
Mussolini's subordinates actually helped him to maintain his image
because they realized that th e ir  own future depended upon Mussolini's 
103position. His subordinates knew that the more powerful th e ir  
dictator appeared, the more secure th e ir own positions would be.
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Therefore, they in tentionally  encouraged the b e lie f that Mussolini
could do no wrong and that a ll Ita lian s  should obey his commands
without question. Consequently, as one might expect, Mussolini
started to believe in his own in f a l l ib i l i t y  and decided that he
needed servants rather than capable subordinates. He was convinced
that he could simply issue orders and dispense with any kind of advice
because he believed that he needed none.
Mussolini was so concerned about images that he wanted his Fascist
state to appear as in fa ll ib le  as himself. As Ivone Kirkpatrick
affirms in his book, Mussolini: A Study in Power, the Puce wanted to
maintain the facade that "in Fascist Ita ly  no one in authority ever
fa ile d , and i f  men disappeared from public l i f e ,  i t  was only because
104in the natural order of things one guard was replaced by another." 
Whenever Mussolini discovered that he could not rely upon a particular  
subordinate he usually tried  to avoid any public scandal. He pre­
ferred simply to replace the individual in question and dismiss the 
change in personnel as routine procedure. Moreover, Mussolini's con­
cern about image extended to a ll  facets of his regime. For example, 
according to Mack Smith, he was so concerned about projecting the 
proper image abroad that he often treated his foreign o ffice  as simply 
"a ministry of propaganda." In addition, not only would Mussolini 
grant numerous interviews to foreign correspondents, but he would 
also give them privileged information that not even ambassadors were
told so that he could ensure fla tte r in g  comments about himself 
105abroad. Mussolini's extraordinary concern about his image had a
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profound e ffec t upon the manner in which he conducted his diplomacy.
Another one of Mussolini's tra its  which affected his leadership
technique was his dynamic charisma. In a manner sim ilar to that of 
H itle r* Mussolini had the a b il ity  to convince people to follow him.
As Mack Smith maintains, Mussolini was aware of the benefits of 
switching roles at w i l l ,  and he could change "his role from hour to 
hour to su it the occasion." He liked to use this technique to keep 
his adversaries o ff balance and to project the image of a leader who
was in complete control and who could change tack without notice and
without concern for the consequences. Unfortunately, Mussolini be­
came so adept at changing his character that he lost the a b ility  to 
stick to a decided course of action for an extended period of time. 
According to Mack Smith, Mussolini often moved from resolution to in ­
decision. " I t  was as though he never knew his genuine se lf and was
1 Ofialways striv ing a fte r  some counterfeit impersonation." By fostering 
a mysterious image and by changing his position without notice, 
Mussolini believed that he could maintain personal control over events. 
He was convinced that his rapidly changing character would prevent 
anyone from anticipating his moves, and that therefore he could remain 
one step ahead of his opponents.
One positive feature of Mussolini's character was his a b ility  to 
charm his opponents. Much lik e  H it le r , Mussolini had a personal mag­
netism which he could use to impress people and to bend them towards 
his way of thinking. In fa c t, Mussolini was so adept at changing his 
character in order to manipulate people and control situations that i t
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became almost impossible to determine when he was serious or when he
was simply playing a part. Mussolini could play any ro le , and he used
this a b il ity  to convince the Ita lia n  people that he was a great leader.
He created "the image of an iron, indomitable Puce, who knew exactly
107what he wanted and where he was going."
Mussolini's oratorical a b ility  was another feature which influenced 
his leadership technique. Mussolini "liked to pretend that he dis­
approved of making speeches as something essentially unfascist, yet
108in practice they were one of his chief preoccupations." Mussolini 
knew that mass po litics  in the twentieth century would dominate a ffa irs ,  
and that e ffective  leaders must guide the masses in the direction they 
desire, and that his oratorical a b ility  could help him accomplish this  
goal. Kirkpatrick described Mussolini's oratorical power as follows:
As an orator he was a master of every tr ic k  with 
which the demagogue binds his audience. His s ty le , 
and he prided himself on the fa c t, was peculiar to 
himself and essentia lly u n - Ita lia n ...  but he could, 
when required, dramatize h im se lf... and... whip up-,,^ 
the enthusiasm of the crowd.
Mussolini was a very e ffective  speaker who could manipulate his 
audiences with re la tive  ease. He could sense what they wanted to hear 
and ju s t how fa r he could push them in his direction. In fa c t, as 
Macgregor Knox notes in his study, Mussolini Unleached, "no less an 
expert than H itle r  te s tif ie d  to the genuineness of the emotions" that 
Mussolini could rouse "in the masses."^10
Mussolini knew that he would have to capture as much popular 
support as possible in order to maintain his position, and therefore
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he was determined to maintain his hold over the masses. Mussolini 
believed that the essential a rt of government was the effective use 
of propaganda, and he was convinced that the masses would be easy to 
deceive and dominate. Mussolini was convinced that the Ita lia n  people 
were unable to make th e ir own decisions and that they preferred to be 
commanded. Therefore, he believed that i t  was only natural that he 
should be the sole ru ler of Ita ly .
Another one of Mussolini's personal tra its  which influenced his 
leadership a b il ity  was his lack of practical experience in governmental 
a ffa irs . Like H it le r , he knew very l i t t l e  about governmental adminis­
tration  or about foreign a ffa irs  when he assumed power. In fa c t, as 
Laura Fermi points out in her book, Mussolini, most of the Puce's 
"p o litica l ideas were shallow or objectionable, or b o th ." ^  More­
over, an important "consequence of Mussolini's s u p e rfic ia lity  was that
he almost never spent time or energy delving deeply into the details
112of governmental administration." Much lik e  H it le r , Mussolini also 
hated the daily routine of administrative paperwork. He used to leave 
as much work as possible in the hands of his subordinates, fo r he was 
not concerned about da ily  routine as long as the major policy decisions 
were le f t  to him, and as long as he maintained the righ t to intervene 
whenever he f e l t  i t  was necessary. As one might expect, Mussolini's 
lack of experience in governmental a ffa irs  coupled with his ignorance 
of administrative details  severely crippled his conduct of foreign 
a ffa irs .
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The combination of Mussolini's ignorance and his unwillingness 
to delegate any substantive authority to his subordinates hampered 
his a b ility  to achieve his goals. Mussolini was determined to handle 
a ll aspects of his regime personally, whether he was capable of such 
a task or not. He liked to appear as the indispensable leader who 
was in charge of everything. Unfortunately, Mussolini did not have the 
experience to f u l f i l l  such a ro le , even i f  i t  had been possible to do so.
Another one of Mussolini's personal tra its  which helped to shape 
his leadership techniques was his aversion to cooperating with others.
He liked to avoid contact with other people and to play the part of the 
loner. According to Mack Smith, not only did Mussolini d istrust almost 
everyone, but he also respected very few of his subordinates. Mussolini 
"assumed that everyone was u tte rly  selfish and nearly everyone in­
competent and untrustworthy." Moreover, Mussolini considered himself 
superior to the common man, and he believed that he did not require 
the advice of others. Mussolini was convinced that a strong leader 
should have no equals and that he should at least appear to make a ll 
important decisions without consultation. Mussolini ju s tif ie d  "his
solitude by claiming that he did not need advice and rarely f e l t  the
113need even to discuss policy with anyone.
As Kirkpatrick argues, Mussolini's " fa ilu re  to establish any basis 
of trus t between himself" and his subordinates "was exceedingly damaging 
to the orderly conduct of a ffa irs ."  His determination to intervene in 
a ll aspects of policy, coupled with his tendency to change tack at the 
slightest whim, destroyed any semblance of consistency in his policies.
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Mussolini's "decisions were often taken suddenly without knowledge of
114the facts or time to give them the necessary consideration."
Mussolini's fancy for ignoring regular administrative channels 
and suddenly announcing major policy changes might have bolstered his 
image as the omniscient d ic ta to r, but his tactics also le f t  his sub­
ordinates with no real responsib ility , and they became wary of acting 
upon th e ir own in it ia t iv e . Therefore, v ir tu a lly  none of Mussolini's 
subordinates had the power or the desire to m itigate his irresponsible 
actions.
According to Macgregor Knox, "Mussolini had a hidden weakness in
dealing with individuals, and was incapable of choosing or retaining
115competent subordinates." Moreover, he did not lik e  to surround him­
s e lf with subordinates who showed more than moderate a b il ity  because 
he was always anxious to appear superior. Also lik e  H it le r , he be­
lieved that loyal incompetents were better suited to his personal style  
of government than people of character who might be brave enough to 
disagree with him and cause internal dissension. I t  is not surprising 
therefore that the m ajority of themen Mussolini appointed to o ffice  
were un intelligent and incompetent. However, Mussolini was always 
on guard to maintain his facade of in f a l l ib i l i t y ,  and whenever some­
one complained about the quality  of a particular subordinate, Mussolini
would "ignore the accusation whenever possible as he could not afford
1 1 fito le t  the public know that he had made a bad choice."
Even Mussolini's concern fo r public appearances, however, did not 
prevent him from changing his subordinates at frequent in tervals.
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Mussolini was determined that no one with genuine ta lent would remain 
in the same position of authority for an extended period of time. He 
believed that such tactics would prevent potential riva ls  from gaining 
too much power. Mussolini had a "deep-seated d istrust of his sub­
ordinates" and he delighted in dismissing them "without warning or 
explanation," even i f  i t  meant replacing "experienced administrators 
with unqualified n o n e n tit ie s ." ^
Mussolini's tendency to surround himself with incompetent sub­
ordinates was in part a re flection  of his desire to assume a ll the 
cred it for any successes, and to assign blame to others for any fa ilu res . 
Of course, Mussolini could not possibly run the entire  state apparatus 
alone, and this meant that an army of temporary subordinates, most 
without any real authority, were expected to carry out state policies 
and make up for Mussolini's deficiencies. As Denis Mack Smith points 
out in his book, I t a ly , Mussolini disliked taking responsibility for
policy decisions, and he therefore placed the burden of responsibility
118upon his incompetent and powerless subordinates. In the same manner 
as H it le r , Mussolini disliked arguments and confrontations, and he 
preferred to ignore problems rather than face the d i f f ic u lt  decisions 
that had to be made. Unfortunately, Mussolini structured his adminis­
tra tiv e  system in such a manner that his incompetent and powerless 
subordinates were unable to compensate for his lack of leadership.
In almost a ll matters of policy, Mussolini allowed himself to 
d r i f t  in any direction that looked advantageous. Mussolini placed a 
great value on the a b il ity  to change course rapidly whenever expediency
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required i t .  He had l i t t l e  fa ith  in consistency, for he had learned
the value of alternating his stance to f i t  d iffe ren t circumstances.
He considered everything legitim ate that might increase his power,
and he never followed a set program. According to K irkpatrick,
Mussolini was a man who “re lied  on fa ith , w ill power, and in tu itio n
rather than on in te lle c t,"  and “i f  he enunciated a princip le , i t  was
only to ju s t ify  a particular policy to which he was momentarily 
119attached." The longer Mussolini remained in power, the more he 
came to re ly  upon his own judgments in making foreign policy decisions.
In a manner sim ilar to that of H it le r , Mussolini refused to accept 
the re a lity  of his s ituation , and he believed that forceful action would 
compensate for his po lic ies, even i f  they were misguided. In fa c t, 
Mussolini even "admitted that he in s tin c tive ly  resorted to action in
ion
moments when he did not know what to do."  ̂ Mussolini was anxious 
to maintain his image as a decisive leader, and he would rather take 
inappropriate action, than appear indecisive. He wanted to be remembered 
as a great leader who was master of his own destiny, and he was w illin g  
to follow any course which might bolster this image.
Mussolini looked back fondly to the days of the old Roman Empire, 
and he wanted his regime to emulate and even surpass i t .  He was de­
termined not only to expand Ita ly 's  colonial possessions, but also to 
make his Fascist system the new inspiration of the revis ion ist powers 
of Eastern Europe who were dissatisfied  with the Versailles peace 
settlement. However, Ita ly  could not compete with the increasing 
power of H it le r 's  Germany, and Mussolini was forced to follow in 
H itle r 's  footsteps. As H it le r 's  Germany became more powerful
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Mussolini became more jealous. According to Nolte, H it le r 's  power 
and "style o f foreign policy appealed to Mussolini's temperament as 
nothing had ever done before," and without a second thought he
121committed Fascist Ita ly 's  future to the success of H itle r 's  Germany.
Mussolini was so anxious to follow in H it le r 's  path and gain glory
and prestige for himself and Ita ly  that he pushed his country into the
Second World War without considering the real dangers of his actions.
Indeed, as Deakin points out, "the Puce in person bore the historical
122responsibility for the entry of Ita ly  into the war."
Aggravated by his natural egotism, Mussolini's jealousy drove him
to attempt to match H it le r 's  power and prestige. As Deakin argues,
Mussolini's jealousy of Germany's power never abated even in the face
of to ta l defeat. Even when the Germans made unjustified aspersions as
to the quality of Ita lia n  troops fighting in Russia, and blamed them for
recent defeats, "Mussolini could not, for reasons of prestige, bring
123himself to recall the whole Ita lia n  armed expeditionary corps."
Mussolini believed that i f  he recalled Ita lia n  troops, then the Germans 
would be ju s tif ie d  in proclaiming the superiority of th e ir  troops. 
Mussolini recognized H it le r 's  b ru ta lity  and his indifference to Ita ly 's  
in terests, but he was so fascinated by H it le r 's  strength of purpose 
and immense power that he could not bring himself to disagree with 
him. As H itle r  became more powerful, Mussolini became more wary of 
thwarting H it le r 's  wishes. In a sense, Mussolini feared H itle r as 
much as he admired him. He was anxious to cap ita lize  on H itle r 's  
growing strength, even though he knew that his own position would grow
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weaker as H itle r  became stronger. As William Halperin maintains in
his book, Mussolini and Ita lia n  Fascism, "Mussolini could not have been
altogether blind to" the dangers of forming an alliance with H it le r ,
124"but he refused to change his course." As with Mussolini's other 
personal t r a its ,  his jealous nature dras tica lly  influenced his actions 
in foreign policy.
T e rr ito ria l Expansion
In dealing with Mussolini's ideological framework, one must re­
member that Mussolini was always more concerned about his personal 
image and prestige than about obscure and long-term po lic ies. He was 
particu larly  anxious to make his mark upon Ita lia n  history by restoring 
I ta ly  to her former greatness. In Mussolini's view, the creation of an 
Ita lia n  colonial empire would dramatically improve his own personal image. 
Therefore, he decided to explo it international "riva lries  among nations
125for the satisfaction of Ita ly 's  te r r ito r ia l and colonial ambitions "
Mussolini believed that colonial expansion would be very beneficial
for himself and his country. In fa c t, the following excerpt from
Mussolini's own p o litic a l essay, The Doctrine of Fascism, underscores
his desire for colonial expansion: "For Fascism the growth of empire,
that is to say the expansion of the nation, is an essential manifesta-
1tation of v i t a l i t y ,  and its  opposite a sign of decadence." He 
believed that the creation of a new Ita lia n  Empire would not only re­
generate the Ita lia n  people, but would also bring added glory and 
prestige to himself as the new "modern Caesar" of Ita ly . Therefore,
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he extolled a ll of the virtues of "classical" imperalism in order to
convince the Ita lia n  people that colonial expansion was the only
possible answer to a ll of Ita ly 's  problems. Mussolini promised his
people that colonial expansion would improve the economy, provide new
liv ing  space for Ita ly 's  growing population, and make Ita ly  a powerful
nation once again. In re a lity , Mussolini's colonial aspirations
actually amounted to "no more than a collection of deserts." However,
Mussolini was determined to pursue a colonial policy, and he was
re la tiv e ly  unconcerned about the actual consequences of his expansionist
127aims as long as his foreign wars appeared successful.
In his quest for colonial expansion, i t  was Mussolini's intention  
to impart a m ilita ry  style to his foreign policy. Mussolini was de­
termined to increase Ita ly 's  m ilita ry  strength and to teach his people 
to consider themselves in a permanent state of war as preparation for 
te r r ito r ia l expansion. He was convinced that Ita ly  was destined to be 
the new leader of Europe, and he wanted to increase Ita ly 's  te r r ito r ia l  
size and m ilita ry  strength in order to f u l f i l l  this ro le. Therefore, 
Mussolini "decided to speed the equipment of the armed forces" and to
increase the frequency of m ilita ry  maneuvers in order to prepare for
128colonial expansion.
Iro n ic a lly , Mussolini the radical so c ia lis t had once ridiculed the 
Ita lia n  government for wasting national resources on colonial adventures, 
but once he came to power he became trapped by his own Fascist propa­
ganda. Because Fascism was intended to represent action, power, and 
growth, i t  became more and more necessary for Mussolini to secure
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te r r ito r ia l successes abroad. The maintenance of Fascism and his own 
power and position became more important to Mussolini than socia list 
ideology. Therefore, he began to press for a colonial empire with 
increased earnestness, and he claimed that he was w illin g  to use force 
i f  necessary. In addition, when his o ffic ia ls  explained to him that 
Ita ly  lacked the economic and financial capability  for colonial ex-
129pans ion, he simply dismissed th e ir arguments as being "irre levant."  
Mussolini was so concerned about prestige and conquest that he tended 
to ignore any evidence that might contradict his plans. In fa c t, 
Mussolini never seriously questioned the fe a s ib ility  of his plans. He 
simply wanted to make trouble abroad in the expectation that Ita ly  
might prosper as a resu lt. His aim was to keep various regions in a 
continuous state of flu x  and to increase a ll potential conflicts when­
ever possible. He believed that such actions would weaken his opponents 
and leave the way open fo r a stronger Ita lia n  presence.
One of the major factors which contributed to Mussolini's desire 
to create an Ita lia n  Empire was his overpowering and insatiable ambition. 
Once firm ly established in power, Mussolini "could not res is t the
temptation to cut a fig u re  " He wanted to accomplish something
dramatic in foreign a ffa irs  in order to prove that his leadership was 
resulting in great things for Ita ly . Because of Mussolini's continual 
boasting that he would make Ita ly  a Great Power, he f in a lly  began to
feel "obliged to find an easily beaten opponent in order to practice
130what he had preached." Therefore, in order to ju s t ify  his regime, 
Mussolini began to look towards Africa as the "logical" area for 
colonial expansion.
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As Mussolini examined Africa for potential areas of conquest, i t  
soon became apparent that Abyssinia was a lik e ly  area fo r his im­
p e ria lis tic  ambitions. Not only did Abyssinia border "upon the 
Ita lia n  colonies of E ritrea to the north and Somaliland to the south­
east," but i t  had also been recognized as belonging "in the Ita lia n
131sphere of influence by" the other "European colonial powers." In 
addition, an attack upon Abyssinia would afford Mussolini an opportunity 
to "avenge" Ita ly 's  defeat at Adowa during the la te  nineteenth century. 
Consequently, Mussolini hoped that his planned invasion of Abyssinia 
would meet with l i t t l e  d irect resistance from the other European powers. 
Moreover, Mussolini confidently expected that Abyssinia could be con­
quered quickly so as to avoid a costly war, and to demonstrate the 
in v in c ib ility  of Ita ly 's  new m ilita ry  machine.
One aspect which helped Mussolini in his quest for colonial ex­
pansion was his a b il ity  to convince the Ita lia n  people to support him.
He convinced the Ita lia n  people they had a righ t to demand equal status 
with the other Great Powers. He stepped up his propaganda campaign 
against the Western Powers, blaming them fo r opposing Ita lia n  colonial 
aspirations solely for the purpose of protecting th e ir  own foreign 
possessions. He was assisted in this regard by the actions taken by 
the League of Nations a fte r  he invaded Abyssinia. When the Ita lia n  
people learned about the economic sanctions which the League of Nations 
had imposed upon Ita ly  in order to punish Ita lia n  aggression they 
ra llie d  behind him. Even though the sanctions proved to be largely  
ineffectual, "to the Ita lia n  people, ignorant of the intrigue behind 
the scenes," and "exposed only to the Fascist viewpoint, the very idea
132of sanctions," seemed not only unfair but also an in justice .
Mussolini was quick to recognize the advantage of using his
propaganda machine to cap ita lize  upon Ita lia n  discontent for his own
purposes. Years of Fascist rule "had le f t  most Ita lians too confused
for honest s e lf-c rit ic is m ,"  and Mussolini persuaded the Ita lia n  people
that the Abyssinian war was a defensive war, "fought against a savage
133and brutal aggressor " Mussolini claimed that the Abyssinians
were savage people who had fa iled  to conform to international law and
that Ita ly  had a righ t to protect its  legitim ate interests.
The Abyssinian war proved to be a disaster for Mussolini and his
country in the long run. The added burden of preparing for a costly
war which Mussolini insisted must be won as quickly as possible eroded
the caliber of Mussolini's administration. Corruption among government
o ffic ia ls  began to spread dramatically as those who were responsible
fo r m ilita ry  preparations began to practice favoritism and allowed
134dishonesty to flourish . Moreover, Mussolini's "parady of an empire.
gave many Ita lian s  a wholly fa lse impression of th e ir country's po-
135te n tia l strength and th e ir  leader's a b il it ie s ."  The Ita lia n  people 
fa ile d  to recognize the true costs of the Abyssinian campaign. Instead 
they clung to the illu s io n  that Ita ly  had emerged as a great power and 
that Mussolini could accomplish any task he cared to set for himself 
and Ita ly . The tragedy of these misconceptions was that Mussolini 
began to believe in his own in f a l l ib i l i t y .  Consequently, Mussolini 
continued his aggressive moves in foreign a ffa irs  and pushed Ita ly  
into an increasingly isolated position. He had no choice but to turn 
to H itle r 's  Germany in order to avoid complete iso lation .
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I t  seemed only natural to Mussolini that Germany and Ita ly  should 
be a llie s . Not only did Mussolini believe that Germany would win the 
future war, but he was also fla tte red  by the manner in which the Nazi 
regime copied many aspects of his own Fascist system. Mussolini liked  
to think of himself as the model for the new Fascist bloc which would 
control Europe a fte r  the war. In addition, Germany and Ita ly  shared 
the same desire to expand by te r r ito r ia l conquest. For a ll of these 
reasons, Mussolini convinced himself that he should move closer to 
H itle r 's  Germany in order to gain more support for his own plans of 
conquest.
As Robert Herzstein points out in his book, Adolf H itle r  and The
German Trauma, "Mussolini was impressed by German might, and lik e  a
jackal he wished to pick up the crumbs that might fa l l  from the German 
136table ." Therefore, when i t  appeared that Germany was about to
achieve a to ta l victory over the French in 1940, Mussolini quickly
took advantage of the opportunity to jo in  in the attack in order to
present his claims for te r r ito r ia l compensation at the expected armistice
ta lks. I t  soon became apparent, however, that Mussolini's "Fascism
never possessed the ruthless drive, le t  alone the material strength,
137of National Socialism." Indeed, as the relationship between 
Mussolini and H itle r  continued, Mussolini became more and more the student 
instead of the teacher. Unlike H it le r , Mussolini fa iled  to appreciate 
that his revis ion ist and colonial po lic ies, i f  carried to th e ir logical 
extreme, would upset the trad itional balance of power on the European 
continent. Mussolini might have been able to avoid the destruction
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of Fascist I ta ly ,  however, he was so anxious to gain glory and prestige
for himself and his country that he allowed Ita ly  to become "a camp
follower in the march of German expansion, and whether victorious or
138defeated she thus stood to lose a l l ."  Because Mussolini was able 
to follow his own whims in foreign a ffa irs , any semblance of rational 
policy was thrown over in favor of his quest for glory and colonial 
empire.
Mussolini as Diplomat
In order to understand Mussolini's concept of diplomacy i t  is 
necessary to acknowledge that Mussolini considered diplomacy as simply 
a tool which one could use to acquire grandeur and prestige. I t  is  
true that he wanted Ita ly  to take its  place alongside the Great Powers 
of Europe, but he was concerned about his country's national interests 
mostly because of the personal prestige which would fa l l  to himself 
i f  he improved Ita ly 's  position in the world. As fa r as Mussolini 
was concerned, international agreements were simply tools to be used 
to enhance his own image wherever and whenever possible regardless of 
the details or consequences involved. As Gordon Craig maintains in 
his essay, "Tota litarian  Diplomacy", Mussolini d isliked the hesitant 
and conventional "forms of diplomacy which sought... to solve European 
problems" by means of "collective agreements" and "m ultilateral 
negotiation." Mussolini was convinced "that the satisfactions to be 
gained from collaborative diplomacy... were not worthy of Fascist 
I ta ly ,  which" should "dazzle the world with spectacular triumphs of 
its  o w n .39
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Like H it le r , Mussolini did not consider diplomacy as a means of 
securing peace through compromise. Instead, diplomacy was to be used 
to increase his own position at the expense of weaker powers. In the 
same manner as H it le r , Mussolini considered a ll international agree­
ments as temporary arrangements which could be violated at any time in 
order to promote his own in terests. Mussolini "was ready... to sign 
a treaty ju s t for its  effect on the public and without bothering too 
much about Ita lia n  interests or the details of what i t  contained..."
Like most d ictators, Mussolini did not consider diplomatic treaties
to be binding agreements, and he was more than w illin g  to ignore such
140"pieces of paper" i f  circumstances changed. Mussolini was proud of 
the menacing posture which his style of diplomacy presented to the 
world, and he was determined to le t  nothing hold him back from the 
pursuits of his goals. As fa r as Mussolini was concerned, no in te r ­
national agreements could be considered binding i f  they hampered his 
desire for power and prestige.
Mussolini did d iffe r  from H itle r  however, in that he did not con­
sider diplomacy simply as a means of preparing for war. I t  is true 
that Mussolini wanted to use diplomacy to gain glory and prestige, 
but he did not want to enter into any ventures where his ultimate 
victory might be in doubt. In fa c t, Mussolini entered the Second 
World War only a fte r  he became "convinced that Germany had won the war," 
and only because he did not want "to be le f t  out when i t  came to sharing 
the spoils.
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Mussolini's overriding concern in the fie ld  of foreign a ffa irs
was his obsession with image and prestige. He was more concerned about
style than substance. Mussolini "was forever talking about the
Fascist style which he equated with courage, resolution, action,
142forceful n e s s a n d  "dynamism." He wanted to present the image of
a strong d ictator who was always reluctant to negotiate and then only 
on his own terms. Moreover, Mussolini wanted to appear strong at home 
as well as abroad. Mussolini knew that a strong image could d istract 
attention from internal problems, and therefore he wanted to impress 
the Ita lia n  people with foreign successes, no matter how t r iv ia l ,  in 
order to bolster his regime. Mussolini was always looking for grand 
gestures that would prove to the Ita lia n  people that he was an in ­
dispensable and in fa ll ib le  leader.
Mussolini was anxious to appear as the new champion of Ita lia n  
in terests. He wanted his Fascist system to represent a break from the 
old stale policies of the past. Therefore, even though Mussolini was 
quite capable of using "trad itional methods of diplomacy," he would 
often ignore trad itio n a l diplomatic channels in an e ffo rt to accomplish 
a grand gesture without the aid of his established Foreign O ffice.
For example, Mussolini liked to use private envoys behind the backs of
his own ambassadors in order to pursue policies that were often con-
143trary  to established procedure in the Foreign O ffice. He believed 
that such tactics would lend credence to the claim that Ita lia n  foreign 
policy had abandoned the stale policies of the past.
Mussolini believed that i t  was more important to present an active 
and forceful foreign policy to the world than to worry about conforming
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to old trad itional procedures. I t  was more important to Mussolini
that Ita ly  be feared than respected, and he did not concern himself
with the poss ib ility  that his belligerent attitude might hamper his
a b il ity  to reach any type of mutual accommodation with other powers.
Mussolini's "basic principle in fascist foreign policy was to make
trouble and thus threaten world peace," and he conducted his policy
under the assumption that the more trouble he caused, the more oppor-
144tun ity  he would create for Ita ly  to gain prestige. Therefore, 
Mussolini believed that his belligerent policy would more than make 
up for any international h o s tility  that might result from his new force­
fu l policy.
Mussolini's contempt fo r the weaker nations of Europe and the 
trad itional procedures that they represented was a natural complement 
to his willingness to indulge in personal whims and in tu tit iv e  fancies 
in foreign a ffa irs . Moreover, Mussolini's extensive use of propaganda 
and showmanship in foreign a ffa irs  meant that his opponents could never 
te l l  when he was deadly serious about a particu lar issue or simply 
strik ing  a pose for internal consumption. I t  was Mussolini's 
"deliberate policy to confuse and soften up opponents by alternating  
suddenly between... fierceness and sweet reasonableness."^45 The 
other European statesmen were forced to determine on th e ir own exactly 
where Mussolini stood on any particu lar issue at any given time. He 
believed that his apparent a b il i ty  to change course at w ill would con­
vince the world that his word alone was the decisive factor in Ita lia n  
foreign policy.
Even though Mussolini was able to maintain an authoritative  
image in foreign a ffa irs , such cosmetics fa iled  to compensate for 
his lack of governmental expertise and for the absence of any long­
term planning. In his book, Mussolini and I t a ly , C. C. Bayne-Jardine 
points out that "Mussolini's foreign p o lic y ... had no general purpose." 
Unlike H it le r , Mussolini did not possess a long-term plan for achieving 
his goals. Instead, Mussolini re lied  upon his in tu itio n  and bluster 
to achieve p o litic a l gains in the diplomatic f ie ld  wherever and when­
ever possible. In fa c t, Mussolini very often had no idea what course 
he should follow and simply directed his policies according to the 
whims of his own personal vanity , regardless of what consequences his 
actions might produce. Mussolini had l i t t l e  patience for "slow 
negotiations or the search for compromise," and he was "ready to sign 
almost any international agreement" so long as i t  demonstrated that he 
was a "strong man of decisive action.
Mussolini was so concerned about his personal prestige that he 
would sacrifice  Ita lia n  national interests i f  he could bolster his own 
image as a resu lt. He took no in terest in learning about the re a lit ie s  
of foreign events and desired only to secure diplomatic successes 
abroad no matter how t r iv ia l  or insign ificant they might prove to be. 
His chief concern was always to maintain a state of tension abroad so 
that he could make p o litic a l gains from the other European powers as 
his price for maintaining the peace.
Unfortunately, as Mussolini applied his unorthodox tactics to 
foreign a ffa irs , the overall quality of Ita lia n  diplomacy declined as
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a resu lt. Mussolini's entire  diplomatic strategy was "dangerously 
muddled between" his "thinking that he could convince foreign admirers 
that Ita ly  was, a safe and s tab iliz ing  force in Europe," and his in ­
sistence that the Versailles peace statement had to "be smashed in
148order to allow" fo r'" fu rth e r Ita lia n  expansion." Mussolini's
attempt to carry on te r r ito r ia l expansion under the cover of peaceful
propaganda was an example of his haphazard and unprofessional method
of conducting Ita lia n  diplomacy. Moreover, Mussolini's insistence
upon an expansionist foreign policy also damaged Ita lia n  diplomacy in
that his constant threatening of Ita ly 's  neighbors greatly increased
the po ss ib ility  of interference by outside Powers in the Mediterranean
area. As Felix G ilbert argues in his essay, "Ciano and his Ambassadors,"
the ultimate resu lt o f Mussolini's conduct of Ita lia n  diplomacy was
that Ita ly  became the prisoner of her own foreign policy:
By replacing a policy of c learly  lim ited aims 
with a policy of unrestricted use of power 
within the whole of the Mediterranean area,
Ita ly  was in fact more deeply drawn into the vortex 
of European power po litics  and lost much of her 
freedom of action in her relations with the Great 
European Powers.
Regardless of the consequences of Mussolini's unprofessional 
methods of conducting Ita lia n  diplomacy, his policies represented a 
profound break from the trad itio na l procedures of the past. His concern 
over prestige and image, his lack of any long-term planning, and his 
lack of any professional experience a ll contributed to a decline in the 
quality of Ita lia n  diplomacy.
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Delegation of Authority
The manner in which Mussolini delegated authority among his 
subordinates, and the various organizations that they represented, 
had a profound effect upon the conduct of his diplomacy. In order to 
understand how Mussolini's delegation of power affected his po lic ies, 
then as with H it le r , i t  is necessary to examine the role played by 
the Foreign O ffice, the m ilita ry , and the Party in administrative 
a ffa irs . Before examining these separate organizations in closer 
d e ta il, however, one should f i r s t  take into account Mussolini's basic 
attitudes towards the delegation of power and responsiblity among his 
subordinates and the various organizations that they represented.
Like H it le r , Mussolini considered his personal authority over 
his governmental organizations more important than the establishment 
of a completely uniform administrative structure. When he f i r s t  started 
to consolidate his own position, Mussolini set out early to gather as 
much power as possible into his own hands. Mussolini considered any 
independence on the part of his subordinates as both disloyal and 
dangerous. He knew that his leadership was fa r from secure, and that 
"existing p o lit ic a l institu tions would have to be abolished or
150dras tica lly  altered i f  he was to avoid being voted out of power." 
Moreover, Mussolini also knew that he would need the support of many 
d iffe re n t factions on his road to complete power, and he developed the 
s k ill of balancing one group against another very early in his career. 
Mussolini became very s k il lfu l at placating several groups at once, 
and he was always careful never to make "changes so fast as to destroy
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the balance between" each group. "His ultimate intention was to
maximize power in his own hands, but he had to proceed gradually"
with the help of others. Mussolini realized that any immediate
purge of the state bureaucracy would have to "be on a small scale."
His program called for an increase in state control, and this would
151require a larger bureaucracy rather than a smaller one.
Mussolini was determined to increase his personal authority by 
bringing every possible aspect of Ita lia n  l i f e  under his central 
direction. His goal was to entrench his authority so completely 
throughout the Fascist system that he could only be removed by force.
In addition, he hoped that his Fascist system would become so dependent 
upon his personal authority that i t  could not function without him.
Like H it le r , Mussolini was always looking for ways to secure his own 
position, even at the cost of administrative effic iency. As Mack Smith 
maintains, he devised his own system fo r maintaining the security of 
his position:
By using party o ff ic ia ls  and the state 
bureaucracy to oversee each other, he created 
a system of checks and balances that deprived other 
people of e ffective responsib ility , leaving him self,52 
with the substance of power.
Mussolini ju s tif ie d  the establishment of his dictatorship by 
arguing that the centralization of a ll authority under his personal 
control would be more e ff ic ie n t and therefore better suited for Ita ly .  
In fa c t, Mussolini made i t  a constant practice to promote his personal 
in f a l l ib i l i t y  in a ll f ie ld s . By convincing the Ita lia n  people that he
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was in fa l l ib le ,  Mussolini hoped not only to secure his own position,
but also to gain the freedom of action necessary to carry out his
personal whims regardless of any possible critic ism  which might be
voiced from within his own bureaucracy. The danger was th a t, like
H it le r , Mussolini began to believe in his own propaganda. Mussolini
"persuaded himself that he was governed by a mystic force and would
always reach the rig h t answers as long as he refused to be deterred by
153critic ism  or advice."
The establishment of Mussolini's personal dictatorship was a
gradual process which took many years to accomplish. Mussolini simply
could not match the speed a t which H it le r  consolidated his power in
Germany. Indeed, as Nolte points out, the "process of unrestricted
p o litic a l seizure of power, which took seven years in I ta ly ,  was
154accomplished in Germany in ten months." Nevertheless, Mussolini
did eventually consolidate his personal dictatorship, and he began to
rule by decree without parliamentary consent. Mussolini considered
parlimantary government unsuitable for his needs. He believed that
such a system would hamper his efforts  to remake Ita ly  according to
his personal vision. As Deakin argues, under Mussolini's guidance the
"administrative and executive organs of the state , apart from working
technical committees, ceased to function." Mussolini's conception of
government was such th a t, "in moments of panic or in an atmosphere
of pessimism," each governmental body would act merely as a ptoential
155forum of critic ism  which he could ignore with impunity. According 
to Mack Smith, Mussolini did feel compelled to allow the Ita lia n  
parliament to remain in existence, but he did this only for propaganda
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purposes. Mussolini believed that foreign powers would look upon 
his regime with greater favor i f  he retained Ita ly 's  parliament.
However, he expected parliament to show a sense of d iscip line , and to 
impress outside opinion by making i t  appear that everyone in Ita ly  was 
behind h im J ^
Mussolini was so anxious to present a united image to foreign
powers that he would not retain anyone in a governmental position who
openly disagreed with him. Moreover, Mussolini feared that competent
functionaries might detract from his own personal image as supreme
leader. He was so anxious to be seen as the sole leader of Fascist
Ita ly  that he surrounded himself with incompetent but loyal followers
who would present no danger to his leadership image. Mussolini would
not allow powerful subordinates to retain  positions in his administration.
Indeed, i t  can be argued that "almost none of Mussolini's chosen apostles
157had any admirable qualities even of a purely technical order."
By surrounding himself with loyal followers and by refusing to 
allow even a small number of competent individuals to remain in o ffic e , 
Mussolini seriously degraded the caliber of his bureaucarcy. His sub­
ordinates discovered very quickly that he was more concerned with 
diplomatic style than with competent diplomacy. Consequently, they 
concentrated on f la tte r in g  Mussolini's ego rather than on attempting 
to improve the effic iency of the bureaucracy. Unfortunately, the con­
stant praise which Mussolini received from his subordinates "in flated
158his own opinion of himself." He became more convinced that he alone 
knew what was best for Ita ly  and that his judgment was indeed in fa l l ib le ,
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and those subordinates who s t i l l  knew the difference between propaganda 
and re a lity  were not about to risk th e ir  positions by forcing Mussolini 
to acknowledge.the tru th . He refused to recognize the re a lity  of 
his s ituation , and his subordinates lacked both the w ill and the power 
to compensate for Mussolini's delusions. Like H it le r , he considered 
his own authority too precious to disseminate among his followers.
In addition, Mussolini considered his own judgment so superior to 
that of his subordinates that he closed his mind to a ll forms of 
critic ism  and advice. For a ll of these reasons, Mussolini only dele­
gated as much authority to his subordinates as absolutely necessary 
in order to keep his regime functioning.
Role of the Foreign O ffice . The role that the Ita lia n  Foreign
Office (also known as the Palazzo Chigi) ,  played in Mussolini's
diplomatic a ffa irs  was conditioned by the uneasy relationship between
Mussolini and the career diplomats. In his book, Mussolini's Early
Diplomacy, Alan Cassels maintains that this relationship could not
help but be distant because Mussolini was considered "an upstart,"
while the diplomatic corps "belonged to an aristocracy which cooperated
159with Fascism only to save i t s e l f ."  The career diplomats at the 
Palazzo Chigi believed that they should remain in power and protect 
Ita lia n  national interests regardless of what p o litic a l system they 
represented. In his work "The Early Diplomacy of Ita lia n  Fascism,"
H. Stuart Hughes points out that the career diplomats supported many 
of the same goals as Mussolini. Not only did they want "to see Ita ly  
great and respected," but also "substantially enlarged in te rr ito ry
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150and influence." Where they differed from Mussolini was in th e ir  
conception of the proper methods for achieving these goals.
According to Hughes, Mussolini was always ready to engage in the 
wildest schemes without bothering to consider the re a lity  of his 
position or the probability of success, while the career diplomats 
recognized "that the inadequacy of Ita ly 's  financial and m ilita ry  
resources made i t  impossible for her to compete with the more prosperous
powers in the game of building up c lie n ts  " The career diplomats
did agree that a Fascist government would give them more "leverage 
for negotiation abroad" and that "they could use i t  to further the 
permanent aims of Ita lia n  policy," but they absolutely opposed
1 filMussolini's unconventional and wild schemes in diplomatic a ffa irs .
The permanent o ffic ia ls  of the Foreign Office were hopeful that
they could guide Mussolini along moderate lines. However, i f  an
opportunity arose to make a big display, Mussolini would rush in
without regard for the consequences. Mussolini took advantage of
any opportunity which would allow him "to show his own people that he
had a unique ta len t for chalking up points for Ita ly  on the international 
1 fi?scorecard." In order to accomplish his goal, Mussolini began to
advocate a policy which called for Ita lia n  expansion and revision of
the Versailles Peace Treaty. He had no specific policy objectives in
mind, but was determined to improve Ita ly 's  status and his own position
by whatever means he could find . Mussolini's main goal seems to have
been to keep Europe tn a constant state of uncertainty whereby he
1could obtain some sort of advantage.
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Although Mussolini desired s tr ic t  obedience from the Foreign 
Office in order to carry out his personal schemes without undue in te r­
ference, he was nevertheless very cautious in his attempts to take over 
complete control of the Foreign O ffice. Like H it le r , Mussolini 
recognized the u t i l i t y  of retaining the older diplomatic structure for 
his own purposes. Mussolini knew that "the continued presence of w ell-
known career diplomats in the Palazzo Chigi helped to a llay  disquiet
1in foreign capita ls ." Moreover, there was no reason for Mussolini
to alienate these in flu e n tia l and useful o ffic ia ls  by a clearcut
campaign to make the foreign M inistry unimpeachably Fascist. I t  would
be much safer and ju s t as easy for Mussolini to simply ignore the career
165diplomats whenever i t  suited his purpose. Therefore, Mussolini 
made i t  a common practice to disregard the advice of his career diplomats. 
In fa c t, Mussolini did not even inform his ministers about decisions 
that concerned th em J^  He preferred to use other means of carrying 
out his policies. Whenever Mussolini "entertained designs which might 
offend the professionals' moral scruples or diplomatic convictions," 
he could always turn "to his own private and sometimes secret agents" 
to accomplish his goals. Quite understandably, many of the career 
diplomats resented the insign ificant role which Mussolini intended 
them to f u l f i l l ,  and many of the career diplomats " le ft  of th e ir  own 
accord, finding for one reason or another Mussolini's indifference to 
th e ir  views to be in su p p o rtab le ."^
The departure of many of the career diplomats made i t  easier for 
Mussolini to control the Foreign O ffice. While many of the older
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diplomats who retained th e ir  positions in the Foreign Office had 
doubts about Mussolini's conduct of diplomacy, they nevertheless 
remained strong nationalists and supported a great part of 
Mussolini's program for national aggrandizement. These diplomats 
agreed with Mussolini that i t  was very important "to restore Ita lia n  
prestige, even i f  i t  involved occasional vulgar and ridiculous 
b o asting ,..."  and other such unconventional diplomatic practices. 
Moreover, the nationalist oriented career diplomats applauded 
Mussolini's quest for empire. His "nationalist s p ir it"  kept "the bulk
of Ita ly 's  foreign service loyal to the Fascist regime until the dangers
168inherent in its  foreign policy became too obvious to ignore."
Unfortunately, by the time the career diplomats realized the probable
consequences of Mussolini's foreign policy, nothing could be done to
save Ita ly  from the destruction of the Second World War.
In order to fa c il ita te  his personal control, Mussolini encouraged
the Fascist Party to in f i l t r a te  and control the Foreign Office as much
as possible. Much lik e  H it le r , he hoped that Party in f i lt ra t io n  of
the Foreign Office would destroy the trad itio na l nonpolitical and
"neutral" character of its  administration. Mussolini was determined
to dismiss many of the older o ffic ia ls  and to replace them with loyal
Fascists. He wanted the Foreign Office to "become the most fascist of
a ll government departments," and he placed "more than a hundred party
stalwarts" into "diplomatic posts" in the mistaken b e lie f that they
169would "increase respect for Ita ly  abroad "
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One might assume that the entire  Foreign Office administration 
resented Mussolini's attempt to reform diplomatic procedure according 
to his personal wishes, but th is was not the case. According to 
Cassels, "Mussolini's reformist s p ir it  was welcomed by some of the 
younger members of the Palazzo Chigi." Many of Mussolini's reforms 
actually helped to modernize the Foreign Office and made i t  more 
e ffic ie n t in many respects. In fa c t, Mussolini's reforms actually  
increased "the element of competition for entrance into the foreign
service" and helped to provide for "quicker promotions on m erit "
However, Mussolini's reform "measures were fa r from radical and did 
l i t t l e  to fa c il ita te  in f i l t r a t io n  by party representatives . " ^ 70
Those Party stalwarts which Mussolini did manage to place within  
the Foreign Office were generally of such poor quality  that they 
proved to be more of a hindrance to Mussolini than an asset. The 
Party men that Mussolini placed there lacked not only in telligence  
and honesty, but even the most elementary knowledge of the outside 
world. I t  is not surprising therefore that very l i t t l e  within the 
Foreign Office was actually changed by direct Party interference. Most 
of the remaining individuals thus "continued to be men of the old type, 
career diplomats and frequently a r is to c ra ts ." ^
In addition to using the Fascist Party to help him control the 
Foreign O ffice , Mussolini also appointed his loyal follower and son- 
in-law Galeazzo Ciano to the position of Foreign M inister. Ciano was 
ju s t as determined as Mussolini to reform Ita lia n  diplomacy along 
Fascist lin es , and he did an excellent job of imprinting Mussolini's
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Fascist style upon Ita lia n  diplomacy. Moreover, as Felix G ilbert 
maintains in his essay, "Ciano and his Ambassadors," this Fascist 
s ty le , or tono-. fasc is ta , was more than simply window dressing. I t  
had a profound influence upon Ita lia n  diplomacy:
The tono fascista of Ita lia n  diplomacy in 
i t s e l f  did not represent a new course of
action but i t  was important in determining and
restric ting  the framework within which Ita lia n  
policy could and would take action. Slow 
proceedings and cautious legal formulas were con­
sidered as contradictory to the emphasis on 
decisive action which was supposed to be 
characteristic o f Fascism and to animate its  , 72 
diplomacy.
By appointing such men as Ciano to the Foreign O ffice , Mussolini 
hoped to replace the older career o ff ic ia ls  upon whom he was forced
to depend with a younger group of a c tiv is t o ff ic ia ls  who would be more
amenable to his personal authority and to the new Fascist style of 
forceful diplomacy. Much lik e  H it le r , Mussolini wanted his new diplomats 
to be compliant tools under his personal command. In Mussolini's view, 
the Foreign Office was not to be a major policy-making organization. 
According to him, the purpose of the Foreign Office was simply to carry 
out the major policy decisions handed down by himself and few close 
but amateur advisers such as Ciano.
However, according to G ilb ert, Ciano was not particu larly  suited 
for the task of accomplishing the Fascization of the Palazzo Chigi, 
for he was far from being a typical representative of the Fascist party. 
Not only was Ciano an outsider, but he was also resented by the older 
members of the Fascist Party who considered him "a spoiled child of
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fortune, raised to prominence because he was the son of one of
Mussolini's chief assistants and the Puce's son-in-law." Moreover,
"Ciano fu lly  reciprocated these feelings," for he considered the older
173leaders of the Party to be "unbearably dull and loquacious fo o ls  "
Since Ciano had few a llie s  among the older diplomats and Party 
members, he knew that he would have to bring his own new personnel 
into the administration with him i f  he expected to capture control of 
the Foreign Office for Mussolini. The prospect of creating a new 
supply of administrative personnel did not bother Ciano however, for 
he regarded himself as a representative of the new Fascist generation, 
and he was anxious to surround himself with subordinates who would 
complement the new Fascist image. Ciano believed that only individuals 
such as himself, who "had grown up in an atmosphere en tire ly  un­
encumbered by the heritage of the past could fu lly "  represent "the 
new attitude.
Ciano decided to create his own separate organization within the
Foreign Office structure in order to bypass the older diplomats and
th e ir trad itio na l procedures. This new organization, called the
Gabinetto, "became Ciano's chief instrument for directing the course
of Ita lia n  foreign policy, and... in a re la tiv e ly  short time, reduced
the trad itional apparatus to an empty shell."  Ciano was anxious to
increase his personal control in the Foreign Office, and by f i l l in g  the
Gabinetto "with young men who shared his general attitude towards
l i f e  and looked up to him admiringly as" th e ir "future leader," he
hoped to consolidate his control by simply bypassing the trad itional
175Foreign Office apparatus.
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The Gabinetto was able to take control away from the trad itional 
diplomatic corps by gaining a monopoly over a ll important information. 
Ciano's subordinates in the Gabinetto were given the authority to 
decide i f  important information should be distributed to the career 
diplomats or i f  important information should be kept secret fo r Ciano's 
personal use. I t  became a clearinghouse for a ll important information, 
and this gave Ciano a decided advantage in his bid to take control of 
the Foreign O ffice. Unfortunately, the arb itrary  actions of his 
functionaries caused a great deal of confusion. By fa ilin g  to d istribute  
important information to many career o ff ic ia ls , the Gabinetto le f t  
the diplomatic corps in the dark with no idea of what particu lar policy  
they should attempt to follow. Such lack of coordination was character­
is t ic  of Ita lia n  diplomacy under the influence of Ciano and his 
Gabinetto organization.
By expanding the Gabinetto, Ciano was able to gain control over 
the Foreign Office for Mussolini without having to insert subordinates 
d irec tly  into the existing diplomatic bureaucracy. Ciano was more 
than content to leave the existing bureaucracy alone, because not only 
did Ciano detest professional diplomats, but lik e  Mussolini, Ciano also 
"liked to work ou tside... regular diplomatic channels." Consequently, 
Ciano not only created his own system of confidants through which he 
could carry out Mussolini's po lic ies, but he also made i t  a practice 
to meet d irec tly  with foreign statesmen himself and bypass the diplo­
matic corps. Ciano was completely "uninhibited by the traditions  
of the diplomatic profession," and "the range of his a c tiv itie s  went 
fa r  beyond" what was considered to be the proper "sphere of action of 
a Foreign M inister."
The imposition of the tono fascista style of diplomacy, under 
the guidance of Ciano and his Gabinetto organization, "made i t  
v ir tu a lly  impossible for envoys abroad to perform e ffec tive ly  th e ir  
duties of representation, reporting and negotiation." Instead of 
representing Ita lia n  interests abroad, the Fascist diplomats were ex­
pected merely to protest "against criticism s of Fascism" abroad, and
177to conform to the new "Fascist s ty le ."  Moreover, according to 
Craig, the tono fascista style of diplomacy was particu larly  damaging 
in re lation  to Ciano's personal negotiations with foreign representatives
The subordination of diplomacy to the tono fascista  
was even more patent in the negotiations that 
Ciano carried on personally a t Mussolini's orders.
In these he appears to have been more interested 
in the speed with which an agreement could be 
reached and the public ity  that could be garnered 
from i t  than in anything else. In general, his 
negotiations were amateurish in technique and , 7g 
dangerous in resu lt.
In an e ffo r t to enhance his tono fascista s ty le , Ciano shunned 
collective agreements and m ultila tera l conmitments. He wanted Ita ly  
to portray the image of a leader in the diplomatic f ie ld , and he wanted 
to be seen as the new dynamic Foreign Minister of his age who could 
advance Ita lia n  interests on his own without the help of the older 
professionals. Like Mussolini, Ciano was more interested in his own 
image and the Fascist style than in protecting and advancing Ita lia n  
national interests through the in te llig e n t conduct of diplomacy. 
Therefore, Ciano was perfectly suited to carry out Mussolini's wishes, 
fo r when i t  came to conducting Ita lia n  diplomacy, "Ciano was l i t t l e
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inclined to base his policy on considerations of permanent and
underlying forces and in terests ." Instead, Ciano preferred to
approach foreign "policy in terms of personality, relying heavily
179upon his judgment of the leading figures of other countries."
In many respects, Ciano was prefectly suited for the role that Mussolini 
intended for him to play in Fascist diplomacy.
Mussolini's style of foreign policy alienated the Western Powers 
and helped to complete Ita ly 's  diplomatic iso lation in European 
a ffa irs . By the late  1930s i t  became apparent that the only course 
le f t  fo r Ita ly  to follow in order to maintain her status and avoid 
complete iso lation was to form an alliance with H it le r 's  Germany. 
Mussolini was convinced, lik e  H it le r , that a new world war was in ­
ev itab le , and that Ita ly  and Germany were destined to be a ll ie s . How­
ever, as Roy Macgregor-Hastie points out in his book, The Day of The
Lion, H itle r  had nothing to o ffer Ita ly  except a re ite ra tion  that he
180would support any Ita lia n  move in the Mediterranean. Such promises 
were small compensation considering the ultimate costs that Ita ly  
would be forced to pay by forming an alliance with Germany. However, 
regardless of the possible costs, Mussolini was determined to create 
a new Ita lia n  empire in alliance with Germany, and he intended to use 
both the Fascist Party and the assistance of Ciano in order to 
eliminate any possible opposition from the Foreign O ffice. Therefore, 
i t  is not surprising that the Ita lia n  Foreign Office became nothing 
more than a compliant tool which Mussolini used to further his own 
personal designs. In Mussolini's view, the purpose of the Foreign Office
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was not to make policy decisions, but simply to carry out his own 
personal wishes as e ff ic ie n tly  as possible.
Role of the M ilita ry . The role that the Ita lia n  m ilita ry  
played in the diplomatic a ffa irs  of Mussolini's regime was a re­
flection  of Mussolini's personal foreign policy goals. The m ilita ry  
was especially important to Mussolini because he wanted to bolster his 
own personal image by pursuing wars of te r r ito r ia l conquest. He 
intended for the Ita lia n  m ilita ry  to serve as the driving force behind 
his policy aims. Mussolini "announced that he wanted an army of five  
m illion  men with a forest of bayonets, an a ir  force so large that i t
would blot out the sun over I ta ly ,  and a navy that other countries
181would see as a real threat to th e ir security." He was determined 
to pursue an active foreign policy and he wanted as much m ilita ry  
capability  as possible in order to f u l f i l l  his plans. In fa c t, 
Mussolini believed that the possession of a powerful m ilita ry  would 
allow him to achieve most of his foreign policy goals through b lu ff 
and bluster. Although he usually avoided armed c o n flic t, Mussolini 
nevertheless encouraged a combative attitude in foreign a ffa irs ,  
especially when he was assured of an easy v ic tory .
Mussolini pursued an active foreign policy based upon the threat 
of force, and he continued to promote the creation of a strong Ita lia n  
m ilita ry  capability in order to achieve his goals. He wanted to 
m ilita rize  the Ita lia n  nation so that whenever the righ t opportunity 
to advance Ita lia n  interests might present i t s e l f ,  he would be able 
to mobilize every Ita lia n  in order to bolster his position in relation
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to the other European powers. Mussolini's primary objective was to
improve Ita ly 's  capacity for war, and he boasted that his Fascist
government was making great progress in its  e ffo rts  to improve Ita ly 's
m ilita ry  strength. In fa c t, not only did Mussolini claim that he would
make Ita ly  a m ilita r is t  nation, but also the only nation "with the
1R?courage to risk a major war and seek m ilita ry  glory." Mussolini 
was determined to capture m ilita ry  glory for himself and I ta ly ,  and 
he expected a ll Ita lian s  to adopt a m ilita ry  bearing and to support 
his new forceful policy in foreign a ffa irs .
According to Knox, Mussolini's interference in Ita lia n  m ilita ry  
a ffa irs  made the " in te llig e n t coordination of the armed forces" 
almost impossible. He was so concerned about maintaining the security 
of his own position that he was w illin g  to sacrifice  any genuine 
coordination and effic iency in m ilita ry  a ffa irs . Mussolini refused to 
allow the creation of a "genuine tr i-s e rv ic e  general s ta ff  capable of 
coordinating the services" because he believed that such an organi­
zation would challenge his own authority. Not only would a general 
s ta ff  of the armed forces "give the service chiefs a co lleg ial voice 
in defense matters," but i t  would also "give the monarchy an opportunity 
to exercise its  m ilita ry  prerogatives, which in theory included the 
supreme command in war, exercised... through a chief of general s ta ff ."  
Moreover, Mussolini feared that the "chief of any tr i-s e rv ic e  s ta ff"
might gain enough power and prestige to become a serious r iv a l to his 
183own position. He wanted to protect his own position as sole 
dictator of Fascist I ta ly ,  and he quickly eliminated any individuals,
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organizations, or governmental and m ilita ry  positions which might 
possibly encroach upon his own personal power.
Mussolini wanted "to run the m ilita ry  establishment himself
with a minimum of technical assistance." Moreover, even though many
of his subordinate officers were very impressed with the new German
tactics of B litzkrieg  and rapid movement, he believed that such
tactics would not e ffec t the long-term outcome of the war. Mussolini
remained convinced that the next war would be a long war of enforced
immobility. In addition, Mussolini believed that the next war would
be won not in the trad itional European theatre of operations, but in
the Mediterranean area. Therefore, Mussolini assigned top p rio rity
to the creation of a " f irs t-ra te  Navy and a powerful A ir Force" in
order to "dominate the Mediterranean." However, neither the Navy nor
the A ir Force had a war plan which would f u l f i l l  Mussolini's ambitions.
Therefore, Ita ly  entered the Second World War "without a coherent
war plan." Such lack of preparation helps to explain the poor per-
184formance of the Ita lia n  m ilita ry  during the Second World War.
Mussolini's e ffo rts  to gain control over the Ita lia n  m ilita ry  
were mostly ineffective . He had to accept the existing structure of 
the Ita lia n  m ilita ry  basically in tac t. He found i t  almost impossible 
to a lte r  the basic structure of the m ilita ry  establishment and main­
ta in  an acceptable degree of competence at the same time. The 
"r ig id ity  o f the armed forces' seniority  system ensured that replace­
ments could come only from the topmost ranks, and nothing guaranteed 
such men would improve on the incumbents." Unlike H it le r , Mussolini
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could not take advantage of a true national m ilita ry  trad itio n . The
Ita lia n  m ilita ry  had "distinguished i ts e l f  by the absence of the study,
planning, and attention to detail that characterized the Germans" in
185the a rt of warfare. In short, he had to depend upon an unim­
pressive and weak m ilita ry  machine in order to achieve his goals. Un­
like  H it le r , Mussolini lacked the basic m ilita ry  structure which was 
necessary to support an active foreign policy. Nevertheless, he 
wanted to pursue an active foreign policy with the support of what 
m ilita ry  strength he did possess.
Because of its  weak position in Mussolini's regime, the Ita lia n  
m ilita ry  fa iled  to restrain  Mussolini. He was able to exert an extra­
ordinary amount of in it ia t iv e  in p o lit ic a l-m ilita ry  a f fa irs , and he 
was determined to explo it his absolute power for the purpose of achieving 
his goals. Like H it le r , he used the m ilita ry  to achieve his foreign 
policy aims, free from a ll restra in ts .
Role of the Party. The role that the Fascist Party played in the
diplomatic administrative a ffa irs  of Mussolini's regime was a reflection  
of Mussolini's desire to maintain absolute and personal control over 
his various organizations. Like H it le r , Mussolini was always on guard 
to protect his own authority, and he would not allow any one group or 
individual to gain too much power. Therefore, he used the Fascist 
Party as a tool to help him prevent any possible riva ls  from gaining 
too much power. As long as his own position was secure, Mussolini 
would put up with the ineffic iency which might result by allowing the 
Party to oversee and in terfere  with organizations outside its  designated
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area of expertise. Such practices help to explain why the Party was 
able to expand its  involvement in diplomatic a ffa irs  in competition 
with the Foreign O ffice. Therefore, an examination of the role of the 
Fascist Party in governmental a ffa irs  is very important in order to 
understand Mussolini's diplomacy. Before examining the role that the 
Party played in governmental a ffa irs , however, i t  is necessary to 
examine Mussolini's personal views concerning the purpose of the Party 
and what role i t  should play in his regime.
In his book, Europe 1914-1939, E. Lipson argues that Mussolini
conceived of the Fascist Party as the "coercive instrument" of his
Fascist regime. He was determined to control the p o lit ic a l, m ilita ry ,
and economic institu tions of Fascist I ta ly ,  and he intended to use the
Party to help him achieve this goal. Mussolini planned for the Party
to intervene in a ll aspects of Ita lia n  l i f e .  I t  was his intention
that every organization which received any sort of o ff ic ia l recognition
from the state would eventually come under some degree of Party control
or interference. The Party rapidly became the "dynamic element in
the State machinery" and brought a ll " a c t iv it ie s .. .  within its  orb it
and under its  d isc ip line ." Mussolini wanted a ll  aspects of Ita lia n
society to be "placed under the supervision of the Fascist Party," and
he was determined that a ll Ita lian s  should be made to follow the "con-
186ception of Fascism in theory and in practice."
Mussolini was particu larly  proud of the way in which he f it te d  
the Fascist party into the State. However, his system created nothing 
but confusion. According to Bayne-Jardine, "a ll to often one branch 
of the government issued orders which were opposite to those issued by
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another branch." In addition, Mussolini contributed to this confusion
himself by his constant practice of contradicting "his own orders
187shortly a fte r  they had been issued." Mussolini was so concerned 
about maintaining his own authority that he refused to recognize the 
need for an adequate system of responsiblity within the Party i ts e l f .  
Instead, lik e  H it le r , Mussolini simply appointed loyal followers to 
key positions within the Party and trusted that these individuals 
would appoint th e ir  own loyal subordinates in turn. As long as he 
retained ultimate authority over key members of the Party, Mussolini 
remained re la tiv e ly  unconcerned about the rank and f i l e .  This un­
coordinated system, where departments were not c learly defined, allowed
Mussolini to play groups o ff against each other, and thereby helped to
188prevent possible riva ls  from gaining too much power. Because he was 
so anxious to preserve his own position, Mussolini was w illin g  to 
dispense with both talented individuals and effic iency within the 
Party structure.
In order to tighten his control over Ita lia n  society, Mussolini 
encouraged the Party to replace the trad itional governmental adminis­
tra tio n . He wanted the Party to set up a bureaucratic structure which 
would allow i t  to absorb the state. E ntirely separate organizations 
were created which were designed to replace governmental offices and 
which were s tr ic t ly  controlled by the Party. In his book, The Fascist 
Government of I t a ly , Herbert W. Schneider maintains that Mussolini 
wanted the Party to be a "training ground for the governing class, and 
a v ita l bond between the government and the masses, animating and
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189educating the nation." Mussolini intended for the Party to control 
the state , while he controlled the Party.
As the Party began to assume more and more power within the state , 
its  members and o ffic ia ls  began to develop a vested in terest in main­
taining the Fascist system. Because the Fascist system provided "as 
many as a hundred thousand jobs for secretaries and organizers," the 
Party was able "to sa tis fy  that deep-rooted desire among Ita lian s  to
find a respectable post in government service, poorly paid but easy
190work and a sure pension." By providing this type of security on 
such a vast scale, Mussolini was able to secure the loyalty of his 
administrative personnel. His subordinates might abuse the Fascist 
system in order to advance th e ir  own personal positions, but they 
remained loyal to the Party that guaranteed th e ir  jobs. In fa c t,
Party membership "soon became essential fo r the acquisition or re­
tention of any job that was d irec tly  or remotely connected with the 
state ," and "party members" were to be "given p r io rity  whenever jobs 
were available ." Therefore, since Party membership was essential 
i f  one wanted to improve one's position, especially in governmental 
a ffa irs , i t  is not surprising that almost the "whole body" of Ita lia n
officialdom "rushed fre n e tic a lly  into the embrace" of the Fascist 
191Party.
Even though Mussolini was anxious for the Fascist Party to expand 
its  role in governmental a ffa irs , he also was determined not to allow 
the Party to become too powerful. Like H it le r , Mussolini was always
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concerned about protecting himself from possible r iv a ls . Therefore,
Mussolini's view of the Party tended to o sc illa te  between admiration
and fear. He would often condone large expulsions of Party members
whenever the "party was suddenly thought to be unwieldy or ridden with
factions." Moreover, the older Party members very often supported
such purges because they considered the mass of newer members to be a
threat to th e ir own privileged positions. Therefore, the "hooligan
192element" tended to reta in  the top positions in the Fascist Party.
Party membership "was supposed to be confined t o . . .  authentic
Fascists" whom the older Party leaders had imbued with the proper
193"Fascist v irtues." Unfortunately, this lim ited screening of new
members fa iled  to guarantee an improvement in the quality  of the new
personnel. Mussolini was re la tiv e ly  unconcerned about the competency
of his personnel however, because he wanted to protect his own position
from powerful r iv a ls . Moreover, since Mussolini frequently replaced
nearly a ll of his "ministers and party leaders" in sweeping changes of
the guard, the competency of his personnel seemed re la tiv e ly  unim- 
194portant. Because he was afraid  that powerful individuals might 
challenge his own authority, Mussolini changed his personnel very fre ­
quently, even i f  he had to se ttle  for incompetence and inefficiency  
as a resu lt.
In addition to ineffic iency and incompetence, the new Party 
members also brought a great deal of corruption into Mussolini's 
regime. Almost every Party member could easily turn into a petty 
tyrant, secure in the knowledge that the Party would protect him from
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any type of legal prosecution. Mussolini, always cautious about his
public image, believed that he could not afford to admit in public
that the Party might be tarnished, even though he was well aware of
acts of insubordination among Party members. He knew that many Fascists
were "no better than common delinquents" who were "using fascism as a 
195cover for crime. However, as long as these individuals did not 
seriously damage his own authority, or hamper the overall achievement 
of his goals, Mussolini was content to le t  his subordinates pursue 
th e ir  own private schemes.
Like H it le r , Mussolini attempted to use the Party to enforce his 
w ill upon the governmental bureaucracy. This tac tic  was not very 
successful, however, because Mussolini's subordinates were more in ­
terested in advancing and protecting th e ir own positions than in carrying 
out Mussolini's unorthodox schemes. His tactics allowed him to maintain 
a great deal of personal control, but they also created unwieldy 
organizations and riv a lr ie s  that hampered the achievement of his 
ideological goals. The main impact that the Party had upon diplomatic 
administration was to increase the amount of confusion that already 
pervaded governmental administration.
Mussolini's Power in Diplomatic Practice
In order to understand the lim its and strengths of Mussolini's 
power in diplomatic practice i t  is necessary to consider both the manner 
in which Mussolini organized his bureaucracy and Mussolini's habits 
of administrative procedure. Moreover, the lim its and strengths of
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Mussolini's rule need to be examined in the context of Mussolini's 
entire  governmental apparatus, and should not be lim ited s tr ic t ly  to 
his diplomatic a ffa irs . As with H it le r , Mussolini's personal system 
allowed various organizations, such as the Ita lia n  Fascist Party, to 
in terfere  with diplomatic administration. Therefore, the lim its and 
strengths of Mussolini's power in auxilia ry  fie ld s  had an indirect 
effec t upon his diplomacy, and such factors need to be considered in 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of Mussolini's diplomacy.
Another factor which one should keep in mind is that many of 
Mussolini's diplomatic techniques could be considered both weaknesses 
and strengths. For example, Mussolini's absolute control over major 
policy decisions could be viewed as a positive factor in that i t  allowed 
him to change course very rapidly with l i t t l e  concern for the con­
sequences. This same t r a i t ,  however, could also be viewed as a negative 
factor in that Mussolini's absolute control over major policy decisions 
tended to exclude the input of professional advice and Ita lia n  diplomacy 
deteriorated as a resu lt. For example, Mussolini's disastrous alliance  
with H itle r 's  Germany might have been avoided i f  he had been more 
w illin g  to lis ten  to the advice of his older professional diplomats.
Limits of Mussolini's Power. One of the most obvious factors which 
lim ited Mussolini's effectiveness in the diplomatic f ie ld  was his 
inordinate concern for his own personal image. His preoccupation with 
image encouraged him to sacrifice  genuine national interests for the 
chance to win a personal propaganda triumph. In fa c t, Mussolini rarely  
even made the e ffo r t to see i f  his policies were carried out because he
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was more interested in th e ir propaganda value than in th e ir actual 
application. He wanted to avoid any situation which might damage 
his personal image of in f a l l ib i l i t y .  He wanted to maintain the 
appearance of being a strong leader, and therefore he avoided making 
d if f ic u lt  decisions whenever possible and re lied  upon his reputation 
to carry him through d if f ic u lt  situations. He cared more about his 
diplomatic style than about the successful conduct of his diplomacy.
Mussolini placed so much emphasis upon his image at the expense 
of professional diplomacy that he fa iled  to establish any type of 
workable diplomatic system. His "fa ilu re  to establish any basis of 
trust between himself on the one hand and his ministers and the 
bureaucracy on the other was exceedingly damaging to the orderly con­
duct of a ffa irs ."  Even though he could maintain his own position as 
dictator of Fascist I ta ly ,  he fa iled  to conduct his foreign policy in 
a consistent and logical manner. He began to believe in his own in ­
f a l l i b i l i t y  and decided that he could conduct his foreign policy without 
professional advice. "His conception of government was personal ru le ,"
and "this was particu la rly  the case in his treatment of international 
196a ffa irs ."  There was no one capable of forcing him to face the
re a lity  of his bankrupt po lic ies, for according to Gallo, "Mussolini
lived in the sealed-off, pompous world of his own glory, imprisoned
in his own postures, his arrogance, and the adulation of those around 
197him." Such an atmosphere coupled with Mussolini's own warped sense 
of personal importance tended to lim it the effectiveness of Fascist 
diplomacy.
TOO
Like H it le r , Mussolini knew very l i t t l e  about governmental 
administration or about foreign a ffa irs  when he assumed power. More­
over, much lik e  H it le r , Mussolini also hated the daily  routine of
administrative paperwork. He rarely spent time or energy trying to
198understand the details of governmental administration. Like most 
dictators, Mussolini le f t  as much paperwork as possible in the hands 
of his subordinates, for he was not concerned about da ily  routine as 
long as he maintained his righ t to determine the ultimate course of 
major policy in it ia t iv e s . Mussolini's lack of concern for administrative 
detail and his lack o f diplomatic experience severely hampered the con­
duct of his diplomacy.
Moreover, Mussolini's unwillingness to delegate any substantive 
authority to his subordinates prevented the Ita lia n  career diplomats 
from shoring up his policies by compensating for his lack of experience.
Mussolini suffered from a "false assurance that he had vast knowledge
199and great a b ility ."  Consequently, he was determined to handle a ll 
aspects of his regime personally, no matter i f  he was capable of such 
a task or not.
Another t r a i t  which lim ited Mussolini's diplomatic effectiveness 
was the manner in which he dealt with his subordinates. Mussolini's 
fancy for playing the part of the indispensable leader was in part a 
reflection  of his aversion to cooperating with others. He liked to 
avoid contact with other people and to play the part of the loner. 
Mussolini had a "profound contempt for mankind," and "he enjoyed
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exercising his ta lent to degrade men and bring out th e ir worst 
q u a lities ."  As fa r as Mussolini was concerned, his "men were only the 
material with which to build the structure of his own personal domina­
tio n . " 200
Like H it le r , Mussolini considered himself superior to the common 
man, and he believed that he did not require the advice of others. He 
was convinced that a strong leader should have no equals and that he 
should at least appear to make a ll  important decisions without consul­
ta tion . For this reason, Mussolini would "never act as a member of a
team, disliked being crossed, and was only happy when he was in a
201position to impose his w il l ."  Mussolini's determination to in te r ­
vene in a ll  aspects of policy, coupled with his tendency to change 
course at the slightest whim, destroyed any semblance of consistency 
in his po lic ies. His fancy for ignoring regular administrative channels 
and suddenly announcing major policy changes might have bolstered his 
image as the omniscient d ic ta to r, but his tactics le f t  his sub­
ordinates uninformed, and they became wary of acting upon th e ir  own 
in it ia t iv e . Besides, i f  one of Mussolini's subordinates did question
the conduct o f Ita lia n  policy, Mussolini would simply re jec t any advice
202which might "keep him within the bounds of prudence." Mussolini 
was determined to follow his own unique road in the conduct of his 
diplomacy. Consequently, no one was le f t  to m itigate Mussolini's 
irresponsible actions-
However, since Mussolini could not possibly run the entire  state 
apparatus alone, he was forced to depend upon his subordinates to
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carry out at least the bare essentials of administrative routine. 
Unfortunately, he "often agreed with the las t of his advisers spoken
203to ," and "frequent administrative paralysis" was the natural resu lt.
Like H it le r , Mussolini disliked arguments and confrontations, and he 
preferred to ignore problems rather than face the d if f ic u lt  decisions 
that had to be made. Moreover, lik e  H it le r , he structured his adminis­
tra tiv e  system in such a manner that his incompetent and powerless sub­
ordinates were unable to compensate for his lack of leadership.
Mussolini wanted to be remembered as a great leader who was master 
of his own destiny, and he would follow any course which might bolster 
his image. He refused to accept the re a lity  of his s ituation , and he 
believed that forceful action would compensate for his po lic ies, even 
i f  they were misguided. Mussolini seemed to believe that with the 
sheer force of his w ill he could be successful where a ll others had 
f a i l e d . ^  Therefore, he was determined not to recognize any restraints  
upon his actions in his quest to accomplish his goals. Unfortunately, 
Mussolini never seemed to p ro fit  from his mistakes, and as a resu lt, 
his diplomatic effectiveness deteriorated as he became more and more 
set in his concepts of appropraite procedure in  administrative a ffa irs .
Strengths of Mussolini's Power. One factor which contributed to 
Mussolini's personal power in the diplomatic f ie ld  was his a b ility  to 
a lte r  his stance in re lation  to any given circumstance. According 
to Mack Smith, Mussolini set l i t t l e  store by coherence of ideas or 
opinions, and he could move quickly from "cynicism to idealism, from 
impulsiveness to caution, generosity to cruelty , resolution to indecision,
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moderation to intransigence." In a sim ilar manner to H it le r ,
Mussolini had the a b ility  to control his emotions and to impress
other people with his personal charisma. He possessed a "marvelous
fa c i l i t y  for playing the most diverse and contradictory parts one after
the other," and he quickly became aware of the p o litic a l benefits of
switching roles at w i l l .  Mussolini had learned the "effectiveness of
alternating menace and conciliation" in foreign a ffa irs , and he liked
to use this technique to keep his adversaries o ff  balance and to project
the image of a leader who was in complete control and who could change
205tack without notice and without concern for the consequences.
By fostering a mysterious image and by changing his position with­
out notice, Mussolini believed that he could maintain personal control 
over events. In addition, Mussolini believed that his rapid changes 
would prevent anyone from anticipating his moves and allow him to remain 
one step ahead of his opponents. For example, he would make every 
e ffo rt to convince foreign journalists that he was essentia lly  a man 
of peace in order to place doubt in the minds of foreign leaders as to 
his real intentions. Mussolini's a b il ity  to switch his personality on 
command helped him to confuse his opponents and put them o ff balance. 
Like H it le r , Mussolini was able to use his charisma to help him advance 
his diplomatic goals.
Mussolini also had the capacity to charm opponents. Like H it le r , 
he had a personal magnetism which he used to impress people and to 
bend them towards his way of thinking. Mussolini "could charm when­
ever he wished," and "he could always impress a v is ito r"  when i t  suited
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?nfihis purpose. In fa c t, Mussolini was so adept at changing his 
character in order to manipulate people and control situations that i t  
became almost impossible to determine when Mussolini was serious or 
when he was simply playing a part. Mussolini's a b il ity  to charm and 
to change his character became a constant trademark of his conduct 
of diplomacy.
Moreover, much lik e  H it le r , Mussolini used his a b il ity  to charm
those around him to capture the obedience of a large section of the
diplomatic corps. As in Germany, the Ita lia n  people were more than
w illin g  to accept a strong leader who promised to remove the alleged
humiliation of Ita ly 's  role in the F irs t World War, and who promised
to make Ita ly  strong once again. "To a population that had lost sight
of its  aims and w i l l ,  that lacked fa ith  in i ts e l f  and was affected by
a mass in fe r io r ity  complex," writes Fermi, "the idea of a savior
207capable of bringing well-being to a l l . . .  was a las t hope." The 
combination of his personal magnetism and the willingness of the Ita lia n  
people to follow a great leader contributed to his a b ility  to retain  
absolute authority over diplomatic a ffa irs . Many o ff ic ia ls  in 
Mussolini's diplomatic corps were w illin g  to put up with his un­
orthodox procedures, as long as he seemed to improve Ita ly 's  position 
in European a ffa irs . The "nationalist temper of Mussolini's diplomacy
gra tified  many of the career diplomats and more than made up for
208Mussolini's neglect" of the Foreign O ffice. His a b il ity  to charm 
those around him contributed to his diplomatic effectiveness.
An additional factor which contributed to Mussolini's lim ited  
effectiveness in the diplomatic f ie ld  was the degree of his own
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personal authority. Despite the extent of confusion which permeated 
his administrative system, Mussolini did manage to reta in  ultimate 
authority in his own hands. Mussolini's subordinates might implement 
his policies according to th e ir  own inclinations, but his major policy 
aims were never appreciably obstructed. As with almost every aspect 
of Fascist society, he had gradually subjected his administrative 
apparatus to his personal control. Therefore, even though Mussolini's 
diplomatic system was permeated by riva l organizations and by confusion, 
this state of a ffa irs  did not hinder his a b il ity  to maintain his own 
personal control.
Since Mussolini retained ultimate authority in a ll decisions, he
knew that he could act quickly and even against accepted practices
without fear of res tra in t. In his book, The Seizure of Power, Adrian
Lyttelton maintains that "Mussolini's personal dictatorship was
absolutely secure so long as his luck held and he could claim successes
209in foreign policy." By securing a high degree of personal authority, 
Mussolini, lik e  H it le r , was able to maintain a great deal of f le x ib i l i ty  
and freedom of action in his diplomatic maneuvers. His personal 
domination over the conduct of Ita lia n  diplomacy allowed him to act 
quickly and without restra in ts . The high degree of Mussolini's 
personal authority contributed to his lim ited effectiveness in diplomatic 
a ffa irs .
Mussolini had a profound impact upon international diplomacy while 
he was ru ler of Fascist I ta ly .  Like H it le r ,  Mussolini's character 
t r a its ,  his ideological farmework, and his unique position of authority
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a ll contributed to the manner in which he reshaped trad itional 
diplomacy. By comparing Mussolini's and H it le r 's  diplomatic practices, 
and the strengths and weaknesses of the methods used by both d ictators, 
i t  is possible to iden tify  certain aspects of each d ic tator's  system 
which acted as guideposts for th e ir  new approach to diplomacy. The 
new procedures which each d ictator introduced into the fie ld  of diplo­
matic a ffa irs  d ras tica lly  changed the conduct of diplomacy between 
nation states.
In both H it le r 's  and Mussolini's view, diplomacy no longer repre­
sented a method of preserving peaceful re lations, but became a tool 
that one should use to further one's own p o litic a l ambitions. H itle r  
only wanted to prepare for war, and Mussolini mainly wanted to bolster 
his own image. Whether H itle r  and Mussolini achieved th e ir personal 
aims through th e ir  unorthodox methods is d i f f ic u lt  to answer. I t  is 
true that H it le r 's  diplomatic tactics helped him to prepare for war, 
and that Mussolini's diplomacy did bolster his image, however, the 
end result of each d ic ta to r's  diplomacy was completely opposite to 
what they supposedly intended to achieve. In order to understand how 
both H it le r 's  and Mussolini's conduct of diplomacy could bring them 
both success and fa ilu re  simultaneously, i t  is necessary to examine 
both H it le r 's  and Mussolini's diplomatic a c tiv ity  in one particular 
test case. By examining what each dictator hoped to achieve in this  
case, and by comparing what actually resulted because of each d ictator's  
particu lar diplomatic procedures, one should be able to fu lly  grasp the 
significance of the new unorthodox procedures that each dictator in tro ­
duced into the diplomatic f ie ld .
IV. GERMAN AND ITALIAN INTERVENTION 
IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR
The Spanish C iv il War of 1936-1939, acquired a special sig­
nificance in European a ffa irs  because i t  represented a testing  
ground for the'forces that would soon face each other in the Second 
World War. Both sides in the co n flic t presented the c iv il war as a 
battle  between the ideologies that divided Europe. The Nationalists, 
who followed General Francisco Franco, presented themselves as 
crusaders defending European c iv iliz a tio n  against a Communist plot 
rather than as defenders of Spanish conservative in terests. The 
Republicans presented themselves as defenders of democracy against the 
evils of Fascism rather than as ordinary supporters of Spanish libera l 
in terests. Therefore, i t  is easy to see why foreign intervention in 
the Spanish C iv il war played such an important part in European diplomacy 
during the early years of Fascist diplomacy conducted by Mussolini and 
National Socialist diplomacy conducted by H it le r .
The major Western Powers, B rita in  and France, tr ied  not to in te r­
vene in the Spanish con flic t because of th e ir  fear of an armaments race 
and eventual war with Germany and Ita ly . Unfortunately, th e ir  re­
luctance was seen as a sign of weakness by the to ta lita r ia n  powers of 
I ta ly  and Germany. Their fa ilu re  to maintain a united and firm front 
against Ita lia n  and German intervention in the Spanish con flic t had 
profound consequences. The League of Nations lost its  prestige and 
Germany was encouraged by the weakness of the democratic powers to
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commit further aggression in other areas. In short, as P.A.M. van der
Esch argues in his book, Prelude to War, "the inadequate response of
the democratic nations to the cynical game of power po litic s  played
by Germany and Ita ly  throughout the Spanish c iv il w ar... heightened
the contempt of the Axis powers for the strength of the democratic
world" and contributed to the willingness of the to ta lita r ia n  powers
210to launch a general European war. In addition to Mussolini's in ­
volvement in the Ethiopian war, the common policy of Ita ly  and Germany 
towards Spain created one of the main foundations on which the Rome- 
Berlin Axis was b u ilt .  The Spanish C iv il War played an important role  
in shaping the foreign policies of both Ita ly  and Germany.
H itle r 's  Intervention Policies
In order to understand the significance of H it le r 's  intervention 
in the Spanish C iv il War, i t  is necessary to take note of the objectives 
H itle r  hoped to accomplish, the procedures he followed to achieve these 
ends, and f in a lly ,  the results of his intervention. Moreover, a 
comparison should be made between H itle r 's  intervention in the Spanish 
conflic t and Mussolini's, which was less calculated and shrewd than 
H itle r 's . By comparing the actions of each d ictator against the other, 
i t  is possible to gain a better understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each d ic ta to r's  approach to foreign policy.
H itle r 's  Objectives. The objectives that H itle r  wished to 
accomplish by intervening in the Spanish C ivil War, of course, were 
varied and often overlapped. Certain major concerns did take
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precedence, however, over others. One of the main objectives which
H itle r  wished to accomplish by intervening in the Spanish co nflic t,
for example, was to encourage dissension between I ta ly  and the Western
A llies . Ita l ia n  involvement in the Ethiopian war had already soured
relations between I ta ly  and the Western democracies, and H it le r  knew
that i f  he could keep I ta ly  at odds with the Western Powers, then
Mussolini would be forced into forming an alliance with Germany as
the only means of escaping complete isolation in European a f fa irs .
As William L. Shirer maintains in his book, The Rise and Fall of The
Third Reich, H it le r  was determined to "prolong the Spanish Civil War
in order to keep the Western democracies and I ta ly  at loggerheads and
211draw Mussolini toward him."
Moreover, in H it le r 's  view, the prolongation of the Spanish Civil
War would allow him to maintain a tighter hold over Franco as well as
Mussolini. H it le r  was never comfortable with equal partnerships and
always sought some type of extra hold over his potential a l l ie s .
Therefore, he questioned the d es irab il ity  of a complete Franco victory
in the Spanish C ivil War because he feared that a victorious Franco
might "attempt to play o f f  Germany and I ta ly  against Britain and 
212France." In H it le r 's  view, Franco's value as a potential a l ly  
would be diminished i f  he achieved complete independence from Germany 
by defeating the Republicans and establishing his own dictatorship.
In addition to gaining a tighter hold over Mussolini and Franco, 
the Spanish C ivil War also afforded H it le r  the opportunity of pre­
senting Nazi Germany as a major world power which the other European
no
nations would be forced to respect i f  not admire. H it le r  was con­
vinced that involvement in the Spanish conflic t would present very 
l i t t l e  risk to Germany because Franco's in i t ia l  opposition seemed 
very s lig h t , and the possib ility  of serious m ilita ry  setbacks seemed 
remote. Therefore, the possible gains of German intervention in the 
Spanish war seemed to outweigh any possible risks.
H it le r  also decided to intervene in the Spanish Civil War because
of Spain's strategic importance. The "geographical position of Spain
gave i t  a strategic importance which was quite out of proportion to
213her internal strength." Spain's geographical position could prove 
v ita l to either the Axis or the Western A llies in any future European 
war. Spain's control of G ilb ra ltar  and her potential naval and a ir  
force bases could help either side control the entire Mediterranean 
and the Northern coast of Africa. Therefore, H it le r  was naturally 
interested in keeping Spain under German influence. However, Franco's 
eventual victory in the Spanish war proved to be of l i t t l e  benefit to 
H it le r .  He could not convince Franco to take an active part in the 
Second World War. Franco was determined to maintain Spanish neutrality  
and to consolidate his Own position rather than to risk involvement in 
a major European war. Therefore, Franco's contribution to the German 
war e f fo r t  proved to be very minimal and fa iled  to measure up to 
H it le r 's  expectations.
H it le r  wanted to intervene in the Spanish conflict because of his 
concern over raw materials which he needed to meet his future war needs. 
Spain had an abundance of raw materials which the Germans needed in
m
order to build up the ir  armaments. Consequently, he insisted upon
German p rio rity  over Spanish mining interests in exchange for German
m ilita ry  assistance during the c iv i l  war.
F ina lly , H it le r  agreed to support Franco in the Spanish C ivil War
because such an alliance offered him the opportunity to present Nazi
Germany as the greatest anti-Communist force in Western Europe. He
wanted to appear as the great "savior" of Western c iv i l iza t io n  who
would protect Western Europe from the Communist menace. Moreover,
he actually believed that the extension of Communism in Europe would
strengthen the hands of Russia, his mortal enemy on the east, and of
214France, Germany's traditional enemy on the west. H it le r 's  genuine
concern over the dangers of Communism was evident in the telegram that
his Foreign Minister Baron von Neurath sent to the German Embassy in
I ta ly  on the 5th of December in 1936. Neurath stated that:
In the Spanish conflic t Germany has predominantly 
the negative goal of not permitting the Iberian 
Peninsula to come under Bolshevist domination, 
which would involve the danger of its  spreading tOp^c 
the rest of western Europe.
H it le r  liked to prepare for future wars, and he wanted to keep Russia 
as weak as possible by keeping Communism out of Western Europe. More­
over, he always tried to augment Germany's strength by gathering 
potential a ll ie s  to his side, and he believed that i f  he supported 
Franco in Spain, then he would be increasing his chances of winning a 
future war against the Soviet Union. As Nolte maintains, H it le r 's  
overriding goal was to attack Russia and destroy the Bolshevik menace.
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He wanted very much to be "the pioneer in the fight against 
bolshevism.
H it le r 's  Procedures. In addition to examining the objectives 
which H it le r  wished to accomplish by intervening in the Spanish Civil 
War, i t  is also necessary to examine the implementation of his policies 
in order to gain a better understanding of the manner in which H it le r  
conducted his diplomacy. As with his objectives, H it le r 's  methods of 
implementation were also varied and often overlapped. However, once 
again, certain major policy practices did take precedence over others 
and were implemented with a f a i r  degree of consistency.
One such policy which H it le r  followed in Spain was the practice 
of keeping his plans and actions as secret as possible. In his book, 
Half of Spain Died, Herbert Matthews argues that H it le r  "took great 
pains to conceal the extent" of his involvement in the Spanish Civil 
War. Mussolini, on the other hand, "boasted openly about Ita lia n  in ­
tervention and permitted the I ta l ia n  press to publish gloating accounts
217of the Fascist deeds in Spain." Instead of following Mussolini's 
example, H it le r  tr ied  to keep the extent of his involvement in Spain 
as secret as possible because he wanted to keep the scale of his in ­
volvement as limited as possible. Unlike Mussolini, H it le r  appeared 
to realize that he could avoid becoming trapped in an endless war in 
Spain i f  he kept his involvement in the c iv i l  war both limited and 
secret.
As Laurence Lafore maintains, "H itler was much wiser" than 
Mussolini in the manner in which he intervened in Spain. "He limited
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his contribution" much more than Mussolini, "and he avoided
associating himself with the fate of the Franquist cause." H it le r
knew that the Spanish Civil War would become a "drain on the strength
218of a ll  who became engaged in i t . "  His judgment was not as clouded 
as Mussolini's, who was blinded to the re a li t ie s  of the Spanish con­
f l i c t  by his inordinate desire for prestige. Therefore, unlike 
Mussolini, H it le r  wisely limited his involvement in the Spanish con­
f l i c t  and gathered what dividends he could from the ensuing situation.
However, H it le r  was more than w illing  to use Spain as a convenient
219testing ground for the new weapons of the Wehrmacht. In fa c t,  not
a ll  of the m ilita ry  supplies which H it le r  sent to Spain were intended
for Franco's forces. Many of the weapons which H it le r  sent to Spain
were en tire ly  in addition to the arms furnished to the Spanish Insurgent
army for use by Spaniards. H it le r  preferred to keep as much distance
as possible between his own forces and Franco's because he wanted to
maintain as much personal control over German involvement as possible.
This policy was especially evident in connection with the special
German a ir  unit known as the Condor Legion. This a ir  unit was at a ll
times under German command, and the soldiers' wages were paid by 
220Germany.
H it le r  believed that i f  he supplied his own troops with special 
weapons, and i f  he diversified German involvement in Spain instead of 
l im iting his intervention to any one specific area, then he would be 
in a better position to maintain his own personal control. He there­
fore encouraged a wide d iversification of German assistance in order
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to augment his own authority. German personnel were responsible
for such diverse projects as building f ie ld  fo r t if ic a t io n s , training
Spanish o fficers , and keeping the sea lanes open for war material
221and troop shipments.
H it le r  also was more careful than Mussolini when i t  came to 
maintaining his personal control over events in Spain. In addition 
to keeping his m ilita ry  forces separated from Franco's Spanish troops 
and of diversifing his involvement to include several areas of im­
portance, he maintained a d is tinct German organization in Spain known 
as the Auslandorganization which he used to further his own motives.
As Esch maintains, the Auslandorganization, which was the National 
Socialist Party's Foreign Organization,was a section of the Nazi Party 
which became deeply involved in internal Spanish a ffa irs  through the 
use of German nationals liv ing  in Spain. German nationals provided the 
Nazi Party with the basis for a vast network of unofficial commercial
and po lit ica l agents who worked secretly to further German interests 
222in Spain. The Aus1andorqanization gave H it le r  an extra advantage 
over Mussolini in achieving his motives in Spain.
Even though Mussolini was a capable leader when i t  came to main­
taining his personal authority at home, he was not very effective in 
the f ie ld  of foreign a f fa irs .  Mussolini's p o lit ica l intelligence seemed 
to fa i l  him when he turned to international a f fa irs .  His preoccupation 
with glory and prestige in international a ffa irs  encouraged him to 
ignore the possible dangers of his policies. Moreover, once he found 
himself irreversibly committed to a particular course of action, he
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lacked the m ilita ry  capability to compensate for his diplomatic
blunders. Therefore, i t  is not surprising that H it le r  gained more
from Spanish intervention than Mussolini.
H it le r 's  Results. H it le r 's  main objective, which was to force
Mussolini into an alliance with Germany, proved remarkably successful.
Franco's victory in the Spanish Civil War "rendered impossible a
reapproachement of Britain and France with I ta ly ,  which the Paris and
London governments had hoped for a fter the termination of the Abyssinian
223War." Therefore, Mussolini was driven "into the arms of H it le r ."
H it le r  knew that i t  would be to his advantage to keep Mussolini pre­
occupied with the Spanish conflic t. H it le r  knew that I ta l ia n  involve­
ment in the Spanish C ivil War would prevent Mussolini from establishing 
better relations with France and England. He knew that an isolated 
Mussolini would have to turn to Germany.
Moreover, Germany's involvement in the Spanish conflict gave 
H itle r  some additional benefits. Not only was H it le r  able to capture 
Mussolini as an a l ly  and prolong the Spanish Civil War in order to 
accomplish his own personal motives, but he was also able to test new 
m ilita ry  weapons and tactics in actual combat situations, to secure 
Spanish neutrality i f  not outright assistance in the Second World War, 
to secure a ready source of raw materials which he needed for his 
future war plans, and f in a l ly ,  to use the Spanish conflict to draw the 
world's attention away from his preparations for war and his tentative  
plans for world conquest.
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Mussolini's Intervention Policies
In order to understand the significance of Mussolini's in te r ­
vention in the Spanish C ivil War note should be taken of more than 
Mussolini's bankrupt policies in th e ir  general context. Instead, 
one should follow the same method used to examine H it le r 's  interven­
tion policies. I t  is necessary to take note of the objectives that 
Mussolini hoped to accomplish, the procedures he followed to achieve 
his ends, and f in a l ly ,  the results of his intervention policies. Then, 
by comparing the actions of each dictator against the other, i t  w ill  
be possible to gain a better understanding of how each dictator con­
ducted diplomacy, and to determine the strengths and weaknesses of 
each dictator's  approach to foreign policy.
Mussolini's Objectives. As with H it le r ,  the objectives that 
Mussolini wished to accomplish by intervening in the Spanish C ivil War 
were varied and often overlapped. However, as with H it le r ,  certain 
major concerns did take precedence over others. The difference between 
the two dictators was that H it le r 's  motives for intervening in the 
Spanish conflict were generally based upon re a lis t ic  expectations, 
while Mussolini's motives for intervening in the Spanish conflict  
were generally based upon personal dreams of prestige and glory that
had no basis in re a l i ty  and l i t t l e  chance of success. As Lafore
maintains:
The real reasons for Mussolini's meddling in 
Spain were ( l ik e  most of Mussolini's policies) 
a mixture of impetuosity and a sort of cynicism 224
which was as often as not based on unrealities.
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Nevertheless, i t  is necessary to examine Mussolini's intended ob­
jectives in  order to understand the fu l l  significance of Mussolini's 
involvement in. the Spanish C ivil War.
One of the main objectives which Mussolini hoped to accomplish by 
intervening in the Spanish conflict was to boost his own prestige by 
creating a dominant role for I ta ly  in the Mediterranean. He had dreams 
of creating a new Roman Empire which would eventually control the whole
Mediterranean, and Spain was a key link in his plans because of its
strateg ically  valuable position in the Western Mediterranean. Mussolini 
believed that i f  he intervened in the Spanish C ivil War and ensured 
Franco's victory, then he would be able to dominate Franco's Spain as 
the price for Ita l ia n  assistance in the c iv i l  war. As Richard Massock 
maintains in his book, I ta ly  From Within, i t  had "always been one of
Mussolini's tenets that you get nothing out of the fighting unless you 
225take part in i t . "  Therefore, Mussolini was determined to intervene
in the Spanish war in order to improve his own position.
Despite his dreams of forming a new Roman Empire, Mussolini was 
also fu l ly  aware of the more practical benefits which he could reap 
from assisting Franco. As Renzo de Felice observes in his study, 
Mussolini, the Ita l ia n  dictator was well aware of the po lit ico -  
strategic importance of Spain in relation to the defense of the
OOC
Mediterranean. Like H it le r ,  Mussolini recognized the value of 
numbers, and he reasoned that Spanish friendship would help to offset 
the re la tive  strength of the British in the Mediterranean and greatly 
improve I ta ly 's  position. Moreover, according to Gallo, Mussolini also
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believed that "Franco's victory would leave France exposed at the
rear and fa c i l i t a te  I ta ly 's  Mediterranean expansion." Therefore,
227Mussolini "committed himself firmly to intervention."
Mussolini placed much more importance upon the propaganda value
of intervening in the Spanish conflict than H it le r ,  who did not want
to draw undue attention to the extent of German involvement in the
Spanish conflic t. In fa c t, Mussolini actually encouraged the Ita lia n
press to report on the events in Spain in great d e a ti l .  He wanted to
g lo r ify  the achievements of the Ita l ia n  Fascist m ilita ry  for propaganda
purposes. Mussolini knew that such measures were necessary in order
to maintain the Fascist myth of in v in c ib il i ty .  As Denis Mack Smith
maintains, "the ruinous search for prestige and reputation had to be
continued" because the " Ita lians had been told to expect success after
success, and any fa i lu re  to repeat the prescription might expose the
228whole sham upon which fascism was b u ilt ."
Moreover, as with H it le r ,  Mussolini wanted to intervene in the 
Spanish conflic t because of his desire to maintain his image as the 
guardian of Western c iv i l iza t io n  against the spread of Communism into 
Western Europe. Obviously, he was more concerned about his dreams of 
glory and conquest than about the spread of Communist influence in 
Western Europe. However, Mussolini's Fascist policies were orig inally  
based upon an anti-Communist theme, and intervention in the Spanish 
conflic t would afford him the opportunity to appear as the great a n ti­
communist champion of the Western Powers. Therefore, his concern 
about the spread of Communism did play a role in convincing him to take
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an active part in the struggle in Spain. The "Spanish republicans
had sinned in Mussoulini's eyes by restoring free speech and more
democratic government at a time when fascism was supposed to be
winning everywhere." Therefore, not only would "intervention in Spain
disguised before the world as a campaign against communism" punish
the Spanish republicans, but i t  would also provide the opportunity to
229bring other po lit ic a l and material benefits to I ta ly  as a bonus.
Mussolini's Procedures. In addition to examining the objectives 
which Mussolini wished to accomplish by intervening in the Spanish con­
f l i c t ,  i t  is also necessary to examine the implementation of his 
policies in order to gain a better understanding of the manner in which 
Mussolini conducted his diplomacy. Moreover, i t  is also necessary to 
remember that Mussolini's policies were not as shrewd as H it le r 's ,  
and that Mussoulini demonstrated very l i t t l e  strategic foresight and 
common sense in the conduct of his diplomacy during the Spanish Civil 
War. However, Mussolini's methods of implementation were similar 
to H it le r 's ,  in that his policies were also varied and often overlapped. 
Moreover, as with H it le r ,  a number of Mussolini's major policy practices 
did take precedence over others and were implemented with a fa i r  degree 
of consistency.
One procedure which Mussolini attempted to follow in Spain with 
a fa i r  degree of consistency was the practice of trying to win as 
quick a victory as possible. Therefore, Mussolini sent comparatively 
more assistance to Franco than H it le r  in the hopes that Franco could 
win a quick victory. Mussolini was w illing to become more d irectly
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involved in the Spanish conflict than H it le r  because he was most
anxious to bring the Spanish C ivil war to a satisfactory conclusion.
Mussolini surpassed the other powers who were involved in the Spanish
conflic t in his efforts to build "up a true expeditionary force in
230Nationalist Spain." Mussolini was w ill ing  to send Franco whatever
m ilita ry  assistance he could possibly spare in order to win a quick
victory in Spain.
In fa c t, Mussolini became so obsessed with gaining a quick victory
and with adding to his prestige that he "became more and more reck-
231less in his search for m ilita ry  success in the Spanish C ivil War."
He actually "went against Franco's wishes by encouraging his Ita l ia n  
expeditionary force to push ahead too fast" during an advance on Madrid. 
The resulting defeat of the I ta l ia n  forces at Guadalajara was a serious 
blow to Mussolini's prestige. He had undertaken so much e ffo r t  to 
build up the myth of Fascist superiority on the b a ttle fie ld  that the 
m ilita ry  reverse which the Ita lians suffered at Guadalajara seriously 
damaged Fascist morale. In addition, the Ita lia n  defeat was particularly  
depressing because the forces which defeated the Fascists "were not 
even trained soldiers but simply an improvised multinational army of 
amateurs."
As a consequence of the I ta l ia n  defeat, Mussolini became even more 
determined to assist Franco in his battle against the Loyalist govern­
ment. The "humiliating defeat at Guadalajara made i t  a l l  the more
necessary to ensure a Franco victory and redeem the damaged reputation 
233of Italiam arms." Fortunately for Mussolini, I ta ly  was in a much
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better position than the other European powers to give assitance to 
Franco. I ta ly 's  geographical position placed Mussolini in a com­
paratively good position to send men and supplies to Spain through 
the Mediterranean.
Another procedure to which Mussolini adheared with a great deal
of consistency during his intervention in Spain was the practice of
portraying the Spanish conflict as a battle against Communism.
Mussolini hoped to drum up support for his intervention policy both
at home and abroad by painting the Spanish Civil War as a crusade
against the spread of Communism into Western Europe. He claimed that
he Was "not prepared to see the establishment of a Communist state in 
234Spain." He shrewdly used his anti-Communist stance as an extra 
ju s tif ica t io n  for intervening in the Spanish war. Even though 
Mussolini's anti-Communist stance was not the main reason why he in­
tervened in Spain, Mussolini did nevertheless support the anti-Communist 
cause, and intervention in Spain provided him with an opportunity not 
only to demonstrate his earnestness in fighting Communism, but also 
with an opportunity to advance his own position as well. Mussolini 
demonstrated a great deal of po lit ica l s k i l l  by using his anti-  
Coirmunist stance to help ju s t i fy  his intervention in Spain.
Mussolini's Results. The results that Mussolini achieved by 
intervening in the Spanish Civil War fe l l  fa r short of the goals that 
he intended to achieve. Unlike H it le r ,  Mussolini was not shrewd enough 
to l im it  the extent of his involvement in the Spanish conflict in 
accordance with the possible gains that he might achieve i f  Franco
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won the war. Mussolini's objective of gaining prestige for himself
and I ta ly  and of improving I ta ly 's  diplomatic standing in respect to
H it le r 's  Germany proved remarkably unsuccessful. In fa c t, not only
did his involvement in the Spanish conflic t damage I ta ly 's  prestige,
i t  also placed I ta ly  firm ly under the influence of H it le r .  Mussolini's
policies actually made I ta ly  more dependent upon Germany for support
than she had ever been in the past. I ta l ia n  involvement in the Spanish
war helped to complete what the Ethiopian War had only started. In
fa c t, as Robert Herzstein points out:
Mussolini's invasion of E th io p ia ,. . .  and 
parallel German-Italian intervention in the 
Spanish C ivil War were milestones on the road 
to Mussolini's loss of p o lit ica l independence to his?oc 
German a lly .
Moreover, by fa i l in g  to keep his involvement in Spain lim ited,  
and by placing I ta l ia n  prestige on the l in e , Mussolini had to forsake 
I ta l ia n  interests in other parts of Europe. Tied to H it le r  and weakened 
by the m ilita ry  and economic drains of Ethiopia and Spain, he had to 
co-operate with the Germans in central Europe, and co-operation meant,
ooc
in the words of Lafore, "abdication." Mussolini's intervention in 
Spain had made the breach with the Western democracies so wide that 
I ta ly  was le f t  with l i t t l e  freedom of action in foreign policy.
Mussolini had been so caught up in his search for prestige that, unlike 
H it le r  he fa iled  to accurately weigh the consequences of I ta l ia n  in ­
tervention in Spain. Mussolini entered the Spanish Civil War without 
any careful calculation as to possible gains, but merely out of a desire
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for adventure and a vague hope that destablizing Europe would be to 
237his advantage.
Mussolini had hoped that I ta l ia n  intervention in the Spanish 
Civil War would increase his prestige and improve his bargaining 
position with the other European Powers, however, Mussolini's involve­
ment in Spain had just the opposite e ffec t. Instead of increasing 
Fascist prestige, the poor performance of the Ita l ia n  Army in Spain 
actually diminished Mussolini's bargaining position. After watching 
the poor performance of the Ita l ia n  forces in Spain, the other European 
powers found i t  easier to disregard Mussolini's bluffing tactics.
They knew that he did not possess the necessary force to back up his 
threats.
Mussolini had to pay a high price for intervening in the Spanish 
Civil War. According to Esch, " Ita lian  intervention in the c iv i l  war" 
was bound to reach "larger proportions than that of any other country" 
because Mussolini's policies set the stage for unlimited involvement. 
Mussolini found i t  increasingly d i f f ic u l t  to disengage himself from 
Spain because the danger of being involved in a major European war
made i t  v ita l for him to keep control of the important I ta l ia n  m ilita ry
238supplies which he had already sent to Spain. Mussolini's in i t ia l  
promise of arms had led by degrees to an inextricable involvement in 
Spanish a f fa irs .
Mussolini had made a p o lit ic a l mistake by intervening in Spain, 
and he could not find a way to withdraw from Spain without incurring
124
serious damage to his own position and to that of I ta ly  as well.
He had no one to blame for this mistake but himself. I t  was Mussolini's
own policies and his personal decisions which placed I ta ly  in such a
disastrous position in Spain. "Like most of Mussolini's adventures,"
the decision to intervene in Spain "was taken without the advice or
approval of the king or other important Ita lian s ."  Moreover, according
to Lafore, l ik e  most of Mussolini's mistakes in foreign policy, his
decision to intervene in the Spanish Civil War rested solely upon his
"ill-judged whimsy." Therefore, i t  is not surprising that Mussolini's
intervention in Spain became a "serious l ia b i l i t y "  for I ta ly .  Even
though Mussolini was not committed to Franco by a formal alliance,
he nevertheless f e l t  compelled to support Franco until he was victorious
because Fascist prestige was on the line . Consequently, Mussolini
allowed Spain to become a "bottomless p it  for Ita l ia n  men, money and 
239equipment."
Mussolini knew that he had to gain at least a certain amount of 
influence over Spain in order to ju s t i fy  I ta l ia n  intervention to his 
people, however, "all that I ta ly  got out of the war" was "a display 
of gratitude and Franco's promise to pay, in a long-term funding 
arrangement, his war debt to Rom e."^* In fa c t, the costs of in te r­
vention in the Spanish conflic t were so high that ordinarily  Mussolini 
would have taken great pains to keep this information secret. However, 
he gradually became trapped by his own propaganda and, according to 
Mack Smith, was forced not only to admit the scale of his involvement, 
but also to proclaim his intervention policy a "huge success." He
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found himself with no choice but to continue his involvement in
Spain and hope that a Nationalist victory would eventually compensate
for his extensive assistance. Mussolini naively expected that Franco,
in gratitude for I ta l ia n  assistance, "would side with him in a more
extensive European war." However, "Franco made i t  abundantly clear
that Spanish national in te re s ts .. .  demanded a long period of recuperative
241peace," and he refused to involve Spain in a major European war.
When Mussolini f in a l ly  began to realize just what a mistake in te r ­
vention in Spain was for I ta l ia n  interests, he made every attempt to 
win the war quickly. He hoped that German assistance could help 
him to end the war, but H it le r  could not be persuaded to increase the 
extent of his involvement in Spain. Unlike Mussolini, H it le r  could 
afford to extend the c iv i l  war in Spain indefin ite ly  without seriously 
damaging his own position. Mussolini on the other hand, continued to
assist Franco only because he had no alternative but to remain in Spain
242until Fascism was victorious. Therefore, the end result of Mussolini's 
intervention in the Spanish C ivil War proved to be disastrous for I ta ly .  
Mussolini followed his personal whimsy rather than sound reasoning in 
conducting his foreign a f fa irs ,  and consequently, I ta ly  ended up trapped 
in a costly c iv i l  war where the possible benefits of victory could 
never ju s t i fy  the enormous costs of intervention.
Diplomatic Practice in the Spanish Civil War
The Spanish Civil War had a direct influence upon the course of 
European diplomacy because i t  helped to set the stage for the Second
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World War. I t  held a special importance in European a ffa irs  because
i t  took "place in a time when great ideological and national forces
faced one another in the rest of Europe." Spain was destined to
243become a "cockpit and a microcosm" of the Second World War.
More than any other event in European a f fa irs ,  the Spanish Civil 
War cemented the alliance of Nazi Germany and Fascist I ta ly  against 
the Western Powers. The friendship between H it le r 's  Germany and 
Mussolini's I ta ly  had never been very solid, but the Spanish Civil War
provided an opportunity for both countries to draw closer together in
a common cause. H it le r  saw an opportunity, by intervening in the 
Spanish war, to weaken the Western Powers and to draw Mussolini into 
an alliance with Germany. Mussolini, on the other hand, saw an 
opportunity, by intervening in the Spanish war, to increase his own 
prestige and to acquire some spoils for I ta ly  at the same time. More­
over, Mussolini was particularly  anxious to join in alliance with H it le r  
after he witnessed the power of Nazi Germany in comparison with the 
apparent weakness of the Western Powers. As Matthews maintains:
The course which the Spanish Civil War took 
understandably led the Duce to believe that Nazi
Germany was invincible and the democracies weak
and contemptible. In Spain, the two dictators 
found a common task, and i t  was natural for the 
Duce to hitch his rickety Roman chariot to the 244 
bright Nazi star.
Unlike H it le r  and Mussolini, the Western Powers were reluctant to 
become involved in the Spanish Civil War and desperately tried to keep
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the Spanish war from sparking a larger European war. Both H it le r
and Mussolini saw the weak response of the Western Powers as a sign
that they could continue to pursue the ir  aggressive policies at w i l l .
The Western Powers did not seem to realize that th e ir  appeasement
policy only encouraged Mussolini and H it le r  to commit further acts of
aggression. They accomplished nothing by appeasing Mussolini and H itle r
in Spain. "The great war came anyway." writes Matthews, "with Spain
in the hands of a dictator friendly to the Axis and with Nazi Germany
245stronger than she should have been."
I t  is clear that the Spanish Civil War had a great influence upon 
the diplomacy of a l l  of the European Powers that became involved in 
the conflic t. This is why i t  is possible to gain a better understanding 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the diplomacy of both H it le r  and 
Mussolini by examining th e ir  intervention policies in the Spanish 
Civil War.
V. TOTALITARIAN DIPLOMACY IN PRACTICE
I f  one desires to understand the nature of diplomacy as practiced 
by Adolf H it le r  and Benito Mussolini, i t  is necessary to examine not 
only each dictator's personal conception of the purpose of diplomacy 
and the manner in which each dictator actually conducted his diplomacy, 
but also such additional factors as the role that the Party, the 
m ilita ry , and the Foreign Office played in the conduct of each dictator's  
foreign policy.
Moreover, i t  is also necessary to examine the personal tactics  
which each dictator used in order to conduct his diplomacy, for both 
H it le r  and Mussolini introduced a number of new factors into the con­
duct of foreign a ffa irs  which were dramatically d ifferent from the 
"traditional" norms of diplomatic behavior as practiced by the Western 
powers. For example, unlike the Western leaders, both dictators liked  
to b lu ff  th e ir  opponents whenever possible, take unexpected and un­
orthodox actions, and conduct th e ir  diplomacy on a personal level 
rather than through subordinates and professional diplomats. Clearly, 
i t  is necessary to examine each dictator's  personal conduct of foreign 
affa irs  in order to understand the impact of to ta li ta r ia n  diplomacy 
upon the conduct of international a ffa irs .
H it le r 's  Diplomacy in Practice
In his book, H i t le r , Joachim C. Fest maintains that H it le r 's  
conception of imperial expansion and alliance policy differed from
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traditional lines in that he wanted to pursue his policies far beyond
anything that the older members of the conservative ruling class had
ever envisioned. H it le r  actually "despised his halfhearted partners
because they stopped short of reaching out for world power as he did."
He wanted to achieve complete world domination. In addition, H it le r 's
notions of imperial expansion differed from that of former traditional
imperialist schemes in that his expansionist policies were based upon
a new ideological foundation. The "notions of selection, racial bloc,
and eschatological mission" made H it le r 's  imperialism qualitative ly
246different from the imperialism of the past. H it le r 's  goals went 
beyond the traditional expansionist policies of the past. I t  is true 
that he was able to use traditional revisionism to further his plans, 
however, he merely used revisionist sentiments as a temporary link with 
the past in order to persuade his followers that his goals were com­
patible with traditional expansionist policies. In fact, H it le r  was 
determined that his program would represent a declaration of war 
against more than just the established order of nation states. He 
wanted to create a. new order based upon the ideal of a superior man, and 
in his view, only Germany had the power to make his dreams a re a li ty .
In H it le r 's  view, as previously discussed, diplomacy alone could 
not achieve his ultimate goals. Only wars of conquest could f u l f i l l  
his desired objectives. H it le r  believed that war was the ultimate 
goal of po lit ic s , and this reasoning shaped his entire conception of 
the uses of diplomacy. As Gordon A. Craig points out in his book,
Europe Since 1915, H it le r 's  preference for the use of m ilita ry  force 
over the use of diplomacy was a product of his war experiences. The
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First World War made H itle r  a "convinced m i l i ta r is t  with a preference,
247which never le f t  him, for m ilita ry  solutions to po lit ica l problems. 
Consequently, H it le r  based his foreign policy on the assumption that 
Germany would eventually be involved in a major war with the other 
European powers.
H it le r  was constantly impatient with the progressof conventional
diplomacy and he was always anxious to press forward into a conflic t.
By the time H itle r  launched the German invasion of Poland in 1939,
i t  was very evident that he had lost a l l  patience with diplomatic
procedures. " I t  was as i f  he were at last tired  of having to adapt
himself to circumstances, tired of the eternal talking, dissimulation,
248and diplomatic wirepulling." In fact, H it le r 's  distaste for  
traditional politics had been a constant part of his character from 
the very beginning of his quest for power. Po lit ica l manuvering seemed 
almost insignificant to him when compared to the possible advantages 
to be gained through war.
However, H it le r  was shrewd enough to realize that he would have to 
be content with diplomatic maneuver until Germany possessed the 
necessary m ilita ry  might to engage in armed co nflic t. Therefore, he 
retained most of the older Foreign Ministry s ta ff  and relied upon 
diplomats who were known abroad in order to reassure foreign powers 
that he would not seriously disturb the existing status quo. More­
over, unlike Mussolini, H it le r  did not complicate the task of his 
foreign diplomats by constantly attacking the international status quo. 
During his early years as dictator of Nazi Germany, H it le r  went out of
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his way to disarm foreign opposition to his plans by presenting a very 
conciliatory figure. Clearly, H it le r  understood the value of diplomacy 
and propaganda.
H it le r 's  personal style of diplomacy was clear in its  ends, but
entire ly  f lex ib le  in its  means and instruments. He considered any means
legitimate so long as i t  helped him to achieve his goals. "What
counted most in H it le r 's  eyes was the rearmament of Germany which
249would enable i t  to move forward by threat or by force." H it le r  
was determined to build up Germany's strength to the point where other 
powers could no longer contemplate war as an answer to German aggression. 
He wanted to be able to advance his plans unhampered by any type of 
restraint until he was ready to launch his planned wars of conquest.
As R.A.C. Parker points out in his book, Europe 1919-45, "the evidence 
of German rearmament clearly suggests that H it le r  was deliberately pre­
paring to fight some kinds of wars or, at least, to be able to risk  
some. " 250
In order to fa c i l i ta te  his diplomatic opportunism, H it le r  also
tended to avoid international collaboration in favor of b ilatera l
agreements in the conduct of his diplomacy. In addition, as Craig points
out in his book, Germany 1866-1945, the Allies were slow to recognize
the weakness of forming b ila tera l agreements with H itle r:
The other Powers were so anxious to believe that 
his intentions were peaceful that they made the 
mistake... of dropping their more comprehensive 
projects and making the kind of agreement he 
preferred, forgetting in doing so that b i la te ra l25-| 
agreements are the easiest kind to break.
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In the early years of Nazi ru le , H it le r  and the Foreign Ministry 
were in fundamental agreement as to the nature and goals of German 
foreign policy. Both the Foreign Ministry and H it le r  advocated a 
basically traditional revisionist l in e , and both supported the achieve­
ment of m ilita ry  equality with the other Powers. During these early  
years, H it le r  gave the Foreign Ministry "no reason to disapprove of 
his policy, which was, at least su perfic ia lly , congruent with their  
own." However, this appearance of common goals and agreed upon pro­
cedures was merely an illu s ion . H it le r  simply took advantage of the 
Foreign Office to advance his own plans. H it le r  had only "allowed 
the old diplomatic establishment to remain in power in order to mask 
his intensions from the rest of the world." He actually had no 
confidence in the a b i l i ty  of the Foreign Office to achieve his goals.
He believed that the older diplomatic o f f ic ia ls  "were incapable of
understanding, le t  alone carrying out, the policy he had projected which
252far exceeded in its  scope the lim its of their narrow revisionism."
H it le r 's  lack of confidence in the Foreign Office and his preference 
for the use of force over the slow processes of diplomacy helps to 
explain his apparent s h ift  away from diplomacy towards m ilita ry  
solutions to p o lit ic a l problems. H it le r  had always placed more fa ith  
in force than in negotiation, and once Germany possessed the m ilita ry  
power to back up his aggressive sty le , he naturally began to dispense 
with negotiation and instead began to develop a tendency to rely  more 
and more upon m ilita ry  pressure instead of negotiating s k il l  to achieve 
his aims. The tone of H it le r 's  diplomacy became menacing and arrogant.
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H itle r  lost interest in negotiation and the benefits i t  might bring.
He was only interested in triumphs that could be won by war, and 
negotiation became less and less important as the Second World War 
began in earnest.
When H it le r  renounced politics in favor of war, he also returned
to his standard ideological positions. His in tellectual r ig id ity
once more began to manifest i ts e l f  as the war progressed. H itle r
believed that he was entering upon a final conflic t which would determine
his ultimate success or fa i lu re ,  and this sense of urgency colored the
manner in which he conducted his foreign policy. He was convinced
that he was running out of time and that he had to launch his war
while the opportunity was s t i l l  propitious. The "effortless victories
of the early period strengthened his conviction that a fter  the fame
of demagogue and po lit ic ian  he would also win glory as the supreme 
253commander." As the war continued and as the expected glory fa iled  
to appear, H it le r  grew more and more determined to follow mistaken 
policies in the be lie f that sheer determination would win the day. He 
fa iled to realize that his policies were bankrupt and that they needed 
to be changed in order to meet new and unforeseen circumstances.
H itle r  did realize that Germany could not win a major protracted 
war against a united coalition of major European powers, but he believed 
that his B1itzkrieg tactics could overcome this obstacle. Since 
Germany did not have the capability to win a protracted war against an 
enemy coalition, H it le r  decided to counter this problem by concentrating 
as much power as possible in short and spaced blows against selected
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individual opponents. By following this tactic  of short concentrated
wars, H it le r  hoped to enlarge Germany's power base in a step by step
process until his country was prepared for a major world war. This
was the essence of his strategic concept which became popularly known
by the term B1itzkrieg.
The concept of B1itzkrieg warfare was a concept "which took account
of the specific weaknesses and strengths of the German situation and
254ingeniously combined them in a novel method of conquest." However, 
even though the B1itzkrieg concept corresponded quite naturally to the 
nature of H it le r 's  improvising style, i t  nevertheless could not achieve 
H itle r 's  ultimate aims because i t  represented tactics which were designed 
as temporary measures and which could not supply the ultimate victory 
which H it le r  desired. H it le r  fa iled to understand that short-term 
measures designed to meet immediate shortcomings could not produce an 
ultimate victory against a united coalition which was determined to 
defeat him. Unfortunately, H it le r  would le t  nothing hold back his quest 
for new triumphs. He was determined to achieve his objectives, and he 
considered war the only possible solution to the attainment of his plans.
Mussolini's Diplomacy in Practice
Like H it le r ,  Mussolini was determined to expand his state through 
limited wars of conquest. Moreover, Mussolini was determined not only 
to raise I ta ly 's  status to equal that of the other European powers, but 
he was also determined to create a new Roman Empire in the process. How­
ever, even granting the excesses of his motives, Mussolini's attempts to
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realize his expansionist goals were actually remarkably consistent 
and tenacious, and his frequent changes of mood in no way obscured 
the course of his policies. In fac t, Mussolini was clever enough, 
l ike  H it le r ,  to avoid diplomatic entanglements with foreign powers in 
order to leave his options open so that he could launch I ta ly  into a 
new war of conquest whenever he chose to do so. "Mussolini refused a ll  
commitments, such as leadership of a neutral bloc, that might inh ib it  
entry into war."
Mussolini's policies were based upon the necessity of war, and a ll  
of his diplomatic maneuvers were designed to prepare I ta ly  for war. 
Mussolini did his best to make I ta ly  independent of foreign resources, 
and he tr ied  to prepare the Ita l ia n  people for the sacrifices that they 
would have to make in the coming war. Much like  H it le r ,  Mussolini was 
determined to participate in wars of conquest, and would not be satisfied  
with what could be accomplished by diplomacy alone. He wanted to restore 
m ilitary  glory to I ta ly ,  and to raise his own status as the new leader 
of a new Roman Empire.
Moreover, in keeping with his emphasis upon glory and empire, 
Mussolini sought to distinguish his diplomacy from that of the other 
European states. He wanted his diplomacy to exhibit a new sense of 
forcefulness which would set i t  apart from the hesitant and conventional 
forms of diplomacy practiced by the Western powers. Mussolini considered 
the usual modes of diplomatic conduct unworthy of I ta ly 's  power and 
prestige. However, like  H it le r ,  Mussolini had to secure his own position 
and build up the strength of his state before he could consider dispensing
136
entire ly  with the accepted rules of diplomatic conduct. Therefore, 
during his early years in power Mussolini continued to negotiate 
with other powers in order to strengthen his position as much as 
possible for the day when he would be able to dispense with diplomacy 
and launch his wars of conquest. Naturally, Mussolini realized that 
the other European powers would never allow Ita ly  to create a new 
colonial empire at the ir  own expense, and that he could never win a 
colonial empire through diplomatic channels alone. He knew that he 
would have to depend upon m ilita ry  force to secure his ultimate aims. 
However, Mussolini did believe that he would be able to achieve many 
of his goals in the early years of his rule with l i t t l e  interference 
from the Western powers because he was convinced that they would be 
too distracted by the economic depression and by the problem of the
new Germany to interfere with his plans until i t  was too late to change
the outcom e.^
Even though Mussolini was always anxious to improve his own status
and the status of I ta ly  through m ilita ry  conquests, what he wanted most
of a ll  was glory for himself. Therefore, even though Mussolini agreed 
with H it le r  that the only solution to Germany's and I ta ly 's  aspirations 
involved a war with the Western democracies, he nevertheless tried to 
restrain H it le r  from launching a major war against the Western powers 
until he could participate on an equal basis and capture his own share 
of the spoils and of the glory. Unfortunately for Mussolini, H it le r  
was unwilling to wait for I ta l ia n  preparedness, and Mussolini was forced 
to jo in the war e a r l ie r  than was practicable for I ta ly  in order not to
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miss out on the division of the spoils. Mussolini's only comfort 
was the hope that German victories and especially a French armistice 
would enable I ta ly  to assert its  supremacy in the Mediterranean by 
force of arms.
Like H it le r ,  Mussolini was content to le t  the older professionals
handle the day to day a ffa irs  of the Foreign Office during the early
years of his rule. Consequently, the older professionals soon found
that by making concessions to Mussolini's vanity, they were able to
moderate his ambitions and to carry on the normal aspects of day to day
diplomacy with the other European powers. However, this situation began
to change once the economic depression of the 1930s and the corresponding
"disruption of European power relationships" began to present Mussolini
257with new opportunities to increase his power.
Mussolini became increasingly determined to follow a new policy of 
a ll-o u t revisionism, and he brought the Ita l ia n  Foreign Ministry under 
his personal control in order to fa c i l i t a te  the style of diplomacy which 
he wished to follow. Consequently, the practice of negotiation became 
almost a forgotten art in Ita lian  diplomacy because Mussolini believed 
that his goals could only be attained through war and not through 
diplomatic means. Therefore, i t  is not surprising that Mussolini 
ordered his diplomats to re f le c t a more m ilitan t attitude in the conduct 
of Ita l ia n  diplomacy. The practical effect of this new style of diplomacy 
was that negotiation with other powers became almost impossible to con­
duct with any reasonable hope of reaching solid agreements. Ita lian  
diplomats became more interested in style than in substance, and they
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became l i t t l e  more than propaganda representatives of Ita l ia n  interests
abroad. They were more concerned with demonstrating the ir  loyalty to
the Fascist regime than with advancing I ta ly 's  national interests.
The shortcomings of this m ilitant or tono fascista style of
diplomacy were especially apparent in the negotiations that Ciano carried
on under Mussolini's orders. Like Mussolini, Ciano was more interested
in the style of Ita lia n  diplomacy than with the substance. Consequently,
Ciano's conduct of Ita l ia n  diplomacy contributed to the decline of
professionalism in Ita l ia n  diplomacy. According to Craig, the essential
weakness of Ita lian  diplomacy "arose from the essential f r iv o l i ty  of
the o ff ic ia ls  charged with the task of conducting i t . "  For example,
Ciano's shocked protest, upon learning that Germany fu lly  intended to
go to war in 1939, despite verbal assurances to the contrary in the
German-Italian m ilita ry  alliance known as the Pact of Steel, was a
"pathetic admission that he had not mastered the art of negotiating
258even with his own a l l ie s ."  The older professionals were quite capable 
of conducting rational policies, however, Mussolini and l îs cohorts were 
not interested in conducting Ita lia n  diplomacy along traditional lines.
Mussolini was determined to follow an expansionist course and to 
create a new colonial empire according to his own personal tastes. 
However, Mussolini was forced to follow in H it le r 's  path because I ta ly  
was too weak to advance his goals without substantial assistance from 
other powers. The best that Mussolini could hope for was that he would 
be able to capitalize upon the unrest between the other European powers. 
Consequently, Mussolini was especially anxious to promote unrest be­
tween Germany and the Western Allies because he knew that he would have
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the best chance of achieving his goals "when the other powers were
259quarrelling and ready to appeal to I ta ly  for support." In this 
respect, Mussolini's policy le f t  him in a position to capita lize upon 
any opportunity which might advance his aims. As long as Mussolini 
was convinced that his actions would not damage the prestige of his 
country or of his personal ru le, then he would take advantage of every 
opportunity to improve I ta ly 's  position in the Mediterranean. Mussolini 
was convinced that i f  he could hold the balance of power on the con­
tinent, then he would be able to attain re lative freedom of maneuver 
for I ta ly .  Mussolini believed that i f  he could make Ita ly  the de­
termining factor in any change of the status quo on the European con­
tinen t, then he would be in the perfect position to demand his share of 
the spoils.
I t  is true that in the beginning of his rule Mussolini did have
some doubts as to how far he could safely push the Western powers in his
pursuit of a colonial empire. However, once Mussolini tasted the fru its
of success in his bid to conquer Abyssinia his "apprehensions gave way
to a new excess of confidence." His plans to make the Mediterranean
an Ita lia n  lake seemed to be more and more feasible as events progressed.
Therefore, i t  is not surprising that when the Spanish Civil War erupted
0in July 1936, he saw in i t  an opportunity to increase his power. The 
Spanish Civil War seemed like  the perfect opportunity to advance his 
plans, and Mussolini became more and more anxious to intervene in the 
Spanish war and to draw closer to H it le r 's  Germany in order to ensure a 
Fascist victory in Spain. Mussolini saw the Spanish conflict as another 
step which would ultimately add to his new Roman Empire. What he fa iled
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to recognize was that H it le r  did not share his motives and did not 
desire a quick victory in Spain. Consequently, Mussolini found himself 
involved in a protracted war of a t t r i t io n  which became a costly burden 
to his regime.
Mussolini was so intent upon creating his new empire that he often
misjudged the value of what could be gained by involving I ta ly  in
questionable adventures abroad. Collaboration with Germany encouraged 
Mussolini to make a major investment of strength in Spain, which drew 
him away from other areas where Ita l ia n  interests were actually more 
v ita l and where Ita l ia n  intervention actually might have proved beneficial. 
The manner in which Mussolini conducted his diplomacy often damaged 
I ta lia n  interests instead of increasing the status of I ta ly  in relation  
to the other European powers. Mussolini's diplomacy was characterized 
by an emphasis upon the sensational, and was to ta l ly  lacking in any 
kind of professionalism. Therefore, Mussolini's diplomacy was bound to 
fa i l  in its  intended objectives.
Conclusion: The Nature of Totalitarian Diplomacy as Practiced by
Adolph H it le r  and Benito Mussolini
In order to understand the nature of to ta li ta r ia n  diplomacy as 
practiced by Adolf H it le r  and Benito Mussolini i t  is necessary to con­
sider not only the dictators themselves, but also such factors as the
role which the Party, the m ilita ry , and the Foreign Office played in 
each dictator's  regime. All aspects of a to ta li ta r ia n  system influence 
the ultimate conduct of that particular state's foreign policy. The 
foreign policies of Nazi Germany and Fascist I ta ly  were dominated by
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several predominant characteristics which set them apart from the 
traditional style of diplomacy practiced by the Western democracies.
Both H it le r  and Mussolini conducted the ir  diplomacy d ifferen tly  
from the Western powers because of the extraordinary amount of inde­
pendence which each dictator possessed within his own state. Unlike 
the Western leaders and diplomats who were forced to consider various 
restraints such as parliamentary approval whenever they contemplated 
making foreign policy decisions, both H it le r  and Mussolini were 
re la t ive ly  free to pursue the ir  own whims in foreign policy.
I t  is not surprising that H it le r  enjoyed a great deal of freedom 
in making foreign policy decisions while he was dictator of Nazi 
Germany. The f i r s t  thing that H it le r  did when he came to power was to 
eliminate a l l  possible sources of opposition to his rule. In fact,  
one of the most remarkable features of the history of Germany under 
National Socialism was the extent to which H it le r  imposed his personal 
authority on the German people and state. H it le r 's  authority was 
absolute and he was master of every aspect of German administration and 
society. After having come to power, H itle r  subjected business and 
labor, the army and the police, and indeed every significant group and 
organization to his control. H it le r  was determined to maintain 
absolute control over every segment of German society which might place 
even the slightest restra int upon his freedom to pursue his foreign 
policy goals. H it le r  knew that his goals could only be achieved i f  his 
own position was unassailable. Therefore, he made certain that his 
control over governmental institutions and party organizations was as
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complete and as solidly entrenched as possible. H it le r  made certain 
that his policy making powers would be free from a ll  possible restraints  
by ordering a " to ta lita r ian  penetration of a l l  social structures by 
means of a close-knit system of supervision, regimentation, and 
guidance.
H it le r 's  a b i l i ty  to conduct his diplomacy unrestricted by con­
ventional restraints was enhanced by the personal style of government 
which he created in terms of administrative d e ta il .  His style of 
government was very f le x ib le ,  and i t  made l i t t l e  difference to H it le r  
i f  his diplomacy was conducted by amateurs or i f  i t  followed unorthodox 
procedures. H it le r  was satisfied with his diplomacy as long as his 
personal goals were achieved and as long as he could claim credit for  
any positive results.
H it le r  used the same tactics to subdue his governmental institutions  
as he used to control the Nazi Party. He encouraged competition within 
the various executive offices of the government so that he could maintain 
his own position as the ultimate authority in a ll  matters of foreign
pco
policy. Iron ica lly , the resulting bureaucratic chaos such a govern­
mental style created added to H it le r 's  personal authority. With so 
many institutions fighting between themselves for his favor and appealing 
to him for his final decision, i t  is not surprising that H it le r  was 
able to maintain such absolute authority within his own hands. More­
over, H it le r  made i t  a practice when dealing with his governmental 
apparatus to keep his subordinates in the dark as much as possible.
This tactic  provided him with a very effective means of exercising his
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own authority over administrative policy. By refusing to depend upon 
competing organizations to carry out his policy decisions, and by 
maintaining absolute authority over a l l  aspects of governmental ad­
ministration, H it le r  was able to conduct his foreign policy re la t ive ly  
free from a l l  restraints. Therefore, H it le r  possessed a great deal of 
freedom of maneuver in his diplomatic practice with the other European 
powers.
In a manner similar to that of H it le r ,  Mussolini also enjoyed a
great deal of freedom in making foreign policy decisions when compared
to the more restricted atmosphere under which the Western leaders
and diplomats had to conduct the ir  diplomacy. Like H it le r ,  Mussolini
wanted his personal authority to be as absolute as possible so that he
could conduct his policies as he wished. Mussolini quickly replaced
a ll  unreliable governmental o f f ic ia ls  with his own personally nominated
subordinates. His position as head of state allowed him to "choose
264his own ministers without reference to anybody." I t  is not sur­
prising therefore, that Mussolini was able to dominate the Ita lian  
government and could conduct his policies as he wished.
One factor which helped Mussolini to maintain such absolute control 
over policy making decisions was that he was head of the Fascist Party 
as well as head of the Ita l ia n  state government. Such a position 
allowed Mussolini to act as umpire between government and Party, and 
this helped him to exercise his personal authority over both in s t itu ­
tions. By playing r iva l factions o ff  against each other, Mussolini 
could maintain his own personal authority over his subordinates and 
leave himself free to conduct his diplomacy with l i t t l e  regard for
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internal restraints. Mussolini's tactics of playing competing power
groups o ff against each other, even within his own governmental
structure, demonstrated his "determination to preserve his own freedom
265of action," even "at the cost of institutional s ta b i l i ty ."
Mussolini was determined to maintain his unassailable position and 
to carry out his plans as he saw f i t  regardless of what his subordinates 
might consider the proper course for I ta ly  to take in foreign a ffa irs .
In fact, not only did Mussolini discourage advice from his subordinates, 
he actually believed that he did not need any advice. He was more in­
clined to give orders and simply would not accept advice from sub­
ordinates. Mussolini liked to appear in fa l l ib le ,  and i f  he were to 
accept advice from subordinates then his image would be tarnished and 
his authority would ultimately be diminished. Consequently, Mussolini 
was careful to protect his image in order to maintain as high a degree 
of authority as possible. He was convinced that i f  his plans were to
have any chance of succeeding then "one person alone should command,
266and even in insignificant matters his f i a t  must not be questioned."
Like H it le r ,  Mussolini wanted complete freedom of action in making 
foreign policy decisions because he was convinced that i f  any restrictions  
whatsoever were placed upon his authority then he would not be able to 
conduct his diplomacy with the forcefulness necessary to achieve his 
aims.
Mussolini placed as much of his administration under his personal 
control as possible. He made decisions without bothering to consult with 
his subordinates, and he took pleasure in bypassing bureaucratic
145
institutions whenever i t  suited his purposes. Naturally, this style 
of government "meant that his ministers were often le f t  with no real 
feeling of responsibility and became timid about acting on the ir  own
Of.1
in i t ia t iv e ."  However, Mussolini was more than w illing to put up 
with this type of administrative weakness as long as he could pursue 
the policies that he wished with l i t t l e  or no concern for internal 
restraints.
Another factor which made the manner in which both H it le r  and 
Mussolini conducted the ir  diplomacy different from the manner in which 
the Western powers conducted their diplomacy was that both H it le r  and 
Mussolini suffered from a lack of professionals in the ir  diplomatic 
corps.
Since H it le r  was determined to keep his personal authority as 
absolute as possible he was careful not to encourage the growth of 
potential rivals within his administration. He appointed o ff ic ia ls  who 
were often less than competent because he was wary of appointing 
individuals who might possess suffic ient talent to amass enough power 
to challenge his own authority. H it le r  was determined to maintain his 
personal authority in decision making even at the cost of keeping in­
competent individuals in his administrative apparatus. He was more than 
content to put up with this type of ine ff ic ien t administration as long 
as he was free to conduct his diplomacy unrestricted by internal adminis­
tra tive  restraints.
In a similar manner to H it le r ,  Mussolini also suffered from a lack 
of professionals in his diplomatic corps. In fa c t, many individuals 
were given positions of authority in Mussolini's government who possessed
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l i t t l e  or no qualifications for their jobs. He continued to appoint 
older Party members instead of talented individuals to administer 
his policies. As a result, incompetent individuals became entrenched 
within his governmental apparatus, and like most leaders, Mussolini 
discovered that his diplomacy could only achieve a limited degree of 
success even i f  his leadership was inspired and even i f  his goals con­
formed to re a lis t ic  expectations.
Mussolini was fu lly  aware that a large majority of his colleagues 
were less than competent, however, he preferred to rely upon dis­
reputable individuals instead of persons who exhibited merit because he 
believed that he could maintain a higher degree of authority over in ­
dividuals who owed the ir  position to his beneficence. Mussolini was 
convinced that most individuals were stupid and dishonest and he believed 
that his own superior a b i l i t ie s  would more than make up for the low 
quality of his subordinates. Moreover, since he fu l ly  intended to con­
duct his diplomacy himself, he therefore saw no need to surround himself 
with talented individuals who would only interfere with his plans and 
who might steal the credit for foreign policy successes. I t  is no wonder 
therefore, that Mussolini "disliked people of character and culture who 
were brave enough to disagree with him," and that he refused to appoint
p/ro
such people to important positions within his administration.
There is no doubt that Mussolini's selection of his administrative 
subordinates weakened his regime. However, he did not want anyone to 
interfere with his conduct of foreign policy, especially i f  they 
exhibited any ta lent for conducting diplomatic a ffa irs . As Mack Smith
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maintains, "no one with genuine ta lent lasted long in authority" 
or was given more than the smallest degree of responsiblity. More­
over, Mussolini would frequently change his ministers in order to
"prevent potential rivals learning the ropes and building an indepen- 
269dent power base." Mussolini wanted to protect his own position so 
that he could conduct his diplomacy free from internal restraints, and 
he would take any action that would maintain the subservience of his 
subordinates. Mussolini even encouraged squabbles between his sub­
ordinates so that he could remain the final arb itra tor in the decision 
making process. Mussolini was w illing to support any action that would 
keep his subordinates subservient and would allow him to conduct his 
diplomacy according to his personal whims.
Another factor that made Nazi and Fascist diplomacy different from 
that of the Western powers was this: neither dictator had to consider
the impact of public opinion upon his diplomacy to the same degree as 
the Western diplomats. Naturally, both dictators had to take public 
opinion into consideration, and they made every e ffo r t  to manipulate i t  
whenever they contemplated foreign policy decisions, however, neither 
dictator had to consider the impact of public opinion as seriously as 
the Western diplomats.
H it le r  was fortunate as far as public opinion was concerned because 
a large majority of the German population supported his regime long before 
i t  became necessary to control public opinion through governmental 
pressures. As Joachim Fest observes:
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I f  the Germans did not share H it le r 's  hunger 
for space, his anti-Semitism, his vulgar and 
brutal qualit ies , they applauded him and 
followed him because he had once more restored 
passion to p o lit ics , and overlaid i t  with a270 
note of dire significance.
The German people saw H it le r  as an effective and strong leader, and 
after twelve years of pariiamentary democracy which appeared incapable 
of mastering Germay's innumerable problems they were w illing  to return 
to some type of authoritarian regime which promised active and forceful 
leadership.
H it le r  understood the best manner in which to motivate people and 
to win the ir  allegiance, an understanding which helped him to control 
public opinion. H it le r  capitalized upon the widespread craving for 
social participation among his people. He realized that most people 
desired to f i t  into an organized whole, and that a large majority of the 
German populace would follow his orders without question i f  only they 
could be convinced that they were f u l f i l l in g  some grand historic de­
sign which would benefit the entire German nation. There is no doubt 
that H it le r 's  a b i l i ty  to manage German public opinion so effective ly
allowed him "considerable room for maneuvering," and "enabled him to
271adjust his plans to changing requirements." H it le r  was very success­
ful at making sure that the impact of public opinion would not interfere  
with the conduct of his diplomacy.
Mussolini sim ilarly attempted to control the impact of public 
opinion upon the conduct of his diplomacy. In fact, Mussolini was so 
successful at in s t i l l in g  public enthusiasm for his policies that he
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actually ran the danger of raising the expectations of his people
to the point where he would be forced to act prematurely in order to
avoid endangering the s ta b il i ty  of his regime. As Adrian Lyttelton
points out, "Mussolini could not for years go on indefin ite ly  whipping
272up enthusiasm without taking action." However, like  H it le r ,
Mussolini enjoyed the support of a large majority of his people during 
most of his dictatorship, and as long as he appeared to be successful 
in foreign a ffa irs  he did not have to worry too much about the pressures 
of public opinion.
Both H it le r  and Mussolini conducted the ir  diplomacy d ifferen tly  from 
the Western powers because they held d ifferent views as to the purpose 
of diplomacy in foreign a f fa irs .  Neither H it le r  nor Mussolini agreed 
with the traditional Western diplomatic view that the purpose of 
diplomacy should be the preservation of peace. The only purpose which 
H itle r  accorded to diplomacy was preparation for war, and the only 
purpose which Mussolini accorded to diplomacy was enhancement of his own 
prestige and power.
H it le r  was determined to conduct his diplomacy in a unique and un­
predictable fashion, and in this respect he was very successful. The
"unpredictability of H it le r 's  manner must be counted among his prime
273tricks as a negotiator." H it le r  proved to be a very capable nego­
t ia to r  who could adapt his policies in order to make allowances for  
changing circumstances. He was a master at adapting his policies when­
ever necessary so that he could accomplish his goals. Moreover, since 
H itle r  only valued diplomacy as a means of preparing for war he could
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afford to conduct his foreign policy in a brash and forceful manner. 
There was no need for H it le r  to consult with his experts or to worry 
about the possible consequences of his actions. In his view, even i f  
he fa iled  to accomplish his goals through diplomatic means, this was 
re la t ive ly  unimportant because he fu l ly  intended to launch a war of 
conquest whether his diplomacy proved successful or not. H it le r  was 
firm ly convinced of the necessity and benefits of armed struggle, and 
his sights were aimed at goals that went fa r  beyond what diplomacy 
alone could accomplish.
There is l i t t l e  doubt that Mussolini shared H it le r 's  misguided 
conceptions concerning the purpose of diplomacy. I t  is true that 
Mussolini was more concerned about his personal prestige than about 
launching wars of conquest; however, in Mussolini's view, wars of con­
quest provided the perfect opportunity for increasing his own personal 
prestige. Mussolini, l ik e  H i t le r ,  regarded diplomacy solely as a means 
of advancing his own designs and did not consider the preservation of 
peace as the ultimate goal of foreign policy. In fact, he preferred 
a continual state of conflic t in international a ffa irs  over a peaceful 
status quo because active international disputes would be more l ik e ly  
to open up opportunities for him to advance his own plans. Mussolini 
suffered from an "uncontrollable restlessness" which compelled him to
take advantage of any situation which might "dramatize the dynamic
274character of his policy." He was more concerned with prestige and 
with scoring dramatic foreign policy successes which would enhance 
his own personal regime than with promoting peaceful relations between 
I ta ly  and the other European powers.
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Since Mussolini was primarily concerned with the propaganda 
value of his foreign policy he lost sight of the re a li t ie s  of I ta ly 's  
position in the international arena. He was so determined to demonstrate 
the dynamic character of his foreign policy that he pushed his country 
into costly foreign adventures which i t  could not afford. Mussolini 
wanted an ambitious foreign policy, regardless of the costs, and he 
refused to be restrained by the guidelines of traditional behavior in 
the conduct of his foreign policy. Mussolini valued his diplomacy as 
a means by which he could increase his own power and prestige, however, 
l ike  H it le r ,  Mussolini was to ta l ly  opposed to the Western conception 
that diplomacy should be used to promote peaceful relations between 
nations. He wanted to capitalize upon international conflic t for his 
own benefit, and he was determined to conduct his diplomacy in a manner 
that would allow him to achieve his aims regardless of the unorthodox 
nature of his diplomacy.
Another aspect which made both H it le r 's  and Mussolini's diplomacy 
different from the diplomacy practiced by the Western powers was that 
neither dictator shared the same ideological beliefs as the Western 
leaders. Both dictators based th e ir  p o lit ica l systems upon a new 
ideological framework, and they were determined that the manner in which 
they conducted the ir  diplomacy should re flec t th e ir  new ideological 
beliefs. In short, the aspirations of both dictators went far beyond 
the understanding of the Western statesmen because the ir  goals were 
based upon premises which did not conform to the accepted moral standards 
of traditional European c iv i l iz a t io n . Even Mussolini, who did not place
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as much importance upon ideological factors as H it le r ,  would not be 
content with simple revisionism. Both dictators presented the Western 
powers with achalenge that traditional diplomacy could not resolve 
in a peaceful manner and the statesmen representing the Western powers 
were too reluctant to accept this fact.
There is no doubt that H it le r 's  ambitions went fa r beyond anything 
the European world had ever seen before. H it le r  envisioned an empire 
that would stretch "from the Atlantic to the Urals and from Narvik to 
Suez." In H it le r 's  view, the German nation had the right to secure an 
empire that would encompass the entire European continent at the expense 
of the other Powers, and he was w illing to take any action that would 
help him to accomplish this goal. H it le r  "was always thinking the un­
thinkable," and he was determined to do whatever was necessary in order
275to make re a li ty  conform to his ideological conceptions.
H it le r  was a masterful p o lit ic ian , and he quickly capitalized  
upon the dynamism of nationalistic  motivation in order to convince the 
German people to support his ideological goals. In addition, a 
nationalistic  approach in foreign a ffa irs  proved to be a very successful 
policy to employ because the former victors of the First World War were 
in disagreement as to how they should treat Nazi Germany in order to 
avoid another world war, and H itle r  was able to use this r i f t  between 
former a ll ie s  as a means to advance his own designs. By exploiting 
France's fears and by appealing to England's scruples, H it le r  was able 
to improve Germany's position in relation to the other European powers. 
H itle r  "succeeded in overturning the entire European system of alliances,
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in uniting Germany, and in preparing the ground for his Lebensraum 
policy . " 276
H itle r  was able to use his nationalistic approach to foreign policy
to great benefit; however, he thought d iffe ren tly  about nationalism
than the democratic leaders of the West. In H it le r 's  view, nationalism
was only valid in a racial context. H it le r  believed that " i t  was
impossible to Germanize peoples of another race." Therefore, H it le r
maintained that "non-German races could never be tru ly  Germanized, and
a ll  efforts to do so could only lead to the bastardization and de-
277gradation of the Germanic race." In short, H it le r 's  concept of 
nationalism went far beyond simple geographical expansion. Not only 
did H it le r  want to conquer new German te rr ito ry , but he also wanted to 
ensure the predominance of the Aryan race in the process. In H it le r 's  
mind, both of these objectives were part of one comprehensive plan, and 
neither objective could be accomplished separately. Preservation of the 
Aryan race and te r r i to r ia l  expansion were both part of one ideological 
concept.
H it le r 's  insane sense of logic and his s t r ic t  adherence to ideolo­
gical concepts were both factors which influenced his diplomacy. His 
ideological beliefs combined with his sense of logic encouraged him to 
pursue any ambition, no matter how unrealis tic , to its  ultimate con­
clusion. Mussolini, on the other hand, was not as concerned about 
ideological factors as H it le r .  According to Nolte, H it le r 's  ideas re­
mained almost unchanged from 1924 on and were not "dependent upon 
the vicissitudes of the po lit ica l history of National Socialism."
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Mussolini's ideas, however, were "simultaneously cause and effect of
278the history of Ita lia n  Fascism." For example, as Rich points out,
Mussolini was content to allow "inferior" races to maintain a position
inside his proposed empire as long as they recognized the superiority
of the ir  Ita lia n  masters. H it le r ,  however, was determined to adhere
to the dictates of his ideological beliefs. He was determined to settle
for nothing less than the "enslavement and eventual annihilation of
279r ival races in te rr ito r ie s  conquered by the Germans." H it le r 's  
concept of nationalism was quite d ifferent from anything that his 
predecessors or adversaries might imagine, and he was obviously w illing  
to take whatever measures he considered necessary in order to f u l f i l l  
his ideological vision.
One of the reasons why H it le r  exploited the nationalist emotions of 
the German people was because he believed that a grandiose cause such 
as establishing a new racial order would e l i c i t  more support than a mere 
drive for po lit ica l power. Therefore, H it le r  was more than w illing  to 
make his Lebensraum policy the foundation of his entire ideological 
program. Since his Lebensraum policy was based upon the asumption that 
only the German Aryan race had the moral right to prosper and to survive, 
such a policy, once put into practice, would give him the moral force 
he would need to implement his unorthodox plans. "H it ler did not dwell 
at length on the mortality of German te r r i to r ia l  expansion" according 
to Rich. "After his many years of patrio tic  brooding on the subject, this
O Q Q
was something he ... took for granted."
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H itle r  was determined to achieve his ideological goals and would 
follow any course that looked promising no matter what the consequences 
might involve. Consequently, H it le r  was more than w illing  to launch 
a world war in order to achieve his plans, and this aspect of his 
diplomacy set his system completely a part from the more traditional and 
peaceful diplomacy practiced by the Western powers.
Like H it le r ,  Mussolini presented the Western powers with a 
challenge that traditional diplomacy could not resolve in a peaceful 
manner. He was determined to launch wars of conquest and to build an 
I ta l ia n  empire, and he would follow any course which promised to advance 
his aims. Consequently, Mussolini conducted his diplomacy solely for 
the purpose of adding to his own power, and he to ta l ly  disregarded the 
Western concept that the purpose of diplomacy should be to maintain 
peaceful relations between nation states. I t  is true, that, like  most 
leaders, Mussolini was w illing  to conduct "traditional" diplomacy 
with other nation states, however, he did so only as a means of furthering 
his own personal designs.
In manner similar to that of H it le r ,  Mussolini also capitalized  
upon the nationalistic  emotions of his people in order to consolidate 
support for his foreign policy. Mussolini exploited the opinion of 
many Ita lians that I ta ly  had been betrayed by her a l l ie s  in the 
Versailles peace settlement, and he encouraged his people to support 
his plans for a general revision of the European status quo. Mussolini 
believed that " Ita ly  should detach herself from the plutocratic nations 
and force a revision of the peace treaties through a reapproachment
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281with her former enemies " Mussolini knew that such a policy
would be very popular with many Ita lian s , and he was more than w illing  
to follow such a course because i t  promised to f u l f i l l  his own personal 
designs for armed conquest.
Both H it le r  and Mussolini placed a great deal of importance upon 
the issue of overpopulation and the need to conquer new te rr ito ry  in 
order to ensure the survival of the state. Of course, as Lyttelton 
points out, i t  seemed remarkably inconsistent for Mussolini to insist  
upon the "absolute necessity" of creating an "outlet for surplus 
population" at the same time that he was also encouraging an increase 
in the birth rate in order to provide I ta ly  with more soldiers.
However, as inconsistent as this conduct might appear, Mussolini was 
remarkably successful at convincing Ita lians and foreigners alike that
his expansionist policy was actually necessary for the survival of the
282I ta lia n  state. Moreover, in Mussolini's view, an alliance with 
H it le r ,  who shared his contempt for Western concepts of appropriate 
diplomatic behavior, seemed to promise the best opportunity for ad­
vancing his ideological concepts.
As with H it le r ,  Mussolini's ideological goals went far beyond the 
mere expansion of Ita lia n  te rr ito ry . I t  is true that Mussolini was not 
as successful as H it le r  in advancing his ideological goals, for Mussolini 
simply did not possess the power he needed in order to match H it le r 's  
performance. According to Nolte, i t  was "merely the accident of in­
fe r io r  means of power and a consequent lesser effectiveness" that put
283Mussolini in second place behind H it le r .  Nevertheless, Mussolini 
wanted to create a new society based upon his Fascist principles, and 
as Lowe and Marzari point out in the ir  book, Ita lian  Foreign Policy
1870-1940, the Ita l ia n  "nation became at once the vehicle arid the
objective" of Mussolini1s proposed "social regeneration." Moreover,
since Mussolini based his goal of social regeneration upon Ita lian
nationalism, i t  is not surprising that his policies took the form of
traditional revisionism. Mussolini gradually came to regard re-
284visionism "as the unifying theme of his foreign policy "
However, Mussolini only regarded his revisionist policy as a means to 
remodel the Ita lia n  nation according to his Fascist principles. 
Mussolini's plans for social regeneration went fa r  beyond any com­
parable ideological concepts which the Western powers might regard as 
acceptable behavior in international a ffa irs .
The manner in which both H it le r  and Mussolini conducted their  
diplomacy was a radical departure from the accepted norms of diplo­
matic behavior as practiced by the Western powers. The characteristics 
which set both H it le r 's  and Mussolini's diplomacy apart from the 
diplomacy of the Western powers, as mentioned above, were a ll  mani­
festations of the general change which took place in the character of 
diplomatic behavior a fter the close of the F irst World War. As Gordon 
Craig points out in , The Revolution in War and Diplomacy, the First 
World War dramatically changed the character of international diplomacy
Before 1914, the states which wefe active in 
international a ffa irs  were in general agreement 
about basic things. -Afjter 1918, a ll  that was 
changed. The nations no longer accepted the same 
norms of international behavior, and i t  was often 
true that the ir  representatives used the same 
words in ways quite d ifferent from th e ir  colleagueSpoc 
from other lands.
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Both H it le r  and Mussolini capitalized upon the slowness with 
which the Western powers accepted this change in the character of 
international diplomacy. Both dictators were convinced that they 
could further the ir  aims to a greater extent by violating accepted 
customs and by promoting outrageous falsehoods than by remaining 
true to the traditional norms of diplomatic behavior. In short, 
unlike the Western diplomats, neither H it le r  nor Mussolini were con­
cerned about preserving the peace, and both dictators were quite w illing  
to use m ilita ry  force in order to achieve their aims. Gordon Craig 
describes the state of diplomatic relations between both to ta lita r ian  
dictators and the Western powers in the following manner:
In a sense, the whole period between the two 
world wars was a dialogue des sourds between 
these governments attempting to construct a 
genuine comity of nations... and those 
revolutionary powers that preferred to 
recognize no rules at a ll  or desired to 
retain the freedom to determine when they pafi
would obey rules and when they would break them.
The in a b il i ty  of the Western diplomats to decide upon an appro­
priate response to the new demands placed upon them by to ta li ta r ia n  
diplomacy contributed to the re lative ease with which H it le r  and 
Mussolini took advantage of the Western powers. The Western diplomats 
were hampered in the conduct of the ir  diplomacy by the backlash of the 
revolution in diplomacy which occurred after the First World War. The 
professional diplomats of the Western powers lost the ir  former prestige 
and public support, and they had to relinquish a great deal of their  
responsiblities to incompetent politic ians who were anxious to take
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over the conduct of foreign a ffa irs . Moreover, the older professionals 
were powerless to stop this encroachment of politicians upon their  
f ie ld  of expertise because the politicians had the support of the 
general public.
The revolution in diplomatic practice which followed the First  
World War hampered the a b i l i ty  of the Western diplomats to maintain 
the peace and helped H it le r  and Mussolini to further their expansionist 
plans. The "Second World War was, to a very large degree", writes
Craig, "the direct result of the revolution in diplomacy that had been
287set in motion in the years between 1914 and 1918." The diplomatic 
tactics which H it le r  and Mussolini used in the pursuit of their  goals 
were entire ly  d ifferent from the traditional methods of the past and 
called for an en tire ly  new approach to the conduct of foreign a ffa irs .
The differences between H it le r 's  and Mussolini's diplomacy and 
the traditional diplomacy of the Western powers can be summarized as 
follows: (1) both H it le r  and Mussolini possessed an extraordinary
amount of independence in the conduct of the ir  foreign a ffa irs  as com­
pared to the Western leaders, (2) both dictator's  regimes suffered 
from a lack of professionals in their diplomatic corps, (3) neither 
dictator had to consider the impact of public opinion upon his 
diplomacy to the same degree as the Western diplomats, (4) both H it le r  
and Mussolini held d ifferent views from the Western diplomats as to the 
purpose of diplomacy in foreign a f fa irs ,  and (5) neither dictator shared 
the same ideological beliefs as the Western leaders.
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The nature of to ta li ta r ia n  diplomacy as practiced by H it le r  and 
Mussolini presented a direct challenge to the traditional methods of 
diplomacy as practiced by the Western democracies. Not only were the 
Western diplomats forced to adapt to the changes in diplomatic method 
introduced by such modern pressures as new elaborate departments, 
expanded s ta ffs , enlarged budgets, new personnel policies, and sophisti­
cated inventions, but they were also forced to confront a direct 
challenge to the very purpose of diplomacy which formed the universal 
basis for a l l  international negotiations. Both H it le r  and Mussolini 
accepted warfare as a necessary ingredient of national policy, and 
they were both confident that they could achieve their goals by the 
proper exercise of m ilita ry  force.
The fa ilu re  of the Western diplomats to recognize H it le r 's  and 
Mussolini's contempt for the values of traditional diplomatic practice 
gave both dictators an advantage over the ir  Western counterparts. 
Moreover, the fa ilu re  to counter the challenges which both H it le r  
and Mussolini presented to traditional diplomacy by adopting suitable 
countermeasures clearly demonstrated the in a b il i ty  of traditional 
diplomacy to cope with the unique problems which to ta li ta r ia n  diplomacy 
introduced to international relations.
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